Kruw

Anyone can create money, the challenge is getting people to accept it.

BIP119
assumevalid=0
mempoolfullrbf=1

Public Key

npub1pww7030g95nv9ptfpgfu69jpfxj6pm33xxueztsupwekce45wx4sm6en60

NIP-57 Address

kruw@stacker.news

Profile Code

nprofile1qqsqh808ch5z6fkzs45s5y7dzeq5nfdqaccnrwv39cwqhvmvv668r2cpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcpzemhxue69uhk2er9dchxummnw3ezumrpdejz7upau5k

Publishing to

relay.primal.net

eden.nostr.land

Author Public Key

npub1pww7030g95nv9ptfpgfu69jpfxj6pm33xxueztsupwekce45wx4sm6en60

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Last Notes

2024-08-17 23:35:11

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You get on chain privacy by default when you use Wasabi Wallet or BTCPay Server's coinjoin plugin.

2024-07-07 20:44:03

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Any time, it triggers whenever there are enough participants ready at the end of the hour.

2024-06-15 10:22:32

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No.

2024-06-11 08:15:19

Testing out a new Lightning wallet, first 3 people who respond to this note get zapped.

2024-06-05 18:56:54

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And coinjoin to make your labels go away 😃

2024-06-04 12:11:45

Getting a few coinjoins over 100 inputs now: https://mempool.space/tx/61a089907936744552b6f2376a03184a95efa4748687265fa8b58eca9bbf6190

2024-06-02 00:58:17

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Just paste `https://btcpay.kruw.io/plugins/wabisabi-coordinator` into the coordinator box in your client.
https://image.nostr.build/891d918f4645a13c850e25e3fdbf8c3baac98ab46f139b448922e38d318d4232.jpg

2024-06-02 00:44:32

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Wasabi fixes this. You gain complete privacy thanks to BIP157/BIP158, Tor, and coinjoins.

2024-06-02 00:43:40

Farewell 🫡
I am coordinating coinjoins for Wasabi, yoy can connect to my coordinator with
https://btcpay.kruw.io/plugins/wabisabi-coordinator/
#nevent1q…e90s

2024-05-27 19:33:11

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Wasabi Wallet x2

2024-05-16 17:41:24

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What "disclaimers"? 🤣 Samourai explicitly deceived people into leaking their xpubs by falsely claiming their wallet was "full node software": https://twitter.com/SamouraiWallet/status/1576923638846005248

2024-05-15 22:32:17

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Why would hashers switch if they make more by not switching and taking the money instead?

2024-05-14 23:50:11

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What difference does it make if your money is stolen from you slowly and steadily?

2024-05-14 23:43:00

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Most importantly:
- Run a coinjoin coordinator (https://docs.btcpayserver.org/Wabisabi/#running-a-coordinator)

2024-05-04 17:19:18

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No toxic change with with Wasabi or BTCPay Server either 😎
Whirlpool was the only offender that peeled toxic change 🍌

2024-04-28 01:26:55

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Size of coinjoins is more important than frequency of coinjoins. Having a 100 input coinjoin every 10 blocks is better than having a 5 input coinjoin every block.
That said, Wasabi is pumping out coinjoins just as fast as ever: https://image.nostr.build/9b7f33c81940357142dfbbfc90e5a6f5ecdcc540e8933bbe2c6363f06ddb44b5.jpg

2024-03-19 18:30:54

I designed this 😄
The "1 beer" pathways aren't written yet and there's a lot of bugs with the final outcome being incorrect, but it's a fun project!
#nevent1q…wpjj

2024-03-19 18:24:27

When Bitcoin wins, you will be able to buy guns out of a vending machine.
#nevent1q…zx2a

2024-03-17 09:40:00

Worked on a fun project this weekend. It had me stressed because the due date is soon and I didn't know whether it would work for certain until I after got 20+ hours into the design phase.

2024-03-15 23:18:19

Listening to the Bitcoin Optech podcast, Murch refers to BIP157/158 filters as a "table of contents of what's in the block". Pretty solid metaphor.

2024-03-12 19:44:56

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They should at least be formal enough to say "Hello world".

2024-01-28 14:49:32

Get rid of phone numbers.
#nevent1q…s2d3

2024-01-22 14:15:38

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To change coordinators in Wasabi, you add the URI to your config file. Coordinator discovery can be done with Nostr: #nevent1q…u30t

2024-01-22 12:19:39

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It depends on the settings the user chooses. Each individual decides which coordinators they connect to and whether they want to cross mix.

2024-01-21 21:43:45

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You can choose any WabiSabi coordinator with either BTCPay Server's coinjoin plugin or Wasabi Wallet.

