Mistr Bigs [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

⚠️ This account is not associated with a real person. It's an archival account for mailing list messages.
🗓️ Active from 2014-06-17 to 2015-07-02
💬 Posted a total of 5 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: Bitcoin-development, bitcoin-dev
🔇 Please do not DM this user as it's used for archive purposes only.

Last Notes

2023-06-07 15:41:29

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📅 Original date posted:2015-07-02
📝 Original message:I'm an end user running a full node on an aging laptop.
I think this is a great suggestion! I'd love to know what system
requirements are needed for running Bitcoin Core.
On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 6:04 AM, Jean-Paul Kogelman <jeanpaulkogelman at me.com>
wrote:
> I’m a game developer. I write time critical code for a living and have to
> deal with memory, CPU, GPU and I/O budgets on a daily basis. These budgets
> are based on what we call a minimum specification (of hardware); min spec
> for short. In most cases the min spec is based on entry model machines that
> are available during launch, and will give the user an enjoyable experience
> when playing our games. Obviously, we can turn on a number of bells and
> whistles for people with faster machines, but that’s not the point of this
> mail.
>
> The point is, can we define a min spec for Bitcoin Core? The number one
> reason for this is: if you know how your changes affect your available
> budgets, then the risk of breaking something due to capacity problems is
> reduced to practically zero.
>
>
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2023-06-07 15:41:29

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2023-06-07 15:28:16

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📅 Original date posted:2014-12-29
📝 Original message:As an outside observer, I have to say I also found Peter's sardonic message
tone inappropriate for furthering the discussion.
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2023-06-07 15:27:35

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📅 Original date posted:2014-11-27
📝 Original message:That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing
transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor
limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address
the issues in Bitcoin proper?
M
On 11/27/2014 9:30 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 5:44 PM, <misterbg6 at gmail.com> wrote:
I might be mistaken, but it seems to me this paper discusses unintended ways
of obtaining the IP addresses of clients involved in transactions on the
core Bitcoin network.
You're mistaken. :)
If a node is used exclusively via tor it effectively doesn't have a IP address.
(short of bugs of a class that aren't discussed here)
The paper is about fingerprinting approaches that probabilistically
connect transactions to hosts that you can already identify their IPs.
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2023-06-07 15:27:34

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📅 Original date posted:2014-11-27
📝 Original message:I might be mistaken, but it seems to me this paper discusses unintended
ways of obtaining the IP addresses of clients involved in transactions on
the core Bitcoin network.
Tor was mentioned only insofar as it might be one's first thought of how to
mitigate this risk, yet Bitcoin over Tor has its own problems that prevent
this from being effective.
But the primary "issues" mentioned in the paper are regarding a Bitcoin
node in default operation, no?
"In their new study, researchers at the Laboratory of Algorithmics,
Cryptology and Security of the University of Luxembourg have shown that
Bitcoin does not protect user's IP address and that it can be linked to the
user's transactions in real-time."
"The basic idea behind these findings is that Bitcoin entry nodes, to which
the user's computer connects in order to make a transaction, form a unique
identifier for the duration of user's session. This unique pattern can be
linked to a user's IP address. Moreover, transactions made during one
session, even those made via unrelated pseudonyms, can be linked together.
With this method, hackers can reveal up to 60 percent of the IP addresses
behind the transactions made over the Bitcoin network."
"'This Bitcoin network analysis combined with previous research on
transaction flows shows that the level of anonymity in the Bitcoin network
is quite low,' explains Dr. Alex Biryukov."
M
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2023-06-07 15:23:02

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📅 Original date posted:2014-06-17
📝 Original message:I have been surprised by the lack of discussion of this topic here!
On 6/17/2014 10:57 AM, Raúl Martínez wrote:
We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate.
While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful.
The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happening again.
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