Chun Wang [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

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🗓️ Active from 2015-05-29 to 2015-12-18
💬 Posted a total of 17 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: Bitcoin-development, bitcoin-dev, BIP 1xx - Draft
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Last Notes

2023-06-07 17:46:49

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-12-18
📝 Original message:In many BIPs we have seen, include the latest BIP202, it is the block
time that determine the max block size. From from pool's point of
view, it cannot issue a job with a fixed ntime due to the existence of
ntime roll. It is hard to issue a job with the max block size unknown.
For developers, it is also easier to implement if max block size is a
function of block height instead of time. Block height is also much
more simple and elegant than time.

2023-06-07 17:44:35

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-11-13
📝 Original message:How about these specs:
* 1 MB, height < 210000;
* 2 MB, 210000 <= height < 420000;
* 4 MB, 420000 <= height < 630000;
* 8 MB, 630000 <= height < 840000;
* 16 MB, 840000 <= height < 1050000;
* 32 MB, height >= 1050000.
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 7:47 AM, John Sacco via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi Devs,
>
>
> Please consider the draft proposal below for peer review.
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
> John
>
>
> BIP
>
> BIP: ?
>
> Title: Block size doubles at each reward halving with max block size of
> 32M
>
> Author: John Sacco <johnsock at gmail.com>
>
> Status: Draft
>
> Type: Standards Track
>
> Created: 2015-11-11
>
> Abstract
>
> Change max block size to 2MB at next block subsidy halving, and double the
> block size at each subsidy halving until reaching 32MB.
>
> Copyright
>
> This proposal belongs in the public domain. Anyone can use this text for any
> purpose with proper attribution to the author.
>
> Motivation
>
> 1. Gradually restores block size to the default 32 MB setting originally
> implemented by Satoshi.
>
> 2. Initial increase to 2MB at block halving in July 2016 would have
> minimal impact to existing nodes running on most hardware and networks.
>
> 3. Long term solution that does not make enthusiastic assumptions
> regarding future bandwidth and storage availability estimates.
>
> 4. Maximum block size of 32MB allows peak usage of ~100 tx/sec by year
> 2031.
>
> 5. Exercise network upgrade procedure during subsidy reward halving, a
> milestone event with the goal of increasing awareness among miners and node
> operators.
>
> Specification
>
> 1. Increase the maximum block size to 2MB when block 630,000 is reached
> and 75% of the last 1,000 blocks have signaled support.
>
> 2. Increase maximum block size to 4MB at block 840,000.
>
> 3. Increase maximum block size to 8MB at block 1,050,000.
>
> 4. Increase maximum block size to 16MB at block 1,260,000.
>
> 5. Increase maximum block size to 32MB at block 1,470,000.
>
> Backward compatibility
>
> All older clients are not compatible with this change. The first block
> larger than 1M will create a network partition excluding not-upgraded
> network nodes and miners.
>
> Rationale
>
> While more comprehensive solutions are developed, an increase to the block
> size is needed to continue network growth. A longer term solution is needed
> to prevent complications associated with additional hard forks. It should
> also increase at a gradual rate that retains and allows a large distribution
> of full nodes. Scheduling this hard fork to occur no earlier than the
> subsidy halving in 2016 has the goal of simplifying the communication
> outreach needed to achieve consensus, while also providing a buffer of time
> to make necessary preparations.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

2023-06-07 17:44:32

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-11-12
📝 Original message:I doubt changing the default value is useful as casual mining had long
dead, and pools all have their own customized policies. But I think
change the priority size to 0 is the right way to do. The sort by
priority part in the block is always the best place for spam nowadays.
I would think about to merge the priority, feerate, and probably
sigoprate into one number, probably 576 priorities trade for 1 satoshi
per kb?
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 4:12 AM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Thursday, November 12, 2015 7:47:50 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> With the mempool limiting stuff already in git master, high-priority
>> relay is disabled when mempools are full. In addition, there was
>> agreement to take the following steps for 0.12:
>>
>> * Mining code will use starting priority for ease of implementation
>
> This should be optional, at least for 0.12.
>
>> * Default block priority size will be 0
>
> We should not be influencing miner policy by changing defaults.
>
> Luke
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 17:40:48