2024-01-21 17:54:33

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Did you install the coinjoin plugin? The discover coordinators and publish coordinator buttons are right there on the first menu:
https://image.nostr.build/7ac0aaebe1d566941b2e1e46c0234774cf0e916eb6e8348223e1d2d5d92cbeb8.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=507x531&blurhash=%7C24Lq8%3F0.QR7R%25X4R7XgIB%3F%40v%3At%24MzbYoyj0kmMf%25yZ%3AtiR7R%25bEaMtja5J4H%5Bb%3Bj0tQoyaOtPj0I-Dkbrn%2CoybFRQoynm9YD%25RjoMt6ayWBoft7DjInRQt6t7j%5Ba%7BafoyR8braNtQj%5DafbYaMoyMeXfR8o%7BjcjboxV%5BkU&x=93e1bca399c420bb6402f04377863f960aa600b7914e0845a35f35a282420870
https://image.nostr.build/23beca74e1bec799f724b1f6ac8c3ddc10c02b8fbba87c451f29d97e1508441e.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=502x311&blurhash=r442%3Bb-%3Bx%5B*ERjM%7BpXV%5BVuw6.j%25_Q%3DpCk%2BR7oxoyyUZ-Vbt%24R7RRo%7BjIjbZpnTa4MNRQV%5BVukBoyijnAZ.Q%3DR8VuVuaybFf%7EQ%3BVbtQi%25aOoxV%5BWB&x=fd1af524de0319308a7a2569054c492558f0d619b0943cad18d295635c6ab3d2

2024-01-21 13:48:01

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That's like saying no one should use Nostr because a single relay censors notes. Anyone can run a WabiSabi coordinator just like anyone can run a Nostr relay, stop blaming the protocol for the actions of a single user of that protocol.

2024-01-21 12:49:22

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Yes, it's a very important detail that WabiSabi does not incentivize free Sybil attacks like Whirlpool does: In Whirlpool, the victims of Sybil attacks pay for the block space used by an attacker, who remixes for completely free. WabiSabi is more resilient to Sybil attacks because the attacker has to pay for the block space they use.

2024-01-21 12:44:44

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Yes, the list of WabiSabi coordinators is published to Nostr so anyone can discover and add them. And yes, BTCPay Server's coinjoin plugin has cross mixing between coordinators built in as a feature.

2024-01-21 02:17:02

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I think that project has long been deprecated. I use BTCPay Server's coinjoin plugin to run my WabiSabi coordinator, you can enable it with 1 click.

2024-01-21 02:14:26

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While the naive per round privacy expectations from Whirlpool are objectively smaller than WabiSabi (5 input minimum in Whirlpool compared to 150 input minimum in WabiSabi), that's just an implementation detail. There's no coordinator fee charged for remixing using zkSNACKs' WabiSabi coordinator either.
The advancement that makes the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol so much better is that you gain COMPLETE privacy on your coins, whereas Whirlpool links your transactions together due to common input ownership being revealed and toxic change being created during the premix transaction.
WabiSabi coinjoins gives the same privacy UX to Bitcoin as Monero does to Monero 🎭 The only exception is if you are the largest whale in your coinjoin round - since Bitcoin does not have confidential transactions, a whale's coins might require multiple remixes before gaining full privacy.
You can read more from the mailing list post if you enjoy the technical details: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-April/020202.html

2024-01-20 14:19:11

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...why would you pay more in fees to get worse privacy using Whirlpool?

2024-01-20 09:02:56

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WabiSabi coinjoins cost far less in mining fees and provide superior privacy compared to Whirlpool since there's no toxic change created and no common input ownership revealed. You can participate in WabiSabi coinjoins with BTCPay Server's coinjoin plugin, Trezor's coinjoin account, or Wasabi Wallet for desktop.

2024-01-19 16:42:44

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Needs WabiSabi coinjoin stats!

2024-01-17 23:28:01

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Huntingsats.com
There's another wallet cracking bounty going out soon 😏

2024-01-07 16:50:07

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A DISCUSSION ABOUT BITCOIN PRIVACY IS NEVER "NOT WORTH CONTINUING".
YOU'VE SPENT 20 POSTS ARGUING ABOUT SYBIL ATTACKS (that don't apply whatsoever if the coordinator is part of your threat model) WITHOUT EVER ADDRESSING HOW TX0 PREMIXING WASTES BLOCK SPACE AND HARMS PRIVACY COMPARED TO DOING A CUTHROUGH TRANSACTION:
https://image.nostr.build/14026e01cbbd0981d24e2b4866265f026b92bc584d9e2dc16acf1d641a4b69ef.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=1544x1491&blurhash=%7C8SF%40R%25M%7EqMy%25hgLogt8wgtRM_D%25xvR%24xv-qV%40oNxbbakCoLR*aejZWUj%5Bxuj%5D%25MWURQWANFoMW-%3FcMxIU%25gNFWExuRjRkM%7BX7xbnQR%2BbEWBX7spf%2CxakBIonjazWBxHNssEt7kCRPtQV%5BM%7BxuRjIUof%25LRkV%40oeWCWAog&x=3226e49be19cf5640fddfd6ca3bccf5b980d5202c66abdcbe16ee69572319df1

2024-01-07 16:39:19

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NO, THEY WOULD PAY LESS IN FEES, AS I CALCULATED ABOVE:
#nevent1q…0ye3
THIS FLOODING DISCOUNT FOR SYBIL ATTACKERS DOESN'T EVEN STOP AT 10 UTXOS, IT GOES TO 70 UTXOS IN THE 1M-50M SAT POOLS!

