Chris Gough [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

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🗓️ Active from 2018-05-10 to 2018-05-11
💬 Posted a total of 2 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: Lightning-dev
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2023-06-09 12:50:27

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📅 Original date posted:2018-05-10
📝 Original message:
On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 9:18 AM, Jim Posen <jim.posen at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hmm, I'm not quite following the situation. What do you mean by "directs
> normal traffic"? Since the sender constructs the entire circuit, routing
> nodes do not get any discretion over which nodes to forward a payment to,
<facepalm>
> only whether to forward or fail. What an attacker could do is perform a loop
> attack and send a payment to another node that they control and delay the
> payment on the receiving end. Note that the sending node loses no
> reputation, only the receiving node. Since the hops being attacked are the
> ones in the middle and they are faithfully enforcing the reputation
> protocol, the receiving node's reputation should be penalized properly,
> making it unlikely the attack will succeed in a second attempt.
So the attacker can purchase reputation for the sacrificial node by
sending them legitimate payments, and then spend that reputation (at
the mutual expense of hops) by delaying targeted transactions. But my
question about obscuring the collusion by artificially lowering
reported risk was nonsense based on misunderstanding. Thanks for
helping me understand.
Chris Gough

2023-06-09 12:50:27

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2023-06-09 12:50:26

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📅 Original date posted:2018-05-10
📝 Original message:
hello, I'm a curious lurker trying to follow this conversation:
On Thu, 10 May 2018, 2:40 pm ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev, <
lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> The concern however is that the CLTV already partly leaks the distance
> from the payee, whereas the reputation-loss-rate leaks distance from the
> payer. It is often not interesting to know that some entity is getting
> paid, but it probably far more interesting to know WHO paid WHO, so leaking
> both distances simultaneously is more than twice as worse as leaking just
> one distance.
>
Consider an asymetrically-resourced malevolent node that wants the ability
to harm a specific small nodes without aquiring a bad reputation (and is
willing to pay for it). In preparation, this bad boss node directs normal
traffic to sacrificial nodes they control, while understating the
reputation-risk (truthfully as it turns out, because they have out of band
influence over the node). When the time comes, the sacrificial node
inflicts delay on the victim node and they both suffer, while the boss
keeps her nose clean.
Is it the case that understating risk of legitimate traffic from boss node
to sacrificial node effectively allows transfer of reputation to the
sacrificial node in preparation for attack, while at the same time
obscuring their association?
Chris Gough
>
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2023-06-09 12:50:26

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