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📅 Original date posted:2015-09-17
📝 Original message:We are currently using nLockTime for share info and nSequence for
extranonce2. I have carefully reviewed the reference implementation of
BIP68 and it should be compatible, but this proposal may break the
implementation unless it does not affect coinbase transactions.
On Fri, Sep 18, 2015 at 2:41 AM, jl2012 via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Fill-or-kill tx is not a new idea and is discussed in the Scaling Bitcoin
> workshop. In Satoshi's implementation of nLockTime, a huge range of
> timestamp (from 1970 to 2009) is wasted. By exploiting this unused range and
> with compromise in the time resolution, a fill-or-kill system could be built
> with a softfork.
>
> -----------
> Two new parameters, nLockTime2 and nKillTime are defined:
>
> nLockTime2 (Range: 0-1,853,010)
> 0: Tx could be confirmed at or after block 420,000
> 1: Tx could be confirmed at or after block 420,004
> .
> .
> 719,999: Tx could be confirmed at or after block 3,299,996 (about 55 years
> from now)
> 720,000: Tx could be confirmed if the median time-past >= 1,474,562,048
> (2016-09-22)
> 720,001: Tx could be confirmed if the median time-past >= 1,474,564,096
> (2016-09-22)
> .
> .
> 1,853,010 (max): Tx could be confirmed if the median time-past >=
> 3,794,966,528 (2090-04-04)
>
> nKillTime (Range: 0-2047)
> if nLockTime2 < 720,000, the tx could be confirmed at or before block
> (nLockTime2 + nKillTime * 4)
> if nLockTime2 >= 720,000, the tx could be confirmed if the median time-past
> <= (nLockTime2 - 720,001 + nKillTime) * 2048
>
> Finally, nLockTime = 500,000,000 + nKillTime + nLockTime2 * 2048
>
> Setting a bit flag in tx nVersion will activate the new rules.
>
> The resolution is 4 blocks or 2048s (34m)
> The maximum confirmation window is 8188 blocks (56.9 days) or 16,769,024s
> (48.5 days)
>
> For example:
> With nLockTime2 = 20 and nKillTime = 100, a tx could be confirmed only
> between block 420,080 and 420,480
> With nLockTime2 = 730,000 and nKillTime = 1000, a tx could be confirmed only
> between median time-past of 1,495,042,048 and 1,497,090,048
>
> ----------------
> Why is this a softfork?
>
> Remember this formula: nLockTime = 500,000,000 + nKillTime + nLockTime2 *
> 2048
>
> For height based nLockTime2 (<= 719,999)
>
> For nLockTime2 = 0 and nKillTime = 0, nLockTime = 500,000,000, which means
> the tx could be confirmed after 1970-01-01 with the original lock time rule.
> As the new rule does not allow confirmation until block 420,000, it's
> clearly a softfork.
>
> It is not difficult to see that the growth of nLockTime will never catch up
> nLockTime2.
>
> At nLockTime2 = 719,999 and nKillTime = 2047, nLockTime = 1,974,559,999,
> which means 2016-09-22. However, the new rule will not allow confirmation
> until block 3,299,996 which is decades to go
>
>
>
> For time based nLockTime2 (> 720,000)
>
> For nLockTime2 = 720,000 and nKillTime = 0, nLockTime = 1,974,560,000, which
> means the tx could be confirmed after median time-past 1,474,560,000
> (assuming BIP113). However, the new rule will not allow confirmation until
> 1,474,562,048, therefore a soft fork.
>
> For nLockTime2 = 720,000 and nKillTime = 2047, nLockTime = 1,974,562,047,
> which could be confirmed at 1,474,562,047. Again, the new rule will not
> allow confirmation until 1,474,562,048. The 1 second difference makes it a
> soft fork.
>
> Actually, for every nLockTime2 value >= 720,000, the lock time with the new
> rule must be 1-2048 seconds later than the original rule.
>
> For nLockTime2 = 1,853,010 and nKillTime = 2047, nLockTime = 4,294,966,527,
> which is the highest possible value with the 32-bit nLockTime
>
> ----------------
> User's perspective:
>
> A user wants his tx either filled or killed in about 3 hours. He will set a
> time-based nLockTime2 according to the current median time-past, and set
> nKillTime = 5
>
> A user wants his tx get confirmed in the block 630000, the first block with
> reward below 10BTC. He is willing to pay high fee but don't want it gets
> into another block. He will set nLockTime2 = 210,000 and nKillTime = 0
>
> ----------------
> OP_CLTV
>
> Time-based OP_CLTV could be upgraded to support time-based nLockTime2.
> However, height-based OP_CLTV is not compatible with nLockTime2. To spend a
> height-based OP_CLTV output, user must use the original nLockTime.
>
> We may need a new OP_CLTV2 which could verify both nLockTime and nLockTime2
>
> ----------------
> 55 years after?
>
> The height-based nLockTime2 will overflow in 55 years. It is very likely a
> hard fork will happen to implement a better fill-or-kill system. If not, we
> could reboot everything with another tx nVersion for another 55 years.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 17:38:28

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-29
📝 Original message:On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Jorge Timón
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
/tx/3b95a766d7a99b87188d6875c8484cb2b310b78459b7816d4dfc3f0f7e04281a?chain=000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943
>
> (a tx in testnet)
>
> /block/00000000000000000b0d504d142ac8bdd1a2721d19f423a8146d0d6de882167b?chain=000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f
Some altcoins (LTC and FTC for example) have the same genesis block hash.
On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Jorge Timón
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 9:01 PM, Matt Whitlock via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> That's still not right, since "mainnet" and "testnet" are not host names.
>>
>> You'd have to do something like:
>>
>> blockchain:?network=testnet&txid=3b95a766d7a99b87188d6875c8484cb2b310b78459b7816d4dfc3f0f7e04281a
>
> I would really prefer chain=<chainID> over network=<chainPetnameStr>
> By chainID I mean the hash of the genesis block, see
> https://github.com/jtimon/bitcoin/commit/3191d5e8e75687a27cf466b7a4c70bdc04809d39
> I'm completely fine with doing that using an optional parameter (for
> backwards compatibility).
>
> I agree with Andreas Schildbach that respecting the most commonly used
> schemes is desirable.
> So my preference would be:
>
> /tx/3b95a766d7a99b87188d6875c8484cb2b310b78459b7816d4dfc3f0f7e04281a?chain=000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943
>
> (a tx in testnet)
>
> /block/00000000000000000b0d504d142ac8bdd1a2721d19f423a8146d0d6de882167b?chain=000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f
>
> (a block in bitcoin's mainnet)
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 17:38:10

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-25
📝 Original message:On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 5:18 AM, Simon Liu via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I don't think this would work.
>
> If the rule is that one user can only have one vote, how do you prevent
> a user running multiple nodes?
The vote is not counted by nodes, but bitcoin amount, or probably
better, coin-days. It works like proof-of-stake. A mix of
proof-of-work and proof-of-stake is good.