2024-01-07 16:12:44

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YOU HAVE IT LITERALLY BACKWARDS. FLOODING COSTS LESS IN COORDINATOR FEES THAN CONSOLIDATING, GIVING SYBIL ATTACKERS AN UPPER HAND OVER HONEST USERS:
Let's say you have 10 million sats. If you flood the 1 million sat pool with 10 UTXOs, you pay 100k sats to the coordinator. If you only create 2 UTXOs and participate in the 5 million sat pool, you pay 175k sats to the coordinator. THE FLOODER PAYS LESS TO THE COORDINATOR THAN THE HONEST USER.
You still haven't even made an attempt to address the main issue which has nothing to do with Whirlpool's backward coordinator fee incentives - the REAL issue is how premixing needlessly consumes block space while HARMING the privacy gains of coinjoin participants:
https://image.nostr.build/14026e01cbbd0981d24e2b4866265f026b92bc584d9e2dc16acf1d641a4b69ef.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=1544x1491&blurhash=%7C8SF%40R%25M%7EqMy%25hgLogt8wgtRM_D%25xvR%24xv-qV%40oNxbbakCoLR*aejZWUj%5Bxuj%5D%25MWURQWANFoMW-%3FcMxIU%25gNFWExuRjRkM%7BX7xbnQR%2BbEWBX7spf%2CxakBIonjazWBxHNssEt7kCRPtQV%5BM%7BxuRjIUof%25LRkV%40oeWCWAog&x=3226e49be19cf5640fddfd6ca3bccf5b980d5202c66abdcbe16ee69572319df1

2024-01-07 15:43:15

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That's the note ABOVE my reply (which remains unaddressed), not a note BELOW it:
#nevent1q…qr0t
Coordinator fees do not protect you at all against a Sybil attacker if the coordinator is part of your threat model 🙄
Mining fees are protect you against a Sybil attacker, and Whirlpool is especially vulnerable to Sbil attacks because THE ATTACK VICTIMS PAY THE MINING FEES FOR THE BLOCK SPACE USED BY ATTACKERS.
The coordinator fee incentives of tx0 give Sybil attackers an advantage over regular users because they get a DISCOUNTED COORDINATOR FEE for splitting their coins and participating in more rounds compared to consolidating into bigger pools.
The worst part is, none of this Sybil attack discussion even remotely touches the original point, which is how premixing is HARMING privacy while WASTING block space:
https://image.nostr.build/14026e01cbbd0981d24e2b4866265f026b92bc584d9e2dc16acf1d641a4b69ef.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=1544x1491&blurhash=%7C8SF%40R%25M%7EqMy%25hgLogt8wgtRM_D%25xvR%24xv-qV%40oNxbbakCoLR*aejZWUj%5Bxuj%5D%25MWURQWANFoMW-%3FcMxIU%25gNFWExuRjRkM%7BX7xbnQR%2BbEWBX7spf%2CxakBIonjazWBxHNssEt7kCRPtQV%5BM%7BxuRjIUof%25LRkV%40oeWCWAog&x=3226e49be19cf5640fddfd6ca3bccf5b980d5202c66abdcbe16ee69572319df1

2024-01-07 15:28:03

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What's the note ID? I don't see it.

2024-01-07 15:23:13

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Haha Matt, if you really feel that way,
I'll oblige your test and reply to every one of your posts until you finally address Whirlpool's vulnerabilities to Sybil attacks, and how Whirlpool's tx0 needlessly wastes block space while damaging the privacy of coinjoin participants:
#nevent1q…qr0t

2024-01-04 00:55:13

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You can consolidate those inputs privately in a WabiSabi coinjoin. If you want amounts over 100k sats, then you should use the coinjoin plugin for BTCPay Server which lets you specify the minimum output amount.
https://image.nostr.build/63b5d935c204cec4bd2b54216d495a5efdbd8f1cae42231c08b06aa6e7e25bda.jpg

2023-12-30 21:32:47

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It's the free market. If you don't like it, then bid more.

2023-12-25 23:10:51

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If you enter a coinjoin round with only a single (nonprivate) input, you should avoid consolidating all outputs from that round in a single transaction. A "Safety coinjoin" will automatically begin under this scenario to remix those outputs, which inhibits guessing using this consolidation heuristic: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/issues/10567

2023-12-22 23:31:45

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You have no response to my technical points explaining why Whirlpool is the worst coinjoin implementation.

2023-12-22 08:14:53

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Whirlpool is the WORST coinjoin implementation in Bitcoin. It creates "toxic change" which can be tracked.
Better coinjoin implementations like WabiSabi and JoinMarket were not affected by OCEAN's filters because they don't waste extra block space with "premixing" like Whirlpool does.

2023-12-19 21:57:21

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This claim is easily defeated by using the same line of reasoning that frustrates the Keynesian inflators: If printing 1 trillion is good for the economy, then printing 10 trillion must be EVEN BETTER for the economy, right? If $15 minimum wage is good solves poverty, then a $100 minimum wage is EVEN BETTER, right?
So, if premixing with tx0 "improves Sybil resistance", then premixing 5 times with tx0, tx1, tx2, tx3, and tx4 is even BETTER, right?

