jk_14 at op.pl [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

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🗓️ Active from 2022-07-26 to 2023-05-26
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2023-06-07 23:18:03

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📅 Original date posted:2023-01-02
🗒️ Summary of this message: Bitcoin's deflation is more complex than in gold, with repercussions for network security. Delaying halvings may be better than not, but won't solve the problem.
📝 Original message:Right now security comes from almost fully from ~1.8% inflation.
In November mempool was inflated to ~150MB and people were rather waiting for cheap transactions back.
Instead of being happy that system is closer for a while to default working area.
Deflation in Bitcoin is not 1:1 matter like in gold, for example.
If all plain gold available to mine would be finished - gold mines as unprofitable enterprices are immediately closed.
And it doesn't affect security of gold already in circulation.
In Bitcoin "the show must go on" and someone must pay for it.
Active and passive users together (balanced by market play) or: only active users (in current scenario, long-term).
Deflation (or more precisely: tiny inflation) in Bitcoin is more complex issue with more repercussions than in gold.
In case of drop of network security - the tax will be paid anyway, in Bitcoin price.
So, there is an self-regulating mechanism here. The harsh one, but still.
W dniu 2023-01-02 05:53:57 użytkownik Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud at gmail.com> napisał:
> is surely better than not delaying it.
I might agree, but I don't think it really solves the problem well enough to be worth it. Any solution that would solve the problem better would make delaying halvings unnecessary.
> there is non-zero risk that people will hoard it more and more, according to old Gresham's law
Gresham's law doesn't apply here. Gresham's law is about the interaction between two currencies with a fixed, usually government-enforced exchange rate. You seem to be saying that Bitcoin will be hoarded because Bitcoin inflation reduces every halving. But even with 0 inflation, it certainly won't cause all Bitcoin to be hoarded. Also, "hoarding" is also known as "saving", and there's nothing wrong with saving. The spectre of deflation comes from a misunderstanding of deflation and why it happens during bad economic times. It is an effect, not a cause.
On Sun, Jan 1, 2023, 15:23 <jk_14 at op.pl> wrote:
Yes, the idea is:
if mining activity is growing - let's execute consecutive halvings
but if miner exodus has happened - let's delay next halving until mining activity is recovered to previous levels
If it gets to the point where a sudden drop in mining difficulty happens - delaying the next halving may be not sufficient to correct, but is surely better than not delaying it.
While Bitcoin is better and better money with every halving in comparision to other types of money - there is non-zero risk that people will hoard it more and more, according to old Gresham's law ("HODL"). And this way decreasing liquidity / transactions volume. The positive feedback loop - is my real concern here.
Regarding the relationship between difficulty and security - I fully agree.
But ASIC technology is already matured. And also any technology breakthrough is a short event within 4 years period.
So growth of difficulty could be gained by technology breakthrough, but any sudden drop of difficulty would be always an issue, while there is no such thing as: ASIC technology regression.
Obviously, not complicated solution would be better than complicated one.
W dniu 2022-12-30 19:21:10 użytkownik Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud at gmail.com> napisał:
If the idea is to ensure that a catastrophic miner exodus doesn't happen, the "difference" you're calculating should only care about downward differences. Upward differences indicate more mining activity and so shouldn't cause a halving skip.
But I don't think any scheme like this that only acts on the basis of difficulty will be sufficient. If it gets to the point where a sudden drop in mining difficulty happens, it is very likely that simply delaying the next halving or even ending halving all together will not be sufficient to correct for whatever is causing hashrate to tank. There is also the danger of simple difficulty stagnation, which this mechanism wouldn't detect.
The relationship between difficulty and security becomes less and less predictable the longer you want to look ahead. There's no long term relation between difficulty and any reasonable security target. A security target might be something like "no colluding group with less than $1 trillion dollars at their disposal could successfully 51% attack the network (with a probability of blah blah)". There is no way to today program in any code that detects based on difficult alone when that criteria is violated. You would have to program in assumptions about the cost of hashrate projected into the future.