2023-06-07 17:38:07

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-25
📝 Original message:Proposal 1 looks good, but tx fee collected can be manipulated by
miners. I like the idea next block collect the tx fee from previous
block.
On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 5:07 PM, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Github:
> https://github.com/UpalChakraborty/bips/blob/master/BIP-DynamicMaxBlockSize.mediawiki
>
> <pre>
> BIP: 1xx
> Title: Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
> Author: Upal Chakraborty <bitcoin at upalc.com>
> Status: Draft
> Type: Standards Track
> Created: 2015-08-24
> </pre>
>
> ==Abstract==
>
> This BIP proposes replacing the fixed one megabyte maximum block size with a
> dynamically controlled maximum block size that may increase or decrease with
> difficulty change depending on various network factors. I have two proposals
> regarding this...
>
> i. Depending only on previous block size calculation.
>
> ii. Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee
> collected by miners.
>
> ==Motivation==
>
> With increased adoption, transaction volume on bitcoin network is bound to
> grow. If the one megabyte max cap is not changed to a flexible one which
> changes itself with changing network demand, then adoption will hamper and
> bitcoin's growth may choke up. Following graph shows the change in average
> block size since inception...
>
> https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-block-size?timespan=all&showDataPoints=false&daysAverageString=1&show_header=true&scale=0&address=
>
> ==Specification==
>
> ===Proposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation===
>
> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
> Double MaxBlockSize
> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
> Half MaxBlockSize
> Else
> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> ===Proposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx
> fee collected by miners===
>
> TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty = Sum of all Block size of first 2008
> blocks in last 2 difficulty period
> TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty = Sum of all Block size of second 2008
> blocks in last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from
> last but one difficulty)
>
> TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty = Sum of all Tx fees of first 2008 blocks
> in last 2 difficulty period
> TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty = Sum of all Tx fees of second 2008 blocks in
> last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from last but one
> difficulty)
>
> If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/4016 >
> 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty >
> TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty >
> TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty) )
> MaxBlockSize = TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize /
> TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty
> Else If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty
> period)/4016 < 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty <
> TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty <
> TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty) )
> MaxBlockSize = TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize /
> TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty
> Else
> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> ==Rationale==
>
> These two proposals have been derived after discussion on
> [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1154536.0 BitcoinTalk] and
> [http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010285.html
> bitcoin-dev mailing list]. The original idea and its evolution in the light
> of various arguements can be found [http://upalc.com/maxblocksize.php here].
>
> ===Proposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation===
>
> This solution is derived directly from the indication of the problem. If
> transaction volume increases, then we will naturally see bigger blocks. On
> the contrary, if there are not enough transaction volume, but maximum block
> size is high, then only few blocks may sweep the mempool. Hence, if block
> size is itself taken into consideration, then maximum block size can most
> rationally be derived. Moreover, this solution not only increases, but also
> decreases the maximum block size, just like difficulty.
>
> ===Proposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx
> fee collected by miners===
>
> This solution takes care of stable mining subsidy. It will not increase
> maximum block size, if Tx fee collection is not increasing and thereby
> creating a Tx fee pressure on the market. On the other hand, though the
> block size max cap is dynamically controlled, it is very difficult to game
> by any party because the increase or decrease of block size max cap will
> take place in the same ratio of average block size increase or decrease.
>
> ==Compatibility==
>
> This is a hard-forking change to the Bitcoin protocol; anybody running code
> that fully validates blocks must upgrade before the activation time or they
> will risk rejecting a chain containing larger-than-one-megabyte blocks.
>
> ==Other solutions considered==
>
> [http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf Making
> Decentralized Economic Policy] - by Jeff Garzik
>
> [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1078521.0 Elastic block cap with
> rollover penalties] - by Meni Rosenfeld
>
> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0101.mediawiki Increase
> maximum block size] - by Gavin Andresen
>
> [https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 Block size following
> technological growth] - by Pieter Wuille
>
> [https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf The Bitcoin Lightning
> Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments] - by Joseph Poon & Thaddeus
> Dryja
>
> ==Deployment==
>
> If consensus is achieved, deployment can be made at a future block number at
> which difficulty will change.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