2023-12-19 15:13:18

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You sent me a "wall of text" about Sybil attacks that has nothing to do with tx0 needlessly wasting block space. Tx0 even HARMS user privacy in edge cases:
https://image.nostr.build/14026e01cbbd0981d24e2b4866265f026b92bc584d9e2dc16acf1d641a4b69ef.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=1544x1491&blurhash=%7C8SF%40R%25M%7EqMy%25hgLogt8wgtRM_D%25xvR%24xv-qV%40oNxbbakCoLR*aejZWUj%5Bxuj%5D%25MWURQWANFoMW-%3FcMxIU%25gNFWExuRjRkM%7BX7xbnQR%2BbEWBX7spf%2CxakBIonjazWBxHNssEt7kCRPtQV%5BM%7BxuRjIUof%25LRkV%40oeWCWAog&x=3226e49be19cf5640fddfd6ca3bccf5b980d5202c66abdcbe16ee69572319df1
Much like the Keynesians are not able to formulate an answer as to "How does printing more paper make society richer", Whirlpoolers are not able to answer "How does premixing make privacy better?"
https://youtu.be/QJwmMu15Exc

2023-12-19 06:41:35

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Glad we can finally have this open conversation:
"Both Samourai & Wasabi attempt to make this type of attack expensive by incorporating a coinjoin fee."
This is incorrect. In Samourai’s Whirlpool, the attack victims pay the fees for the block space consumed by attackers since the attacker only pays in their the initial round. In Wasabi, attackers must ALWAYS pay for their own block space.
"Wasabi actually has a reverse incentive that rewards them with higher fee revenue if they attempt to sybil or pump liquidity into the system since fees by users scale up with the number of utxos in a round."
This is an implementation detail that is no longer the case in Wasabi 2.0. Instead, there’s a flat 0.3% fee (only charged on inputs over 1 million sats) and never any coordinator fee for remixing.
"Wasabi is also setup in a way that allows participants to choose which rounds they participate in which can allow an external sybil attacker to pick and choose which rounds to attack based on their desired target. This reduces the cost of an attempted sybil attack. Samourai on the other hand does not allow users to choose their rounds. Round selection is random."
This is incorrect, in Samourai, round selection is not random, it is performed by a trusted third party.
"Furthermore, if you attempt to run multiple clients simultaneously - which is what an attacker would do - you pay a higher effective fee then if you run a single client."
This is incorrect. If you split into more UTXOs to enter a smaller pool instead of a larger pool, Samourai charges a lower coordinator fee percentage. This gives Sybil attackers who want to flood the queue an economic advantage over users who are trying to gain privacy.
"Another important piece of information is that the more coinjoin rounds you do, the more difficult it is to be the victim of a sybil attack since the attacker will need to be in every round. Samourai provides an incentive to remix while remixing in wasabi costs more in fees."
As mentioned before, Whirlpool is uniquely vulnerable to Sybil attacks because the attack victims pay for the block space used by the attackers. In Wasabi, block space is always paid for by the user who consumes it, fixing this misaligned incentive.
"There are two types of samourai users. Those who use their own node and those who trust samourai's node. If you don't use your own node then you trust samourai with your transaction history but not IP address(es) since the wallet defaults to Tor."
This is incorrect, Samourai has Tor off by default.

2023-12-18 00:48:19

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I just read the doc, it didn't explain at all why you would do a premix trasaction. You can go directly from the deposit account to the postmix account, premixing first just wastes block space (and hurts your privacy).

2023-12-18 00:06:51

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Okay @npub1qny…95gx, let's have the conversation instead of avoiding it this time:
https://image.nostr.build/7f6f8f19033641f9b23854e481ae57ce08aba7167a241de0b593519069a8f804.jpg#m=image%2Fjpeg&dim=1077x1755&blurhash=%5E25E%3AA_NE0R.RkV%40%3FvSiI%3AR*M%7CofxuWVbIj%5BWAofyDo%7EkrX9R*WBK4KPcFOsNGae%3FbogM%7BWBV%40fk%24%25aKV%40s9oet7yEtlt7ozWqV%40xv%25Mxtt7ogWB&x=0e96aa50af2c24d2232ac553e3ee24b82d83da6e15a0ddf562048287bdcea4be

2023-12-17 17:36:05

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Whirlpool makes the situation horribly worse by wasting block space with "premix" and "postmix" transactions 💩
WabiSabi coinjoins allow you to mix and send directly to your destination in a single transaction, without leaking common input ownership and without creating any unspendable "toxic change" 🎭

2023-12-12 11:33:25

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Then I'm happy you're about to switch back to Wasabi since Samourai uses a fixed fee address: https://web.archive.org/web/20231025112815/https://code.samourai.io/wallet/samourai-wallet-android/-/issues/462

2023-12-12 02:59:10

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Mixing already splits up the coins, and you can pay the fee directly in the mix. Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, Trezor, and JoinMarket all do this already.

2023-12-11 13:41:09

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Tx0 does not increase the fungibility of coins, it's a self spend transaction without other participants. No other coinjoin implementation creates this waste.

2023-12-09 04:45:58

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I fully agree there's no reason to limit OP_RETURN. But that doesn't excuse Whirlpool wasting block space for no reason.

2023-12-09 01:39:13

Notice how OCEAN isn't filtering other coinjoin transactions? It's crazy how many people don't understand that you DON'T need OP_RETURN to coinjoin. Samourai/Sparrow's Whirlpool tx0 is literally unnecessary spam garbage.

2023-12-09 01:27:53

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You do not need OP_RETURN or a "prep" transaction to coinjoin. Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, Trezor, and JoinMarket all do coinjoin transactions WITHOUT spamming the chain with tx0 transactions.

2023-12-09 01:23:33

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Kortik, what are you talking about?... Samourai reuses addresses for fee collection, tx0 does nothing to stop that: https://web.archive.org/web/20231025112815/https://code.samourai.io/wallet/samourai-wallet-android/-/issues/462

2023-12-09 01:18:45

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Sparrow is behind Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, and Trezor in upgrading to the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol 😒

2023-12-08 13:28:29

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Just became a 100k sat mortal. I'll take a size M.