I can't think of any robust automatic way to do this. I think to a certain degree, it will have to be a change that happens in a fork of some kind (soft or hard) periodically (every 10 years? 30 years?). The basic relations needed is really the cost in Bitcoin of the security target (ie the minimum number of Bitcoin it should take to 51% attack the system) and the cost in Bitcoin of acquiring a unit of hashrate. This could be simply input into the code, or could use some complicated oracle system. But with that relation, the system could be programmed to calculate the difficulty necessary to keep the system secure.
Once that is in place, the system could automatically adjust the subsidy up or down to attract more or less miners, or it could adjust the block size up or down to change the fee market such that more or less total fees are collected each block to attract more or less miners.
On Tue, Dec 27, 2022, 09:41 Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
It seems like the more elegant solution could be by using a chainwork parameter instead.
i.e. comparison just before halving - if the last 210,000 block interval has a higher chainwork difference between the begining and the end of interval
than any other such inter-halving interval before.
LIttle digression yet:
A system in which all users participate in ensuring its security looks better than one in which only some (i.e. active) of them participate (and passive stakeholders are de facto free riders)
In my opinion this concept above is only the complement of currently missing mechanism: achieving equilibrium regarding costs of security between two parties with opposing interests.
It's easy to understand and - most important - it has no hardcoded value of tail emission - what is the clear proof it is based on a free market.
And last but not least, if someone is 100% sure that income from transactions will takeover security support from block subsidy - accepting such proposal is like putting the money where the mouth is: this safety measure will never be triggered, then (no risk of fork)
Best Regards
Jaroslaw
W dniu 2022-12-23 20:29:20 użytkownik Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> napisał:
>
Necessary or not - it doesn't hurt to plan the robust model, just in case. The proposal is:
Let every 210,000 the code calculate the average difficulty of 100 last retargets (100 fit well in 210,000 / 2016 = 104.166)
and compare with the maximum of all such values calculated before, every 210,000 blocks:
if average_diff_of_last_100_retargets > maximum_of_all_previous_average_diffs
do halving
else
do nothing
This way:
1. system cannot be played
2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of network security
Best Regards
Jaroslaw
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2023-06-07 23:18:02

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📅 Original date posted:2023-01-01
🗒️ Summary of this message: A proposal for a halving system based on average difficulty is suggested, but it does not address the immediate danger of profit margins and hashing power. A demurrage soft-fork may be a more plausible solution.
📝 Original message:Is a storage fee averaged out over many future blocks - but not hardcoded value and regulated by a free market?
The problem with demurrage I see is that the fee is taken when you spend. There is no additional income for miners if people are still hoarding.
In tail emission even if people are still hoarding - the fee is taken immediately and is distributed to miners.
We have a hope there is still the global adoption ahead (most of countries are like El Salvador). It may increase price and marketcap of Bitcoin by order of magnitude.
And that's why hoarding in demurrage may still exist: due to extremely appealing long-term risk/reward (i.e. relatively small, delayed tax versus huge possible profit)
W dniu 2022-12-31 00:29:08 użytkownik Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> napisał:
> On Fri, Dec 23, 2022 at 07:43:36PM +0100, jk_14 at op.pl wrote:
>
> Necessary or not - it doesn't hurt to plan the robust model, just in case. The proposal is:
>
> Let every 210,000 the code calculate the average difficulty of 100 last retargets (100 fit well in 210,000 / 2016 = 104.166)
> and compare with the maximum of all such values calculated before, every 210,000 blocks:
>
>
> if average_diff_of_last_100_retargets > maximum_of_all_previous_average_diffs
> do halving
> else
> do nothing
>
>
> This way:
>
> 1. system cannot be played
> 2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of network security
First of all - while I suspct you already understand this issue - I should
point out the following:
The immediate danger we have with halvings is that in a competitive market,
profit margins tend towards marginal costs - the cost to produce an additional
unit of production - rather than total costs - the cost necessary to recover
prior and future expenses. Since the halving is a sudden shock to the system,
under the right conditions we could have a significant amount of hashing power
just barely able to afford to hash prior to the halving, resulting in all that
hashing power immediately having to shut down and fees increasing dramatically,
and likely, chaotically. Your proposal does not address that problem as it can
only measure difficulty prior to the halving point.