2023-06-07 15:49:30

- reply

2023-06-07 15:39:04

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19
📝 Original message:Before F2Pool's launch, I performed probably the only successful
bitcoin double spend in the March 2013 fork without any mining power.
[ https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=152348.0 ] I know how bad
the full RBF is. We are going to switch to FSS RBF in a few hours.
Sorry.
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:44 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:05AM -0400, Stephen Morse wrote:
>> It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
>> alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
>> fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
>> negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?
>
> Specifically the following is what I told them:
>
>> We are
>> interested in the replace-by-fee patch, but I am not following the
>> development closely, more background info is needed, like what the
>> difference between standard and zeroconf versions? Thanks.
>
> Great!
>
> Basically both let you replace one transaction with another that pays a
> higher fee. First-seen-safe replace-by-fee adds the additional criteria
> that all outputs of the old transaction still need to be paid by the new
> transaction, with >= as many Bitcoins. Basically, it makes sure that if
> someone was paid by tx1, then tx2 will still pay them.
>
> I've written about how wallets can use RBF and FSS-RBF to more
> efficiently use the blockchain on the bitcoin-development mailing list:
>
> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html
> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html
>
> Basically, for the purpose of increasing fees, RBF is something like %50
> cheaper than CPFP, and FSS-RBF is something like %25 cheaper.
>
> In addition, for ease of implementation, my new FSS-RBF has a number of
> other restrictions. For instance, you can't replace multiple
> transactions with one, you can't replace a transaction whose outputs
> have already been spent, you can't replace a transaction with one that
> spends additional unconfirmed inputs, etc. These restrictions aren't
> "set in stone", but they do make the code simpler and less likely to
> have bugs.
>
> In comparison my previous standard RBF patch can replace multiple
> transactions with one, can replace long chains of transactions, etc.
> It's willing to do more computation before deciding if a transaction
> should be replaced, with more complex logic; it probably has a higher
> chance of having a bug or DoS attack.
>
> You've probably seen the huge controversy around zeroconf with regard to
> standard replace-by-fee. While FSS RBF doesn't make zeroconf any safer,
> it also doesn't make it any more dangerous, so politically with regard
> to zeroconf it makes no difference. You *can* still use it doublespend
> by taking advantage of how different transactions are accepted
> differently, but that's true of *every* change we've ever made to
> Bitcoin Core - by upgrading to v0.10 from v0.9 you've also "broken"
> zeroconf in the same way.
>
>
> Having said that... honestly, zeroconf is pretty broken already. Only
> with pretty heroic measures like connecting to a significant fraction of
> the Bitcoin network at once, as well as connecting to getblocktemplate
> supporting miners to figure out what transactions are being mined, are
> services having any hope of avoiding getting ripped off. For the average
> user their wallets do a terrible job of showing whether or not an
> unconfirmed transaction will go through. For example, Schildbach's
> Bitcoin wallet for Android has no code at all to detect double-spends
> until they get mined, and I've been able to trick it into showing
> completely invalid transactions. In fact, currently Bitcoin XT will
> relay invalid transactions that are doublepsends, and Schildbach's
> wallet displays them as valid, unconfirmed, payments. It's really no
> surprise to me that nearly no-one in the Bitcoin ecosystem accepts
> unconfirmed transactions without some kind of protection that doesn't
> rely on first-seen-safe mempool behavior. For instance, many ATM's these
> days know who their customers are due to AML requirements, so while you
> can deposit Bitcoins and get your funds instantly, the protection for
> the ATM operator is that they can go to the police if you rip them off;
> I've spoken to ATM operators who didn't do this who've lost hundreds or
> even thousands of dollars before giving up on zeroconf.
>
> My big worry with zeroconf is a service like Coinbase or Shapeshift
> coming to rely on it, and then attempting to secure it by gaining
> control of a majority of hashing power. For instance, if Coinbase had
> contracts with 80% of the Bitcoin hashing power to guarantee their
> transactions would get mined, but 20% of the hashing power didn't sign
> up, then the only way to guarantee their transactions could be for the
> 80% to not build on blocks containing doublespends by the 20%. There's
> no way in a decentralized network to come to consensus about what
> transactions are or are not valid without mining itself, so you could
> end up in a situation where unless you're part of one of the big pools
> you can't reliably mine at all because your blocks may get rejected for
> containing doublespends.
>
> One of my goal with standard replace-by-fee is to prevent this scenario
> by forcing merchants and others to implement ways of accepting zeroconf
> transactions safely that work in a decentralized environment regardless
> of what miners do; we have a stronger and safer Bitcoin ecosystem if
> we're relying on math rather than trust to secure our zeroconf
> transactions. We're also being more honest to users, who right now often
> have the very wrong impression that unconfirmed transactions are safe to
> accept - this does get people ripped off all too often!
>
>
> Anyway, sorry for the rant! FWIW I updated my FSS-RBF patch and am
> waiting to get some feedback:
>
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6176
>
> Suhas Daftuar did find a pretty serious bug in it, now fixed. I'm
> working on porting it to v0.10.2, and once that's done I'm going to put
> up a bounty for anyone who can find a DoS attack in the patch. If no-one
> claims the bounty after a week or two I think I'll start feeling
> confident about using it in production.
>
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 000000000000000003188926be14e5fbe2f8f9c63c9fb8e2ba4b14ab04f1c9ab
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