2023-12-06 17:42:16

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WabiSabi coinjoins solve the toxic change and common input ownership problems of Whirlpool, it's a massive improvement in block space efficiency and privacy.

2023-10-02 16:23:33

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Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, and Trezor have the largest and most private coinjoins. Unlike Whirlpool, there is no common input ownership revealed, no totic change to trace, and there's no coordinator fees charged for any inputs 1m sats or lower.
https://youtu.be/UbOAbXjzBJg?feature=shared

2023-07-30 00:57:11

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If a coordinator refuses to include your UTXO because of a chain analysis company's opinion, you can use a different coordinator or run your own since everything is open source. Wasabi is designed so there is never a risk to the user's data even if the coordinator is malicious.

2023-07-29 01:54:44

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In addition to eliminating doxxic change, Wasabi's coinjoins also hide common input ownership. Huge step forward in Bitcoin privacy.

2023-06-27 00:12:06

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You can use Wasabi wallet for coinjoins and remix whenever you want since you pay for your own mining fees. You won't have to pay the coordinator any extra fees for remixing though.

2023-06-16 10:38:47

I took a couple week break from nostr by accident... I signed out of my client by mistake while traveling to another continent 🫣

2023-05-20 10:07:20

Wasabi coinjoins are like taking the bus.
Joinmarket coinjoins are like taking a taxi.

2023-04-19 20:02:28

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I tried this approach, but the opinion of the Samourai developers is that privacy MUST be opt-in by default, not opt-out by default. They said any PR to make privacy features enabled by default would not be merged: https://code.samourai.io/wallet/samourai-wallet-android/-/issues/458

2023-04-13 13:02:42

A false notification (1) bubble that won't go away is the absolute worst bug.

2023-04-08 15:03:07

Progress on silent payments:
https://twitter.com/provoost/status/1644375531872239616