Other than that problem, I agree that this proposal would, at least in theory,
be a positive improvement on the status quo. But it is a hard fork and I don't
think there is much hope for such hard forks to be implemented. I believe that
a demmurrage soft-fork, implemented via a storage fee averaged out over many
future blocks, has a much more plausible route towards implementation.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

2023-06-07 23:17:58

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📅 Original date posted:2022-12-27
📝 Original message:It seems like the more elegant solution could be by using a chainwork parameter instead.
i.e. comparison just before halving - if the last 210,000 block interval has a higher chainwork difference between the begining and the end of interval
than any other such inter-halving interval before.
LIttle digression yet:
A system in which all users participate in ensuring its security looks better than one in which only some (i.e. active) of them participate (and passive stakeholders are de facto free riders)
In my opinion this concept above is only the complement of currently missing mechanism: achieving equilibrium regarding costs of security between two parties with opposing interests.
It's easy to understand and - most important - it has no hardcoded value of tail emission - what is the clear proof it is based on a free market.
And last but not least, if someone is 100% sure that income from transactions will takeover security support from block subsidy - accepting such proposal is like putting the money where the mouth is: this safety measure will never be triggered, then (no risk of fork)
Best Regards
Jaroslaw
W dniu 2022-12-23 20:29:20 użytkownik Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> napisał:
>
Necessary or not - it doesn't hurt to plan the robust model, just in case. The proposal is:
Let every 210,000 the code calculate the average difficulty of 100 last retargets (100 fit well in 210,000 / 2016 = 104.166)
and compare with the maximum of all such values calculated before, every 210,000 blocks:
if average_diff_of_last_100_retargets > maximum_of_all_previous_average_diffs
do halving
else
do nothing
This way:
1. system cannot be played
2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of network security
Best Regards
Jaroslaw
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bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 23:17:57

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📅 Original date posted:2022-12-23
📝 Original message:Necessary or not - it doesn't hurt to plan the robust model, just in case. The proposal is:
Let every 210,000 the code calculate the average difficulty of 100 last retargets (100 fit well in 210,000 / 2016 = 104.166)
and compare with the maximum of all such values calculated before, every 210,000 blocks:
if average_diff_of_last_100_retargets > maximum_of_all_previous_average_diffs
do halving
else
do nothing
This way:
1. system cannot be played
2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of network security
Best Regards
Jaroslaw

2023-06-07 23:12:49

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-08-18
📝 Original message:Fortunately halving in 2020 will be non destructive because it looks like we will have higher difficulty in 2024 than in 2020.
Let's assume the worst case scenario: after halving in 2024, we have regression of difficulty in 2028. Annual inflation rate in 2028 is 0.81%. Removal of halvings in this year means that in year 2100 (72 years later) we will have 0.51% annual inflation rate, still. And that is Monero concept in fact: constant annual supply, thus very slowly decreasing of inflation.
Yes, you are right. Better that that - would be to wait for bitcoin ecosystem to show us what is the equilibrium/saturation level at globe scale - I hope it will be several years later and "the annual inflation to keep" - will be 0.40% in 2032 or even 0.20% only in 2036.
And then instead of halving every 210k blocks - just to adjust the block reward (i.e. slightly increase). To keep the annual inflation rate constant. Constant forever. On most proper level - because determined empirically. I didn't propose it, because of certain, immediate backlash :)
And for the same reason, as an answer how much security we need. Empirically reached security level is - the most accurate one. In military terminology: the protection of already conquered land. Regression is sign of weakness and we probably don't want to see it in Bitcoin.
