Chris Wardell [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

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🗓️ Active from 2015-05-07 to 2015-08-23
💬 Posted a total of 5 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: bitcoin-dev
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2023-06-07 17:37:30

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-23
📝 Original message:While I like the idea of voting on the block size debate... Why is this
vote limited to miners only?
I would prefer to see a vote by owners/holders of bitcoin, not miners of
bitcoin.
If miners with 10%+ hashrate are the only ones who get to vote... bitcoin
development is an oligarchy
My 2cents
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 11:14 PM, odinn via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
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> This is great!! Thank you.
>
> On 08/21/2015 06:24 AM, Christian Decker wrote:
> > I hacked together a simple tracking page for the 'block votes', it
> > currently includes the 8MB vote and XT, as well as the /BV\d+/ vote
> > for generic size: http://bitcoinstats.com/network/votes/
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 7:25 AM odinn via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
> >
> > Hello Nicolas,
> >
> > On 08/20/2015 08:49 PM, Nicolas Dorier via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >>> A visualization I would like to see would include:
> >
> >>> pie graph(s) of what % are voting for (BIP 100, BIP 101, 8MB,
> >>> BIP sipa
> >> etc) based on what's published in blocks.
> >
> >> If such a vote existed, I would gladly show the pie on BIPxDevs.
> >> However there is no standard way for miners to vote informally
> >> BIP they support.
> >
> > What about formal votes? Is there a way to visually have them
> > appear in a pie chart as the votes become apparent in blocks?
> >
> > I appreciate good visualizations and am trying to get a (visual)
> > comparison of the votes on these competing proposals.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev
> >> mailing list bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing
> > list bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
>
> - --
> http://abis.io ~
> "a protocol concept to enable decentralization
> and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good"
> https://keybase.io/odinn
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> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-07 17:36:26

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-18
📝 Original message:I agree with the simplicity of this approach and with removing the
reduction step... it's unlikely the block size would ever need to be
reduced, only increased with demand?
I like this solution better than either kicking the can, or raising the
block size based on chain height (another dynamic solution).
-Chris
On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Danny Thorpe via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I like the simplicity of this approach. Demand driven response.
>
> Is there really a need to reduce the max block size at all? It is just a
> maximum limit, not a required size for every block. If a seasonal
> transaction surge bumps the max block size limit up a notch, what harm is
> there in leaving the max block size limit at the "high water mark"
> indefinitely, even though periods of decreased transaction volume?
>
> I'd argue to remove the reduction step, making the max block size
> calculation a monotonic increasing function. Cut the complexity in half.
>
> -Danny
>
> On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Regarding:
>> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html
>>
>>
>> I am arguing with the following statement here...
>>
>> *I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner
>>> with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever
>>> mining empty blocks.*
>>
>>
>>
>> First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone
>> wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining
>> empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11%
>> hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon
>> that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence,
>> they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason
>> why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash
>> power.
>>
>>
>> Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to
>> this problem in algorithmic format...
>>
>> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
>> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
>> Double MaxBlockSize
>> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the
>> last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
>> Half MaxBlockSize
>> Else
>> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>>
>> This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50%
>> hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10%
>> hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In
>> this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say.
>> Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx
>> to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016
>> blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to
>> orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having
>> 16 confirmation.
>>
>> Looking for comments.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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2023-06-07 17:36:20

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-18
📝 Original message:I'm no authority on the subject, but I don't understand why there is a max
block-size, other than anti-spam measures.
The only other reason I have heard for a max-block-size is to force people
into paying higher fees.
This seems like the wrong way to force fees. If you want to force fees,
then do exactly that - make fees required, and set a minimum... don't force
people to pay fees by limiting transactions per second. That's like
shooting yourself in the foot to get free surgery....
On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 8:13 AM, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Regarding:
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html
>
>
> I am arguing with the following statement here...
>
> *I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner
>> with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever
>> mining empty blocks.*
>
>
>
> First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone
> wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining
> empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11%
> hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon
> that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence,
> they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason
> why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash
> power.
>
>
> Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to
> this problem in algorithmic format...
>
> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
> Double MaxBlockSize
> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
> Half MaxBlockSize
> Else
> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50%
> hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10%
> hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In
> this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say.
> Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx
> to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016
> blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to
> orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having
> 16 confirmation.
>
> Looking for comments.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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- reply

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- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-17
📝 Original message:I would prefer a dynamic solution that did not necessitate a second hard
fork down the road.
I propose doubling the block size every 100k blocks (~2 years)
block 400,000 = 2MB (2016)
block 500,000 = 4MB (2017)
block 600,000 = 8MB (2018)
Chris
On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:57 PM, Ross Nicoll via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I'd back this if we can't find a permanent solution - 2MB gives us a lot
> more wiggle room in the interim at least; one of my concerns with block
> size is 3 transactions per second is absolutely tiny, and we need space for
> the network to search for an equilibrium between volume and pricing without
> risk of an adoption spike rendering it essentially unusable.
>
> I'd favour switching over by block height rather than time, and I'd
> suggest that given virtually every wallet/node out there will require
> testing (even if many do not currently enforce a limit and therefore do not
> need changing), 6 months should be considered a minimum target. I'd open
> with a suggestion of block 390k as a target.
>
> Ross
>
>
> On 17/07/2015 16:55, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> Opening a mailing list thread on this BIP:
>
> BIP PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/173
> Code PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6451
>
> The general intent of this BIP is as a minimum viable alternative plan
> to my preferred proposal (BIP 100).
>
> If agreement is not reached on a more comprehensive solution, then this
> solution is at least available and a known quantity. A good backup plan.
>
> Benefits: conservative increase. proves network can upgrade. permits
> some added growth, while the community & market gathers data on how an
> increased block size impacts privacy, security, centralization, transaction
> throughput and other metrics. 2MB seems to be a Least Common Denominator
> on an increase.
>
> Costs: requires a hard fork. requires another hard fork down the road.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing listbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.orghttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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2023-06-07 15:33:22

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-05-07
📝 Original message:Instead of raising the block size to another static number like 20MB, can
we raise it dynamically?
Make the max block size something like:
pow(2, nHeight/100000) * 1MB; //double every ~2 years
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