GrapheneOS

Open source privacy and security focused mobile OS with Android app compatibility.

Public Key

npub1235tem4hfn34edqh8hxfja9amty73998f0eagnuu4zm423s9e8ksdg0ht5

NIP-05 Address

GrapheneOS_at_grapheneos.social@mostr.pub

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs9g69ua6m5ec6ukstnmnyewj7a4j0gjjn5hu75f7w23d64gczunmgpz4mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumt0wd68ytnsw43qz9thwden5te0v35hgar09ec82c30wfjkcctexf34p3

Publishing to

relay.mostr.pub

ditto.pub/relay

relay.shitforce.one

Author Public Key

npub1235tem4hfn34edqh8hxfja9amty73998f0eagnuu4zm423s9e8ksdg0ht5

Show more details

Last Notes

2024-11-10 17:14:45

Our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer is open source code shipped as part of GrapheneOS which enables optionally installing and running Google apps as regular apps in the standard app sandbox without any special access, control or privileged integration into the OS.

2024-11-10 14:48:02

- reply

@npub129w…lvlj @npub1scl…uywt If you do need to use WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, etc. it's much better on GrapheneOS than Android due to features like Contact Scopes, Sensors toggle, etc. iOS 18 added a subset of our Contact Scopes feature but it has more control on GrapheneOS where you can choose to only give access to parts of the contact information such as the number instead of other details like their name, address or whatever else you have stored.
Can also use a Private Space and secondary users.

2024-11-08 19:25:25

Vanadium version 130.0.6723.102.1 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/130.0.6723.102.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/17198-vanadium-version-130067231021-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #browser

2024-11-06 17:13:11

GmsCompatConfig version 148 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/releases/tag/config-148
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/17141-gmscompatconfig-version-148-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #gmscompat

2024-10-16 09:00:26

GrapheneOS version 2024101600 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024101600
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/16491-grapheneos-version-2024101600-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-10-15 16:36:45

Android 15 is being released today and we should be ready to quickly ship a release based on it as if this is a monthly update, not even a quarterly one.
We already put together builds working well across all supported devices based on the Android 15 Beta and September sources.

2024-10-09 06:34:33

- reply

iOS has direct equivalents to everything that's covered.
If what people take from the article is that they should use a non-Pixel Android device with Google Play, they'll have a dramatically less secure device with the same privacy issues and additional ones from OEM services.

2024-10-09 06:34:28

- reply

It goes through connections for the Google Play network-based location that's offering as an option during the initial setup wizard, the optional Google Play account-based device management, Google Play feature flags, Google Play telemetry, etc. It gets a lot of details wrong.

2024-10-09 06:34:24

- reply

Any non-Pixel device with the standard Google Play integration has similar Google service integration doing the same things. You don't avoid it at all by using a non-Pixel, but you do end up with a device that's far less secure and adds OEM services with their own privacy issues.

2024-10-09 05:59:45

There's a highly inaccurate article about Pixels from Cybernews making the rounds everywhere in privacy communities. It gets the details nearly completely wrong and thoroughly misrepresents things like the optional network-based location used nearly everywhere as Pixel specific.

2024-10-08 17:37:02

GrapheneOS version 2024100800 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024100800
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/16321-grapheneos-version-2024100800-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-10-07 20:58:31

Our understanding is that there will be a stable release of Android 15 on October 15th. We fully ported all our changes to it by September 3rd after the early source code release in September. We'll aim to have a release out within 24h of the stable release being pushed to AOSP.

2024-09-29 23:29:15

GrapheneOS users on 8th/9th gen Pixels are making a massive contribution to getting memory corruption bugs in the open source ecosystem thanks to the nice crash report notifications created by our hardware memory tagging feature. One of the latest fixes:
https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/pull/6727/files

2024-09-06 02:29:02

- reply

Author is willing to fix issues but since ad blockers are cheating it'd need to be moved to another domain after fixing it.
Vanadium will not include rules for cheating at content filtering tests because we think it would be a breach of user trust, regardless of flaws in a test.

2024-09-06 02:28:56

- reply

Here's where Adguard cheats at the test, which is at least done case-by-case with explanations:
https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardFilters/blob/daba77058c72b983f2a46b97dca5b669710a7414/SpywareFilter/sections/specific.txt#L4491-L4521
Some of the tested domains are simply not used on other sites. In other cases, it is used that way but blocking it would break sites so they don't do it.

2024-09-06 02:28:36

- reply

Here's where uBlock Origin simply fudges the results for the test by blocking everything tested by d3ward.github.io:
https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uAssets/blob/master/filters/filters.txt#L14202-L14206
Brave uses uBlock Origin filters as their base set of filters and then extends it, so it's cheating at the test through that too.

2024-09-06 02:28:05

Ad blocking test at https://d3ward.github.io/toolz/adblock is extremely flawed. It tests domains which are not used for ads/tracking and doesn't take into account that mainstream ad blocking is blocking specific paths hosted at those domains. Mainstream ad blockers also cheat at these tests.

2024-09-03 06:32:32

GrapheneOS support for the Pixel 9 Pro Fold is no longer marked experimental and is now available through our production site:
https://grapheneos.org/releases https://grapheneos.org/install/web
Our 2024083100 release has been confirmed to be working and to have a working future upgrade path.