Anyway, keeping Bitcoin in the middle of ultra-obvious Edge Case, with pathological Friedman's "free lunches" for stakeholders, due to this overtaxing (punish) people which are simply want to use Bitcoin, additionally with pure form of Prisoner's Dilemma here, and with Trust to "large" stakeholders, while almost every of them will convince himself he is not really a large one and "let Microstrategy run Antminers" (and burn money)
- and all above only because we are too greed to pay miners as low as only few tenths of a percent per year for their real service as keeping network secure, pay in most honest way, because with no exceptions and proportionally to holdings - and instead of it we rather prefer to take the high risk of spiral of death - is madness.
Pure madness. This is what almost 50y old cynic may assure you.
Regards
Jaroslaw
W dniu 2022-08-18 17:44:29 użytkownik Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud at gmail.com> napisał:
While constant tail emission does in fact converge to 0 inflation over time (which bitcoin's halvings do as well mind you), tail emission does *not* solve the potential problem of mining rewards, it only delays it. A tail emission of 200,000 btc/year (~1% of the current supply) would be equivalent to halvings every ~50 years rather than every 4 years. Were we to implement this kind of thing right after the last non-" destructive" halving, it would buy us 46 years of extra time. Nothing more, nothing less.
While its mildly interesting to know that tail emission converges to a stable point, while no inflation implies monetary deflation at the rate of loss, this feels very likely to be an insignificant problem. I think 1% loss rate per year is an absurdly high estimate these days, and the loss rate is likely to decrease as methods of storing bitcoin mature. Imagine bitcoin was worth $1 trillion (not so hard, since it was not too long ago), then try imagining people losing $10 billion of bitcoin every year. Highly unlikely IMO. A rate of loss of 0.01%/year might be more realistic for a near-future mature bitcoin. That's not going to be enough to make a significant difference even over 100s of years.
If we actually wanted to solve the potential problem of not-enough-fees to upkeep mining security, there are less temporary ways to solve that. For example, if fees end up not being able to support sufficient mining, we could add emission based on a constant fraction of fees in the block. For example, every block could emit new bitcoin amounting to 10% of the fees collected in that block. This would tie coinbase rewards to the real world (since the fee market is tied to the real economy) and ensure higher block revenue indefinitely - ie not just for another 50 years.
But its also worth saying that blockchain security (which mining revenue correlates with) does *not* need to increase indefinitely. There is some amount of security (and therefore some amount of mining revenue) that is sufficient, beyond which additional security is simply unnecessary, unwarranted, and wasteful (you wouldn't buy a $1000 safe to store $1000 of valuables). Do we, as the bitcoin community, have some good idea how much security we need? Do we have some idea how costly a 51% attack must be where we can be comfortable it will never happen? I'm curious to hear what people think about that. Because without having some kind of estimates of what "enough security" is, there's absolutely no way of evaluating whether or not its likely that bitcoin fees alone will be able to sustain enough security.
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2023-06-07 23:12:47

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📅 Original date posted:2022-08-17
📝 Original message:On one scale you puts the Trust to the large stakeholders (why we avoid plenty of small stakeholders, btw),
and on the other side I put game theory and well defined Prisoner's Dilemma.
Again: large stakeholders WILL NOT incentivised to mine, they will have the hundreds excuses why not to switch-on Antminers back.
That's how it simply works. Bitcoin would fail miserably if Satoshi was based his concept mainly on existence of idealists.
If we will observe lack of hashrate recovery four years after some halving and still unprepared like today
- means the trust in large stakeholders was a very costly mistake.
Superiority of Proof of Work against Proof of Stake has been discussed enough either
The overall conclusion with what I fully agree is: swapping PoW to PoS - would be a degradation.
You can stop talking about degradation to proof of stake, but just: degradation.
Degradation of Bitcoin, due to human greed.
Now you mine and you have an INSTANT gratification.