2023-06-07 15:39:01

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19
📝 Original message:Hello. We recognize the problem. We will switch to FSS RBF soon. Thanks.
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:33 PM, Stephen Morse
<stephencalebmorse at gmail.com> wrote:
> It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
> alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
> fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
> negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?
>
> Best,
> Stephen
>
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:39 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>>
>> Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
>> power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions with
>> me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if a
>> conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements for
>> the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
>> previous transaction.
>>
>>
>> I'm a user. What does this mean for me?
>> ---------------------------------------
>>
>> In the short term, very little. Wallet software aimed at average users
>> has no ability to reliably detect conditions where an unconfirmed
>> transaction may be double-spent by the sender. For example, Schildbach's
>> Bitcoin Wallet for Android doesn't even detect double-spends of
>> unconfirmed transactions when connected to a RBF or Bitcoin XT nodes
>> that propagate them. The least sophisticated double-spend attack
>> possibly - simply broadcasting two conflicting transactions at the same
>> time - has about 50% probability of success against these wallets.
>>
>> Additionally, SPV wallets based on bitcoinj can't even detect invalid
>> transactions reliably, instead trusting the full node(s) it is connected
>> too over the unauthenticated, unencrypted, P2P protocol to do validation
>> for them. For instance due to a unfixed bug¹ Bitcoin XT nodes will relay
>> double-spends that spend the output of the conflicting transaction. I've
>> personally tested this with Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet for Android,
>> which shows such invalid transactions as standard, unconfirmed,
>> transactions.
>>
>> Users should continue to assume that unconfirmed transactions could be
>> trivially reversed by the sender until the first confirmation. In
>> general, only the sender can reverse a transaction, so if you do trust
>> the sender feel free to assume an unconfirmed transaction will
>> eventually confirm. However, if you do not trust the sender and/or have
>> no other recourse if they double-spend you, wait until at least the
>> first confirmation before assuming the transaction will go through.
>>
>> In the long term, miner support of full RBF has a number of advantages
>> to users, allowing you to more efficiently make transactions, paying
>> lower fees. However you'll need a wallet supporting these features; none
>> exist yet.
>>
>>
>> I'm a business. What does this mean for me?
>> -------------------------------------------
>>
>> If you use your own node to verify transactions, you probably are in a
>> similar situation as average users, so again, this means very little to
>> you.
>>
>> If you use a payment processor/transaction API such as BitPay, Coinbase,
>> BlockCypher, etc. you may or may not be accepting unconfirmed
>> transactions, and they may or may not be "guaranteed" by your payment
>> processor even if double-spent. If like most merchants you're using the
>> API such that confirmations are required prior to accepting orders (e.g.
>> taking a meaningful loss such as shipping a product if the tx is
>> reversed) nothing changes for you. If not I recommend you contact your
>> payment processor.
>>
>>
>> I'm a miner. Why should I support replace-by-fee?
>> -------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Whether full or first-seen-safe⁵ RBF support (along with
>> child-pays-for-parent) is an important step towards a fully functioning
>> transaction fee market that doesn't lead to users' transactions getting
>> mysteriously "stuck", particularly during network flooding
>> events/attacks. A better functioning fee market will help reduce
>> pressure to increase the blocksize, particularly from the users creating
>> the most valuable transactions.
>>
>> Full RBF also helps make use of the limited blockchain space more
>> efficiently, with up to 90%+ transaction size savings possible in some
>> transaction patterns. (e.g. long payment chains⁶) More users in less
>> blockchain space will lead to higher overall fees per block.
>>
>> Finally as we'll discuss below full RBF prevents a number of serious
>> threats to the existing level playing field that miners operate in.
>>
>>
>> Why can't we make accepting unconfirmed txs from untrusted people safe?
>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> For a decentralized wallet, the situation is pretty bleak. These wallets
>> only have a handful of connections to the network, with no way of
>> knowing if those connections give an accurate view of what transactions
>> miners actually know about.
>>
>> The only serious attempt to fix this problem for decentralized wallets
>> that has been actually deployed is Andresen/Harding's double-spend
>> relaying, implemented in Bitcoin XT. It relays up to one double-spend
>> transaction per double-spent txout, with the intended effect to warn
>> recipients. In practice however this functionality makes it easier to
>> double-spend rather than harder, by giving an efficient and easy way to
>> get double-spends to miners after the fact. Notably my RBF
>> implementation even connects to Bitcoin XT nodes, reserving a % of all
>> incoming and outgoing connection slots for them.
>>
>> Additionally Bitcoin XT's double-spend relaying is subject to attacks
>> include bandwidth exhaustion, sybil attacks, and Gervais's non-sybil
>> interactive attacks⁷ among many others.
>>
>>
>> What about centralised wallets?
>> -------------------------------
>>
>> Here the solutions being deployed, planned, and proposed are harmful,
>> and even represent serious threats to Bitcoin's decentralization.
>>
>>
>> Confidence factors
>> ------------------
>>
>> Many services such as BlockCypher² have attempted to predict the
>> probability that unconfirmed transactions will be mined, often
>> guaranteeing merchants payment³ even in the event of a double-spend. The
>> key component of these predictions is to sybil attack the P2P network as
>> a whole, connecting to as many nodes as possible to measure transaction
>> propagation. Additionally these services connect to pools directly via
>> the getblocktemplate protocol, repeatedly downloading via GBT the lists
>> of transactions in the to-be-mined blocks to determine what transactions
>> miners are attempting to mine.
>>
>> None of these measures scale, wasting significant network and miner
>> resources; in one instance a sybil attack by Chainalysis even completely
>> blocked the users of the SPV wallet Breadwallet⁴ from accessing the
>> network. These measures also don't work very well, giving double-spend
>> attackers incentives to sybil attack miners themselves.
>>
>>
>> Transaction processing contracts with miners
>> --------------------------------------------
>>
>> The next step after measuring propagation fails is to contract with
>> miners directly, signing contracts with as much of the hashing power as
>> possible to get the transactions they want mined and double-spends
>> rejected. The miners/pools would then provide an authenticated API
>> endpoint for exclusive use of this service that would allow the service
>> to add and remove specific transactions to the mempool on demand.
>>
>> There's a number of serious problems with this:
>>
>> 1) Mining contracts can be used to double-spend
>>
>> ...even when they're being used "honestly".
>>
>> Suppose Alice is a merchant using CoinPayCypher, who has contracts with
>> 75% of the hashing power. Bob, another merchant, meanwhile uses a
>> decentralized Bitcoin Core backend for payments to his website.
>>
>> Mallory wants to double-spend Bob's to buy his expensive products. He
>> can do this by creating a transaction, tx1, that pays Alice, followed by
>> a second transaction, tx2, that pays Bob. In any circumstance when
>> Mallory can convince Bob to accept tx2, but prevent Bob from seeing tx1,
>> the chance of Malory's double-spend succeeding becomes ~75% because
>> CoinPayCypher's contracts with mining ensure the transaction paying
>> Alice will get mined.
>>
>> Of course, dishonest use and/or compromise makes double-spending
>> trivial: Malory can use the API credentials to ask miners to reject
>> Bob's payment at any time.
>>
>>
>> 2) They still don't work, without 51% attacking other miners
>>
>> Even if CoinPayCypher has 75% of the hashing power on contract, that's
>> still a potentially 75% chance of being double-spent. The 25% of miners
>> who haven't signed contracts have no _decentralized_ way of ensuring
>> they don't create blocks with double-spends, let alone at low cost. If
>> those miners won't or can't sign contracts with CoinPayCypher the only
>> next step available is to reject their blocks entirely.
>>
>>
>> 3) Legal contracts give the advantage to non-anonymous miners in
>> Western jurisdictions
>>
>> Suppose CoinPayCypher is a US company, and you're a miner with 1%
>> hashing power located in northern China. The barriers to you succesfully
>> negotiating a contract with CoinPayCypher are significant. You don't
>> speak the same langauge, you're in a completely different jurisdiction
>> so enforcing the legal contract is difficult, and being just 1%,
>> CoinPayCypher sees you as insignificant.
>>
>> Who's going to get the profitable hashing power contracts first, if at
>> all? Your English speaking competitors in the west. This is inherently a
>> pressure towards centralization of mining.
>>
>>
>> Why isn't this being announced on the bitcoin-security list first?
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> I've had repeated discussions with services vulnerable to double-spends;
>> they have been made well aware of the risk they're taking. If they've
>> followed my own and others' advice they'll at minimum have constant
>> monitoring of the rate of double-spends both on their own services and
>> on the P2P network in general.
>>
>> If you choose to take a risk you should accept the consequences.
>>
>>
>> How do I actually use full RBF?
>> -------------------------------
>>
>> First get the full-RBF patch to v0.10.2:
>>
>> https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/tree/replace-by-fee-v0.10.2
>>
>> The above implementation of RBF includes additional code to find and
>> preferentially connect to other RBF nodes, as well as Bitcoin XT nodes.
>> Secondly, try out my replace-by-fee-tools at:
>>
>> https://github.com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools
>>
>> You can watch double-spends on the network here:
>>
>> http://respends.thinlink.com/
>>
>>
>> References
>> ----------
>>
>> 1) "Replace-by-fee v0.10.2 - Serious DoS attack fixed! - Also novel
>> variants of existing attacks w/ Bitcoin XT and Android Bitcoin
>> Wallet",
>> Peter Todd, May 23rd 2015, Bitcoin-development mailing list,
>>
>> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07795.html
>>
>> 2) "From Zero to Hero: Bitcoin Transactions in 8 Seconds",
>> June 2nd, 2014, Erik Voorhees,
>>
>> https://medium.com/blockcypher-blog/from-zero-to-hero-bitcoin-transactions-in-8-seconds-7c9edcb3b734
>>
>> 3) Coinbase Merchant API, Accessed Jun 19th 2015,
>> https://developers.coinbase.com/docs/merchants/callbacks#confirmations
>>
>> 4) "Chainalysis CEO Denies 'Sybil Attack' on Bitcoin's Network",
>> March 14th 2015, Grace Caffyn, Coindesk,
>>
>> http://www.coindesk.com/chainalysis-ceo-denies-launching-sybil-attack-on-bitcoin-network/
>>
>> 5) "First-Seen-Safe Replace-by-Fee",
>> May 25th 2015, Peter Todd, Bitcoin-development mailing list,
>>
>> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development%40lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html
>>
>> 6) "Cost savings by using replace-by-fee, 30-90%",
>> May 25th 2015, Peter Todd, Bitcoin-development mailing list,
>>
>> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html
>>
>> 7) "Tampering with the Delivery of Blocks and Transactions in Bitcoin",
>> Arthur Gervais and Hubert Ritzdorf and Ghassan O. Karame and Srdjan
>> Capkun,
>> Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/578, Jun 10th 2015,
>> http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/578
>>
>> --
>> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>> 0000000000000000070a2bb3b92c20d5c2c971e6e1a7abe55cdbbe6a2dd9a5ad
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>
>
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2023-06-07 15:39:00