2023-04-04 15:29:05

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The claims made in this thread include some that are false and presented with no proof or arguments, alongside some useful descriptions of potential attacks and edge cases that can cause less than perfect privacy. Here’s a line-by-line rebuttal:
_____________________
"1) Wasabi's funding and willing usage of chain surveillance companies puts your on-chain data at risk when you use them. This usage of CA could ... lead to harming your privacy directly"
_____________________
This is simply false, Wasabi wallet never puts your on-chain data at risk:
-Your IP address is never linked to your addresses because Tor is used by default
-Your addresses are never linked to each other because client side block filters are used by default.
Any "usage of chain surveillance companies" by coinjoin coordinators would mean a coordinator is BUYING their data, not SELLING data to them since Wasabi is designed not to reveal any user data.
By comparison, Samourai wallet DOES put your on-chain data at risk:
-By default, all of your addresses are linked together (even the private addresses of your equal output coinjoins) and sent to Samourai's server, which becomes a honeypot of data.
-By default, Tor is not enabled.
_____________________
"1a) Usage of CA could also easily be turned into a honeypot where "bad inputs" automatically get sent to mix with only Sybil inputs, providing 0 privacy but not showing that in your client."
_____________________
A malicious coordinator can attempt to Sybil attack a target input no matter what coinjoin protocol is used. WabiSabi is especially resilient to Sybil attacks, while Whirlpool is especially susceptible to them,
It's possible to perform this attack with some sort of reliability on a 5 input coinjoin like Whirlpool, especially if the coordinator knows the xpub of other users in the round, turning those users into unwilling attackers as well. The cost of a Sybil attack in Whirlpool is reduced to a one time payment because an attacker’s mining fees for remixes are paid by the victims of the attack.
In WabiSabi, the potential for this attack is also mitigated by the 150+ input size of the round, requiring an enormous amount of luck and liquid capital to even attempt. The attacker would need to get lucky for the target to register their non private input first in order for the malicious coordinator to know to fill the round with 149 dummy inputs and exclude registration from any unknown inputs. In order for this attack to ever succeed, the malicious coordinator would have to be enormously well capitalized and liquid (coins that are unconfirmed cannot be registered) to control that many UTXOs and pay their mining fees.
With WabiSabi, the target of the attack would be also able to detect the malicious coordinator when they try to register their second input (which would be rejected). With Whirlpool, the target would not be able to detect a malicious coordinator this way since they are limited to registering a single input in a round.
Wasabi 1.0 and 2.0 clients are also able to detect/prevent this attack in an additional way since a unique "Satoshi" Tor identity is used by the client to get the round status, which is not connected to "Alice" Tor identities used for input registration.
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"2) WabiSabi as a protocol is only a tool for aggregating inputs where each input/output is blinded from the coordinator, and is not in any way a Coinjoin protocol - it is merely the input aggregation portion of one.
As such, the specifics of the WW2 protocol are unclear."
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It is simply false that WabiSabi is not a coinjoin protocol.
Aggregating inputs privately is a cryptographic advancement made possible by the WabiSabi protocol, but aggregation is not required, you can still register with a single input. By enabling private consolidation, WabiSabi's properties grant the side effect of making outputs that are larger than a smaller single input a potential link since the larger output could have been created from a consolidation of inputs below the output value, not just created by inputs bigger than the output value.
Since input selection and output selection is done by the client instead of the coordinator, there is a specific deterministic process (with added randomness) to get clients to to choose outputs of the same amount by using a frequency table generated from a template of inputs registered to the round and their values: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-April/020202.html
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"3) There is currently *zero* way to verify the privacy provided by a given mixing round in WW2, and even Wasabi themselves don't seem to understand how their "anon score" metric works.
If you can't verify the privacy you get, you *should not trust it*."
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The privacy metric is verifiable, both implementations consider outputs private by using the same method. WabiSabi participants and Whirlpool participants use the number of other outputs in the coinjoin that share an equal value to determine how private it is. The only way your anonymity score will increase in Wasabi's client is if your output has a value matching others in the round.
Although measuring and quantifying the minimum privacy gain is easy, the dispute among Wasabi contributors themselves is how to quantify the additional privacy gains that are created by the composition and decomposition possibilities of WabiSabi, which is a novel property of the protocol. Since there is no consensus on finding a way to measure the exact privacy gained from these combinations, they are ignored entirely, and do not adjust your score to be any higher. This means Wasabi clients will always underestimate how private your output is and will never overestimate how private your output is.
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"4) "Lonely whales" (i.e. those with larger amounts of Bitcoin) can often gain *zero* privacy in mixes and have 100% deterministic links between their inputs and outputs.
Have seen as little as 6 BTC gaining no privacy from mixing rounds."
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6 BTC significantly surpasses the potential values that can be made private in a Whirlpool coinjoin. The maximum value of Whirlpool inputs is only 0.5 BTC, which is far lower than the 6 BTC whale you observed creating change.
If a whale output (or any output) gains zero privacy from a round, then the wallet will not identify that output as private. Any non private output can simply be remixed again without paying additional coordinator fees.
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"5) Due to the client + coordinator not learning amounts chosen by participants in rounds, you can never be sure that a mixing round provides you with any privacy, as it's always possible no one selects the same amounts as you, providing an anon set of 1 (your input/output)."
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This unlikely (but possible) result will cause the output to register to be remixed.
Even though this standalone output still gains real privacy in the real world (if it is not the whale), the client is not able to measure this privacy gain, so it just gives it the minimum anon score of 1.
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"6) The usage "big TX = good privacy" in Wasabi marketing is BS, as the only thing that matters for privacy in a transaction is the potential outputs to match your inputs.
That is really only the outputs that share a denomination with your output, not all outputs in a TX."
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An output (if it is not the whale) cannot be matched to an input even if there are no other outputs sharing the denomination.
If you think this claim is "marketing BS", then go ahead prove it by identifying the input that created this output: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru
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"7) If the creators of this purported privacy tool don't know how to measure the privacy provided by their protocol, it should raise red flags for you.
Not knowing how your own protocol actually provides privacy opens up so many potential implementation flaws."
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The minimum privacy gained can be measured, only the maximum privacy gained cannot be measured. There is no downside to gaining more privacy in the real world than your client is able to detect, quantify, and display.
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"8) There is a *long* history of tracing of Wasabi's previous implementation due to flaws in protocol and flaws in implementation,
so we should be incredibly wary of trusting privacy claims until 100% proven over time."
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[Citation needed] You provided *zero* examples of this "long history of flaws" you claim exist.
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"9) There remain *zero* post-mix spending tools in Wasabi, something that is absolutely vital to actually gaining privacy from Coinjoins when spending Bitcoin. Even if the protocol was perfect this would lead to many privacy issues and ‘foot guns’."
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This is simply false. You can use Wasabi for post-mix Payjoin transactions.
But WabiSabi is so flexible that you shouldn't settle for "post-mix" tools at all: Since there is no fixed standard denomination set by the coordinator, you can send payments DIRECTLY to the receiver INSIDE a 150-400 input coinjoin transaction so that the receiver never even learns the input addresses or the change address of the sender.
It gets even more incredible. The key verified anonymous credentials (ecash tokens) issued by the coordinator can be used as a completely private second layer for Bitcoin. This allows Bitcoin payments to be made so privately that the sender does not even learn the address of the receiver: https://twitter.com/MrKukks/status/1619294492854747138
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"This thread comes after spending many hours digging into the WabiSabi protocol, their documentation, and speaking with them at length.
I have no personal beef with Wasabi but try to remain open to learning from new approaches and wanted to give WabiSabi a fair shake."
_____________________
I hope that you will use the information you learned from this response thread to issue corrections to the original.
_____________________
"As a note to Thibaud and others I spoke with on the Space last week, that was not merely recon or similar, I genuinely wanted to learn and thought that would be a good place.
Unfortunately I didn't really get much mic time or many questions answered and it felt like marketing."
_____________________
In hindsight, it would have been great if there were time budgeted for an audience Q&A. Perhaps you can gather questions from your audience and strongest Samourai warriors to ask a WabiSabi expert about on your podcast.

2023-03-26 03:04:06

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I can only thing of one instance in which merging post mix coins could create a near deterministic link, which would be if you sent a single UTXO to an empty wallet, coinjoined for a single round, then swept the resulting UTXOs to cold storage.
This edge case correlation is prevented if you register a second UTXO (especially if the second UTXO is already private), remix any UTXO from the first round, or merge your coins in two separate transactions when spending.

2023-03-26 01:53:33

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What sort of actions in Wasabi would undo the benefits of your coinjoin? If you have both non-private and private coins in your wallet at the same time, the wallet selects your private inputs when making a payment.

2023-03-18 14:54:00

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If you unwittingly and unknowingly received coins from a nefarious actor identified by a coordinator, then nothing happens. That UTXO just sits there in the original address instead of being coinjoined.
This does not affect the user's privacy in any way whatsoever: All the user has to do is switch to a different coordinator who doesn't consider this coin to be a risk to their business or their customers, and coinjoin it with them instead.