Then you will mine and it will cost you real money, but simple switch - and you have a DELAYED, maybe some day in the future, maybe only a tiny - punishment.
And The Punishment Won't Be Tiny.
"If the pain after hitting the hand with a hammer would appear after a month - people would notoriously walk with swollen fingers"
100% (^2)
Regards
Jaroslaw
W dniu 2022-08-17 13:10:38 użytkownik Erik Aronesty <erik at q32.com> napisał:
> you can stop talking about the "security of the system" as meaningful
> this has been discussed enough
> if fees are not sufficient, clearance times increase and large stakeholders are incentivised to mine
> in the best case, fees are sufficient
> in the worst case, it degrades to proof of stake
> i'm sure you can see how that's fine either way
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2023-06-07 23:12:43

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📅 Original date posted:2022-08-15
📝 Original message:> New blog post:
> https://petertodd.org/2022/surprisingly-tail-emission-is-not-inflationary
Tail emission is inevitable, Milton Friedman says...
The key thing here in my opinion is to properly understand the seriousness of the situation.
"There is no such thing as a free lunch" - is definitely helpful quote here.
There are two edge cases.
1. while starting given cryptocurrency
- the annual inflation is huge, nobody (in developed/mature monetary system) would like to keep such kind of money with e.g. 100% annual inflation rate, but from the other side there is no problem for transaction fee to be free of charge here
2. while given cryptocurrency is switching off the block reward, in supposed "mature phase":
- the annual inflation is zero, everyone want to hoard such money, transaction fees must carry the whole security of the system
In the first edge case: active users have got "free lunches" and passive users (i.e. holders) are paying for it (by "inflation tax")
In the second edge case: passive users have got "free lunches" and active users should pay for it (by "transactional tax")
So far I only highlighted some maybe not very well recognized, but pure facts (it's not comfortable to contradict the facts...)
The reason people do pay in the first phase - is a hope/promise of system growth (future coin price appreciation = profit)
The problem in the second phase is that there is no real incentive for people to pay for other's free lunches.
Any wishful thinking that most (or even: any significant part) of holders will resign from a free lunch and will buy and run ASIC mining equipment at loss - is just a delusional perspective. It's well proven by game theory and what says us the Prisoner's Dilemma about it. For better understanding - here is my modified version of Prisoner's Dilemma short description:
"The Prisoner's Dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why completely rational large holders might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so."
I'm pretty sure we will have a textbook case of Prisoner's Dilemma here.
As a useful example - let's assume that fees don't compensate low block reward. Btw, right now a single transaction fee need to be $60 to compensate that (and it will only get worse in time). System is not inclusive with $60 per transaction fee. Only rich people will use it. Another possible scenario is a x100 drop of network hashrate to catch a previous fee levels. The network is x100 less secure, then. It really doesn't matter if this process is spread over the long run...
So, for example - let every 10 BTC holding needs to be secured by one Antminer S19 running.
In an ideal world every large bitcoin holder will run proper amount of ASICs and run it at loss.
The holders of less than 10 BTC - will organize "group pays", this time for sharing loss (electricity costs)
Exactly the same way like people made "group buys" of ASIC hardware in 2013.
I hope it's clear that in the real world it WILL NOT work. People will simply think, that there is only a tiny punishment for betrayal.
Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while he/she can sell this energy for the market price. Even Bitcoin can't beat the human nature.
Thanks to Milton Friedman - we can easily say that situation with "free lunches" (at least for some part of users) - is an unhealthy state of financial system.
And may last only exceptionally for short period of time, and definitely not as a default state. System must be sustainable and time to accept that there is a real problem here (or: an elephant in the room - but maybe not such invisible like was before).
The good news is a natural solution exists. Bitcoin can solve this issue natural way.
While decreasing block reward and moving from the first edge case to the second one - the system naturally cross the Area of Balance.
And healthy system should stay somewhere in such area. And that's exactly what Monero did. But they did it arbitrally, at 0.9% level.