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19
📝 Original message:On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:00 PM, Adrian Macneil <adrian at coinbase.com> wrote:
> However, we do rely pretty heavily on zeroconf transactions for merchant
> processing, so if any significant portion of the mining pools started
> running your unsafe RBF patch, then we would probably need to look into this
> as a way to prevent fraud.
This might be useful to you: https://www.f2pool.com/api/mempool

2023-06-07 15:37:31

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-14
📝 Original message:To tell you the truth. It is only because most miners are not located
in the West. If Slush, Eligius and BTC Guild still on top 3, the core
developers, including brain-dead Mike Hearn, would be very happy to do
BIP100 just like they did BIP34 and BIP66. Shame on you!
On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Danny Thorpe <danny.thorpe at gmail.com> wrote:
> Please forgive my ignorance, but why should Bitcoin users have a say in
> block size limits? It's the miners and Bitcoin node operators that bear the
> burden of managing large blocks, no?
>
> Users voting on network parameters sounds like neighbors voting on how deep
> my swimming pool should be.
>
> Thanks,
> -Danny
>
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>>
>> Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed
>> entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by
>> hashing power.
>>
>> This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
>> the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions
>> themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included
>> in a block casting a specific vote.
>>
>> We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
>> either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
>> fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
>> nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
>> decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
>> indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
>> fees to vote according to user wishes.
>>
>> Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an
>> additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
>> can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
>> mechanism such as replace-by-fee.
>>
>>
>> See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:
>>
>>
>> https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
>>
>> --
>> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>
>
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2023-06-07 15:36:06