2023-03-18 14:29:49

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The implied tradeoff is that there are less occurrences of each standard denomination compared to WW1/Whirlpool which forces every participant to create the same size standard denomination: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/privacy-guarantees-of-wasabi-wallet-2-0/
However, this tradeoff is overwhelmingly negated once the round gets large enough; Since there is no 1:1 ratio of participants to standard amounts of a single size like WW1 or Whirlpool, observers have to consider all the possible compositions and decompositions of ANY input and ANY output.
Since zkSNACKS has a minimum of 150 inputs per round (up to 400), the possibilities break your calculator:
https://nostr.build/i/nostr.build_de4ce4c4a892d04a03a44d2c59e058b4b3cb13a9123ed787ba221f113a614c02.png

2023-03-17 19:54:07

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I am shilling Wasabi.
As you can see from the amounts and addresses I posted above, Whirlpool has a known flaw allowing you can find the leftover coins and new addresses of people who enter the Whirlpool by looking at the tx0 self spend.
Wasabi does not have this flaw. ALL your coins are made private, there is no "bad bank" or "toxic change" leftover. People who send you coins in Wasabi only ever know the address they sent to, cannot identify any of your other addresses:
#[8]

2023-03-16 12:52:28

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Kortik, you are lying again. Every single line of Wasabi's coordinator code is free and open source software, ANYONE can run their own coordinator just like they can run their own wallet: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/tree/master/WalletWasabi.Backend

2023-03-14 23:47:12

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Doxxic change is NOT a requirement for equal outputs to exist. Wasabi Wallet's coinjoins eliminate traceable change, which entirely solves Whirlpool's issue of creating unspendable non private coins: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/toxic-change-wabisabi-bitcoin-coinjoin-privacy

2023-03-12 06:43:30

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I think that's a very cool feature how all of the Wasabi Wallet code is open source, including the backend coordinator.
Where can I find the open source code for running my own Whirlpool coordinator? How does a user change which coordinator they coinjoin with in Samourai Wallet?

2023-03-11 11:15:37

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Wasabi 2.0 did not add chain analysis. Your IP address is always masked by Tor and your xpub is always masked by block filters, and all the code is open source so you can verify this for yourself: https://github.com/zkSnacks/WalletWasabi

2023-03-10 20:01:41

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I asked a dev, his guess is that you have the "Coinjoin time preference" setting preventing you from joining while fees are higher than normal. If you have it set to "Days", "Weeks", or "Months", change it to "Hours" instead.

2023-03-10 15:32:45

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Is that the exact message in the progress box at the bottom of the screen? Or does it say "Waiting for confirmed funds"?

2023-03-09 15:16:50

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You do reveal new information: tx0 shows multiple payments were sent to the same user since they are consolidated before entering the coinjoin. Each of the entities that sent these payments become aware of each other as well as aware of new addresses that you own that none of them interacted with at all, which is both the doxxic change address as well as the addresses of the first equal sized output you create to enter the first round.
WabiSabi coinjoins hide all this information since every transaction is a coinjoin instead of revealing these links through the self spending tx0. Multiple payments can't be deterministically linked to the same user with WabiSabi since your inputs are consolidated within a coinjoin instead of consolidated in a self spend. No doxxic change is created either in WabiSabi coinjoins unless a whale submits a non private input worth more than the rest of the round's participants combined.

2023-03-09 14:47:21

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I like Wasabi Wallet most due to its zero knowledge design. It provides Bitcoin privacy by default since it uses Tor to mask your IP address and client side block filters to find your balance from the blockchain without leaking your wallet's previously used addresses or unused addresses to any third parties.
The most impressive feature is the WabiSabi coinjoins that run passively in the background. These coinjoins fully prevent any on chain links from being created between any two payments you receive as well as hiding the source of your funds from any future payments you send.
Here's a demonstration: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbOAbXjzBJg
In this video, the address that received coins from "Alice" (bc1qektmga2cn487jm8h3jf96hkp22cda2hn40myk2) and the address that received coins from "Bob" (bc1q0d9z8epkmud0nyycm6gdp3just6hl4vvsk6s4x) both got coinjoined with 285 other inputs from other users in tx ea3d037b16f72afbbb29170511f93af390bd42911931a94f6c13161204884f44 without revealing both addresses belonged to the same wallet.
The payment sent to "Carol" (bbe3436287f19cbd9a3df5abdc4871e87137831be23dea2763b557064b06f900) was made from addresses bc1qvax8ea5h49sd284vfp73ywqgrh4mqr3p23pvql and bc1qgsjl0k3mlnls7a7jmga5u3x9630d0xpnwxx7tq which have no deterministic links to the addresses that Alice and Bob paid, since they were made private by the coinjoin transaction.

2023-03-08 15:47:04

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Would it be fair to blame the user if they imported the seed into a second client running simultaneously? This would cause address collisions since each client is not aware of transactions the other is signing.

2023-03-08 13:38:11

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When you say "Doxxic change is split up before the mix so there is nothing revealed", that's obviously wrong because I clearly just revealed the doxxic change of the equal sized inputs being entered into the coinjoin.
A "perfect coinjoin" would not produce Doxxic change at all. As you can see, WabiSabi coinjoins do not create toxic change, nothing is "split up before the mix" so ALL of your coins are made private instead: https://mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b

2023-03-08 07:13:56

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Reusing addresses is bad for privacy, there's no denying that at all.
But at the end of the day, Bitcoin is non custodial: Your keys, your coins. If you choose to send to an already used address, the coordinator can't do anything to stop you in a meaningful way.