Bitcoin is able to do it much better - because empirically.
There is a simple trigger if the system is leaving an Area of Balance and cross the line of Phase 2 with "free lunches". The network difficulty / global network hashrate chart.
Four years after some particular halving (in 2028, 2032 or later - no matter when in fact) - we will (definitely) see difficulty is not recovered during four long years.
This is a big red light. It means that halvings starts to be destructive to the network security.
Something what became destructive to the network - must be removed. Halving must be removed in such moment. Moment determined empirically - what is good thing. Satoshi Nakamoto wasn't able to properly predict when this moment may appear, but we are in better situation.
"Bitcoin to the moon" (and any other pro-21M hardcap shortsighted slogans) - must have a lower priority than network security/health.
I'm sure Satoshi would agree with it. Of course, someone may set up such environment, where holders (i.e. passive users) have got a free lunches
and security of network is based on active users' shoulders only. Someone could even insist that it is quite fair...
But please don't expect a lack of impact for the network security where not all, but only a part of users - participate in supporting network health.
Many people don't realise a simple fact: keeping destructive halvings in such situation above, just for maximising appreciation of already hoarded coins
- is counterproductive. Because the network security is decreasing.
We have a lot of time yet to educate people about it - for reaching common consensus for halvings removal with "ease".
We should probably use Milton Friedman's quote and highlight that balanced system with 0.45% / 0.225% / 0.1125% (?) annual inflation rate (and slowly decreasing)
- is still enormously better than any surrounding fiat system. But system still balanced and stable - and not in spiral of death...
“Bitcoin should have had a 0.1% or 1% monetary inflation tax to pay for security,” Peter said long time ago, further arguing bitcoin will die if it doesn’t change the limit.
I fully agree with Peter. The halvings should be removed in case it starts to be destructive to the network security (lack of hashrate recovery during long 4 years after given halving). Because that means bitcoin system has reached equilibrium / saturation on a globe scale level. The evolutionary path is the best path.
The worst path is: overcomplicated constructs, completely unclear for Average Joe. Additional merge-mining coins, whatever etc. - just to achieve the same final goal.
KISS = Keep It Simple. Halving removal is the most honest, simplest and most understandable way to make every bitcoin pasive user to participate in keeping Bitcoin network secure. It just force the rule, that someone pay proportionally to amount of bitcoins he/she hold, and all participants are sure that everybody participate (no Prisoner's Dilemma, what is crucial matter)
Yes, that means: hard fork. But as written above - Bitcoin will die without the solution.
Bitcoin may be also out of sudden in a deadly risk from quantum computers. In such circumstances everyone (or: almost, i.e. everyone who cares) - would immediately download a quantum resistant, freshly released bitcoin wallet, no doubt. And these two dangers are similar at least in one aspect: both will cause the spiral of death.
Widespread consensus would be the best scenario, but from the other side: a fork always shows retrospectively, who was right (BCH turmoil in 2017)
Regards
Jaroslaw
P.S some other resources yet:
"Friedman originally proposed a fixed monetary rule, called Friedman's k-percent rule, where the money supply would be automatically increased by a fixed percentage per year. Under this rule, there would be no leeway for the central reserve bank, as money supply increases could be determined "by a computer", and business could anticipate all money supply changes. With other monetarists he believed that the active manipulation of the money supply or its growth rate is more likely to destabilise than stabilise the economy.
Most monetarists oppose the gold standard. Friedman, for example, viewed a pure gold standard as impractical.[9] For example, whereas one of the benefits of the gold standard is that the intrinsic limitations to the growth of the money supply by the use of gold would prevent inflation, if the growth of population or increase in trade outpaces the money supply, there would be no way to counteract deflation and reduced liquidity (and any attendant recession) except for the mining of more gold"
no block reward => reduced liquidity (reduced number of transactions) => network security in spiral of death
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetarism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman%27s_k-percent_rule
https://twitter.com/hasufl/status/1511470668457652224
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