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-01
📝 Original message:The current max block size of 1000000 bytes is not power of two anyway.
On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 10:46 PM, Oliver Egginger <bitcoin at olivere.de> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 3:59 PM, Gavin Andresen wrote:
>> What do other people think? Would starting at a max of 8 or 4 get
>> consensus? Scaling up a little less than Nielsen's Law of Internet
>> Bandwidth predicts for the next 20 years? (I think predictability is
>> REALLY important).
>>
>> I chose 20 because all of my testing shows it to be safe, and all of my
>> back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate the costs are reasonable.
>>
>> If consensus is "8 because more than order-of-magnitude increases are
>> scary" -- ok.
>
> It would feel better for me if you would keep the power of two:
>
> 2^0 = 1MB
> 2^1 = 2MB
> 2^2 = 4MB
> 2^3 = 8MB
> .
> .
> .
>
> But that's only personal. Maybe other people feeling the same.
>
> - oliver
>
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2023-06-07 15:36:05

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-01
📝 Original message:That is good. I oppose 20MB because I estimate it may increase the
overall orphan rate to an unacceptable level. 5MB, 8MB or probably
10MB should be ok.
On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 9:59 PM, Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 7:20 AM, Chun Wang <1240902 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> I cannot believe why Gavin (who seems to have difficulty to spell my
>> name correctly.) insists on his 20MB proposal regardless the
>> community. BIP66 has been introduced for a long time and no one knows
>> when the 95% goal can be met. This change to the block max size must
>> take one year or more to be adopted. We should increase the limit and
>> increase it now. 20MB is simply too big and too risky, sometimes we
>> need compromise and push things forward. I agree with any solution
>> lower than 10MB in its first two years.
>>
>
> Thanks, that's useful!
>
> What do other people think? Would starting at a max of 8 or 4 get
> consensus? Scaling up a little less than Nielsen's Law of Internet
> Bandwidth predicts for the next 20 years? (I think predictability is REALLY
> important).
>
> I chose 20 because all of my testing shows it to be safe, and all of my
> back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate the costs are reasonable.
>
> If consensus is "8 because more than order-of-magnitude increases are scary"
> -- ok.
>
> --
> --
> Gavin Andresen

2023-06-07 15:36:04

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-01
📝 Original message:I cannot believe why Gavin (who seems to have difficulty to spell my
name correctly.) insists on his 20MB proposal regardless the
community. BIP66 has been introduced for a long time and no one knows
when the 95% goal can be met. This change to the block max size must
take one year or more to be adopted. We should increase the limit and
increase it now. 20MB is simply too big and too risky, sometimes we
need compromise and push things forward. I agree with any solution
lower than 10MB in its first two years.
On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 7:02 PM, Chun Wang <1240902 at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:
>> Whilst it would be nice if miners in China can carry on forever regardless
>> of their internet situation, nobody has any inherent "right" to mine if they
>> can't do the job - if miners in China can't get the trivial amounts of
>> bandwidth required through their firewall and end up being outcompeted then
>> OK, too bad, we'll have to carry on without them.
>>
>> But I'm not sure why it should be a big deal. They can always run a node on
>> a server in Taiwan and connect the hardware to it via a VPN or so.
>
> Ignorant. You seem do not understand the current situation. We
> suffered from orphans a lot when we started in 2013. It is now your
> turn. If Western miners do not find a China-based VPN into China, or
> if Western pools do not manage to improve their connectivity to China,
> or run a node in China, it would be them to have higher orphans, not
> us. Because we have 50%+.
On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 7:02 PM, Chun Wang <1240902 at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:
>> Whilst it would be nice if miners in China can carry on forever regardless
>> of their internet situation, nobody has any inherent "right" to mine if they
>> can't do the job - if miners in China can't get the trivial amounts of
>> bandwidth required through their firewall and end up being outcompeted then
>> OK, too bad, we'll have to carry on without them.
>>
>> But I'm not sure why it should be a big deal. They can always run a node on
>> a server in Taiwan and connect the hardware to it via a VPN or so.
>
> Ignorant. You seem do not understand the current situation. We
> suffered from orphans a lot when we started in 2013. It is now your
> turn. If Western miners do not find a China-based VPN into China, or
> if Western pools do not manage to improve their connectivity to China,
> or run a node in China, it would be them to have higher orphans, not
> us. Because we have 50%+.

2023-06-07 15:36:04

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-01
📝 Original message:On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:
> Whilst it would be nice if miners in China can carry on forever regardless
> of their internet situation, nobody has any inherent "right" to mine if they
> can't do the job - if miners in China can't get the trivial amounts of
> bandwidth required through their firewall and end up being outcompeted then
> OK, too bad, we'll have to carry on without them.
>
> But I'm not sure why it should be a big deal. They can always run a node on
> a server in Taiwan and connect the hardware to it via a VPN or so.
Ignorant. You seem do not understand the current situation. We
suffered from orphans a lot when we started in 2013. It is now your
turn. If Western miners do not find a China-based VPN into China, or
if Western pools do not manage to improve their connectivity to China,
or run a node in China, it would be them to have higher orphans, not
us. Because we have 50%+.