2023-03-08 05:50:48

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This WabiSabi coinjoin has 5 inputs for 0.05000000 and 8 outputs for 0.05000000 - mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b
Since it provides even greater privacy than any 1:1 Whirlpool coinjoin can, what do you call that? 160% entropy?

2023-03-07 20:58:09

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Why aren't merges of private coins smart? It's still private since you keep the lowest anonymity score of the inputs you merge to create a transaction.

2023-03-07 20:43:18

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Yes. As you can see from the Wasabi coinjoin, ALL of the coins are made private, so there is no way to unpeel it like I just did with the Whirlpool coinjoin to reveal the new entrants' change addresses.

2023-03-07 14:40:50

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What do you mean "it makes nothing traceable?" I literally just traced the exact addresses and amounts of inputs with a 100% deterministic link to each of the new Whirlpool entrants.
If their coordinator upgraded from Whirlpool to WabiSabi, they would not have created these traceable links.

2023-03-07 14:33:55

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Exactly. Instead of peeling your change with tx0 to make it traceable, WabiSabi makes EVERY spend a coinjoin. Leftover change gets turned into amounts of equal sizes which can't be linked to the original input.

2023-03-07 14:22:53

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What do you mean "I unmix nothing"? I just showed you the exact addresses and exact amounts belonging to two of the Whirlpool participants. This information would have been hidden in a WabiSabi coinjoin, but Whirlpool leaks it.

2023-03-07 14:20:46

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Why doesn't the coordinator of Whirlpool coinjoins upgrade their protocol to coordinate WabiSabi coinjoins instead? This upgrade would eliminate their creation of this doxxic change.

2023-03-07 14:10:28

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Exactly. Unlike Whirlpool, WabiSabi has zero deterministic links: No doxxic change is ever created at all.

2023-03-07 12:34:21

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Whirlpool leaves deterministic links because it peels the change during the tx0 used to create sized equal outputs. I just unmixed the Whirlpool transaction from your screenshot to reveal the change: https://mempool.space/tx/323df21f0b0756f98336437aa3d2fb87e02b59f1946b714a7b09df04d429dec2
Address bc1qgwv9hn979rex0rhfp3cknfdkyrgk04493gclvv belonging to Whirlpool input 1 created 0.01346981 BTC in traceable change which has 100% deterministic links to bc1qjy3zud5c7qypvgccgvptvaxkcsg6g4jl3u4tdy
Address bc1q528pyda90y4j9nuqrcm65rlxz9txljtn208dqm belonging to Whirlpool input 3 created 0.01971146 BTC in traceable change which has 100% deterministic links to bc1q50akm6ggcwgjext09tuz0rcl6cya2huu70pef4
Feel free to post any other Whirlpool tx ids and I'll unmix them too.

2023-03-06 12:30:42

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Do you know of any (talented) Bitcoin devs in need of funding that are working on a cross input signature aggregation BIP? The only progress I know of is what I heard from Jonas Nick & Tim Ruffing when they appeared on Stephan Livera's podcast (ep 400).

2023-03-06 05:18:25

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Your claim that Wasabi has no equal outputs is just plain false. Anyone can look at the transactions on the blockchain themselves to see you are lying to them: https://mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b
There are...
7 equal outputs for 20.00000000 BTC
3 equal outputs for ‎10.73741824 BTC
25 equal outputs for ‎1.34217728 BTC
6 equal outputs for ‎0.67108864 BTC
8 equal outputs for ‎0.43046721 BTC
6 equal outputs for ‎0.28697814 BTC
6 equal outputs for ‎0.20000000 BTC
11 equal outputs for ‎0.14348907 BTC
6 equal outputs for ‎0.10000000 BTC
8 equal outputs for ‎0.05000000 BTC
17 equal outputs for ‎0.03188646 BTC
14 equal outputs for ‎0.02097152 BTC
7 equal outputs for ‎0.01594323 BTC
6 equal outputs for ‎0.01062882 BTC
11 equal outputs for ‎0.00531441 BTC
12 equal outputs for ‎0.00354294 BTC
13 equal outputs for ‎0.00262144 BTC
6 equal outputs for ‎0.00200000 BTC
11 equal outputs for ‎0.00118098 BTC
13 equal outputs for ‎0.00100000 BTC
7 equal outputs for ‎0.00065536 BTC
9 equal outputs for ‎0.00039366 BTC
7 equal outputs for ‎0.00032768 BTC
25 equal outputs for ‎0.00020000 BTC
4 equal outputs for ‎0.00016384 BTC
10 equal outputs for ‎0.00013122 BTC
12 equal outputs for ‎0.00010000 BTC
5 equal outputs for ‎0.00008192 BTC
15 equal outputs for ‎0.00006561 BTC
12 equal outputs for ‎0.00005000 BTC
And most importantly, there is NO TRACEABLE CHANGE in Wasabi, unlike Whirlpool transactions which can always be unpeeled to reveal a 100% deterministic link to the change created from the tx0.

2023-03-06 04:35:54

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If an input is blacklisted, the input doesn't move at all. It just stays in the original address.