phantomcircuit [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

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🗓️ Active from 2011-06-16 to 2011-07-26
💬 Posted a total of 2 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: Bitcoin-development
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2023-06-07 02:07:59

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📅 Original date posted:2011-07-26
🗒️ Summary of this message: Implementing DNS resolution is easier than properly checking HTTPS certificate chains, which is vulnerable to attacks like self-signed certificates. DNSSEC is not a good solution for Bitcoin address communication.
📝 Original message:dns resolution is far simpler to implement than properly checking the https certificate chain
Matt Corallo <bitcoin-list at bluematt.me> wrote:
>For some reason my mail client is being thick and not responding
>on-list, sorry about that...
>
>On Tue, 2011-07-26 at 08:34 -0700, Rick Wesson wrote:
>> > Most OSes dont do any resolving at all, they just query upstream
>> > resolvers. In the case of the coffee shop, that upstream resolver is
>> > the attacker. This attacker can easily just claim that the zone you
>> > requested is not DNSSEC signed and return their data and the OS will not
>> > be any wiser. AFAIK, most OSes dont have a mechanism to require the
>> > zone queried is DNSSEC signed meaning you have to implement a full DNS
>> > resolver in Bitcoin in order for it to be secure.
>>
>> Matt,
>>
>> The same attack can apply to https with a self signed cert where it is
>> the A record that is replaced by the attacker and the https request is
>> sent to evil.com's server which responds to the request with an answer
>> in the form you expect. This is what lots of malware does on windows
>> to steel bank login credentials, securing http doesn't prevent such an
>> attack.
>If you are using a self-signed cert to do any kind of important data
>transfer you are just being stupid. Here I am assuming your computer
>isnt actually compromised, but only the network is, which I think is a
>fairly good assumption.
>>
>> Windows has supported DNSSEC since 2008 as have most of the unix
>> variants, mac osx since 10.3 Android also seems to include DNSSEC
>> capable resolvers.
>>
>> If this thread is really about DNSSEC then we might move it to a more
>> appropriate forum for discussing how applications leverage DNS
>> security extensions. Its taken some years to get the specs done and
>> the root signed I expect it to take many more to enable the
>> applications to leverage the deployed infrastructure.
>No, DNSSEC is very well done, this thread is specifically about the
>security implications of using DNSSEC for Bitcoin address communication.
>IMO it is not a good idea, as for it to be secure against a coffee-shop
>network MITMer you have to implement a full resolver with root trust
>anchors and knowledge of root servers in Bitcoin, which does not seem
>like a good idea.
>>
>> I am interested in working on the issues surrounding usability and I
>> find that remembering and communicating a bitcoin address are current
>> limiting factors in the acceptance and deployment of this software. My
>> goal is for simpler user experience.
>I totally agree, however I don't think DNS-based resolving is a good
>idea here. HTTPS does have several advantages over a DNSSEC-based
>solution without any significant drawbacks that I can see.
>
>Matt
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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2023-06-07 02:07:59

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2023-06-07 01:56:38

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📅 Original date posted:2011-06-16
🗒️ Summary of this message: Experts suggest air-gapped wallets to improve Bitcoin wallet security, but an insecure PC remains a major vulnerability. Scratch off branch with email and password is a better solution.
📝 Original message:On 06/16/11 20:18, Luke-Jr wrote:
> On Thursday, June 16, 2011 1:59:56 PM Jeff Garzik wrote:
>>> 2) Wallet security.
>> Agreed, though security professionals (and luke-jr) are already
>> pointing out the wallet crypto mainly eliminates a bit of bad PR,
>> rather than being a major crime deterrent.
>>
>> zooko on IRC had a pretty good suggestion: introduce a built-in
>> facility for air-gapped wallets (multiple wallets), so that loss of
>> your everyday transactional wallet does not mean loss of everything.
> Even if you do this, a cracker can still simply send your encrypted wallet to
> himself, secure-delete your local one, kill your client, and demand you
> publish your password if you want some portion of your coins back.
>
> I'm not sure there's *any* defense for an insecure PC. Maybe Bitcoin will end
> up forcing people to reconsider their priorities when it comes to security...
Jeff's scratch off branch modified to use email (as unique salt) and
password would eliminate the need for a static wallet.dat for 99% of the
userbase. This seems like a much better solution than encryption.
(Although obviously it's still vulnerable to key loggers).

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