2023-06-07 15:35:57

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-05-30
📝 Original message:On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 9:57 PM, Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Bad miners could attack us and the network with artificial
>> big blocks.
>
>
> How?
>
> I ran some simulations, and I could not find a network topology where a big
> miner producing big blocks could cause a loss of profit to another miner
> (big or small) producing smaller blocks:
>
> http://gavinandresen.ninja/are-bigger-blocks-better-for-bigger-miners
>
> (the 0.3% advantage I DID find was for the situation where EVERYBODY was
> producing big blocks).
If someone propagate a 20MB block, it will take at best 6 seconds for
us to receive to verify it at current configuration, result of one
percent orphan rate increase. Or, we can mine the next block only on
the previous block's header, in this case, the network would see many
more transaction-less blocks.
Our orphan rate is about 0.5% over the past few months. If the network
floods 20MB blocks, it can be well above 2%. Besides bandwidth, A 20MB
block could contain an average of 50000 transactions, hundred of
thousands of sigops, Do you have an estimate how long it takes on the
submitblock rpccall?
For references, our 30Mbps bandwidth in Beijing costs us 1350 dollars
per month. We also use Aliyun and Linode cloud services for block
propagation. As of May 2015, the price is 0.13 U.S. dollars per GB for
100Mbps connectivity at Aliyun. For a single cross-border TCP
connection, it would be certainly far slower than 12.5 MB/s.
I think we can accept 5MB block at most.
(sorry forgot to cc to the mailing list)

2023-06-07 15:33:43

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-05-29
📝 Original message:Hello. I am from F2Pool. We are currently mining the biggest blocks on
the network. So far top 100 biggest bitcoin blocks are all from us. We
do support bigger blocks and sooner rather than later. But we cannot
handle 20 MB blocks right now. I know most blocks would not be 20 MB
over night. But only if a small fraction of blocks more than 10 MB, it
could dramatically increase of our orphan rate, result of higher fee
to miners. Bad miners could attack us and the network with artificial
big blocks. As yhou know, other Chinese pools, AntPool, BW, they
produces ASIC chips and mining mostly with their own machines. They do
not care about a few percent of orphan increase as much as we do. They
would continue their zero fee policy. We would be the biggest loser.
As the exchanges had taught us, zero fee is not health to the network.
Also we have to redevelop our block broadcast logic. Server bandwidth
is a lot more expensive in China. And the Internet is slow. Currently
China has more than 50% of mining power, if block size increases, I
bet European and American pools could suffer more than us. We think
the max block size should be increased, but must be increased
smoothly, 2 MB first, and then after one or two years 4 MB, then 8 MB,
and so on. Thanks.
On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 6:02 AM, Matt Corallo <bitcoin-list at bluematt.me> wrote:
> OK, so lets do that. I've seen a lot of "I'm not entirely comfortable
> with committing to this right now, but think we should eventually", but
> not much "I'd be comfortable with committing to this when I see X". In
> the interest of ignoring debate and pushing people towards a consensus
> at all costs, ( ;) ) I'm gonna go ahead and suggest we talk about the
> second.
>
> Personally, there are several things that worry me significantly about
> committing to a blocksize increase, which I'd like to see resolved
> before I'd consider supporting a blocksize increase commitment.
>
> * Though there are many proposals floating around which could
> significantly decrease block propagation latency, none of them are
> implemented today. I'd expect to see these not only implemented but
> being used in production (though I dont particularly care about them
> being all that stable). I'd want to see measurements of how they perform
> both in production and in the face of high packet loss (eg across the
> GFW or in the case of small/moderate DoS). In addition, I'd expect to
> see analysis of how these systems perform in the worst-case, not just
> packet-loss-wise, but in the face of miners attempting to break the system.
>
> * I'd very much like to see someone working on better scaling
> technology, both in terms of development and in terms of getting
> traction in the marketplace. I know StrawPay is working on development,
> though its not obvious to me how far they are from their website, but I
> dont know of any commitments by large players (either SPV wallets,
> centralized wallet services, payment processors, or any others) to
> support such a system (to be fair, its probably too early for such
> players to commit to anything, since anything doesnt exist in public).
>
> * I'd like to see some better conclusions to the discussion around
> long-term incentives within the system. If we're just building Bitcoin
> to work in five years, great, but if we want it all to keep working as
> subsidy drops significantly, I'd like a better answer than "we'll deal
> with it when we get there" or "it will happen, all the predictions based
> on people's behavior today say so" (which are hopefully invalid thanks
> to the previous point). Ideally, I'd love to see some real free pressure
> already on the network starting to develop when we commit to hardforking
> in a year. Not just full blocks with some fees because wallets are
> including far greater fees than they really need to, but software which
> properly handles fees across the ecosystem, smart fee increases when
> transactions arent confirming (eg replace-by-fee, which could be limited
> to increase-in-fees-only for those worried about double-spends).
>
> I probably forgot one or two and certainly dont want to back myself into
> a corner on committing to something here, but those are a few things I
> see today as big blockers on larger blocks.
>
> Luckily, people have been making progress on building the software
> needed in all of the above for a while now, but I think they're all
> very, very immature today.
>
> On 05/07/15 19:13, Jeff Garzik wrote:> On Thu, May 7, 2015 at 3:03 PM,
> Matt Corallo <bitcoin-list at bluematt.me
>> <mailto:bitcoin-list at bluematt.me>> wrote:
> -snip-
>>> If, instead, there had been an intro on the list as "I think we should
>>> do the blocksize increase soon, what do people think?", the response
>>> could likely have focused much more around creating a specific list of
>>> things we should do before we (the technical community) think we are
>>> prepared for a blocksize increase.
>>
>> Agreed, but that is water under the bridge at this point. You - rightly
>> - opened the topic here and now we're discussing it.
>>
>> Mike and Gavin are due the benefit of doubt because making a change to a
>> leaderless automaton powered by leaderless open source software is
>> breaking new ground. I don't focus so much on how we got to this point,
>> but rather, where we go from here.
>
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