2024-08-24 23:39:46

- reply

Telegram is capable of handing over all messages in every group and regular one-to-one chat to authorities in France or any other country. A real private messaging app like Signal isn't capable of turning over your messages and media. Telegram/Discord aren't private platforms.

2024-08-24 23:39:41

- reply

Telegram has heavily participated in misinformation campaigns targeting actual private messaging apps with always enabled, properly implemented end-to-end encryption such as Signal. Should stop getting any advice from anyone who told you to use Telegram as a private messenger.

2024-08-24 22:43:04

Telegram has full access to all of the content of group chats and regular one-to-one chats due to lack of end-to-end encryption. Their opt-in secret chats use homegrown end-to-end encryption with weaknesses. Deleting the content from the app likely won't remove all copies of it.

2024-08-16 17:55:33

https://x.com/cryps1s/status/1824077327577591827
This is a fake story. Turns out that getting security information from the CISO of a mass surveillance company trying to build a dystopian police state providing police with "predictive policing" software largely based on racial stereotypes is a bad move.

2024-08-15 17:52:34

Wired was manipulated into spreading misinformation to market Palantir and iVerify by misrepresenting a vulnerability in a disabled demo app as being a serious problem which could be exploited in the real world. They should retract the article but won't.
https://wired.com/story/google-android-pixel-showcase-vulnerability/

2024-08-06 20:52:16

- reply

@npub1w52…rqkr Do you think apps like Signal/Molly or Organic Maps are spying on you? You choose which apps you use.

2024-08-06 20:36:34

- reply

@npub1w52…rqkr You won't have privacy/security using carrier-based calls rather than end-to-end encrypted messaging. Decent smartphones are also much more secure than desktops or laptops.

2024-08-06 19:30:57

- reply

Google is actively cracking down on competition in the mobile space by convincing app developers to use their Play Integrity API. Play Integrity API bans using operating systems not licensing Google's apps/services and agreeing to highly restrictive and anti-competitive terms.

2024-08-06 19:28:25

- reply

Android and Chromium would massively benefit from proper collaboration between stakeholders without Google's business model getting in the way. Should be forced to deal with both following the model of the LLVM Foundation and also spin off Google Play into an independent company.

2024-08-06 19:19:40

- reply

We recently published a detailed thread about this here:
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112878067304840664
We're in contact with the regulators in MULTIPLE countries about this. Don't fall for Google pretending Play Integrity API is security related or that their licensing system is about compatibility.

2024-08-06 19:17:29

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/08/google-loses-dojs-big-monopoly-trial-over-search-business/
Action is still urgently needed to address the highly anti-competitive Google Mobiles Services licensing system and the Play Integrity API which are a major part of Google maintaining their monopolies over search and many parts of the mobile market.

2024-08-03 20:29:58

- reply

This new temporary approach should be compatible with any normal VPN apps and services. Only VPN apps which don't provide DNS and depend on sending all DNS requests to the local network will be incompatible but it doesn't really make much sense to support leak blocking for those.

2024-08-03 20:25:37

Our latest release with prevention for most VPN app DNS leaks is currently available in our Alpha and Beta channels:
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112896412987587996
We need more feedback from testing VPN apps and services with leak blocking toggled on, which GrapheneOS already enables by default.

2024-07-31 23:52:09

- reply

Our changes to this resolved most of the compatibility issues with obscure VPN apps. However, Proton VPN is still partially incompatible and doesn't work properly for all users with this leak blocking in place. We aren't sure how to move forward yet. Other apps are compatible.

2024-07-31 15:42:44

- reply

The hardest part of shipping privacy and security improvements is often fully preserving compatibility with the massive number of Android apps. We try to avoid needing toggles to work around compatibility issues, but we make an exception for apps with memory corruption bugs.

2024-07-30 23:36:58

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2024/07/loss-of-popular-2fa-tool-puts-security-minded-grapheneos-in-a-paradox/
The article unfortunately leaves out most of the points we made in the thread.
GrapheneOS supports hardware-based attestation and it's entirely possible for Google to allow it as part of the Play Integrity API. They choose to ban using GrapheneOS.

2024-07-21 00:08:39

- reply

It's common for them to fall behind by a few months for new iOS and Android versions. Android and iOS have no secure way to automatically get devices back into Before First Unlock from After First Unlock as GrapheneOS does so attackers can simply wait until they have an exploit.

2024-07-21 00:06:13

Cellebrite Premium documentation we published in May and which recently received a lot of media coverage was from April 2024. Someone has shared a newer version of the iOS table indicating Cellebrite caught up to iOS 17.5.1 or higher along with the iPhone 15 for the OS exploits.

2024-07-20 23:22:22

GrapheneOS App Store now includes a mirror of Accrescent, which is a privacy and security focused alternative to the Play Store distributing developer builds of apps:
https://accrescent.app/
Accrescent comes from within the GrapheneOS community and we're collaborating together.

2024-07-10 01:06:11

- reply

https://beacondb.net/ is a promising project aiming to allow anyone to host the service or use it from a local client with the same data.
Don't contribute your data to a service trying to centralize control, particularly one from the folks behind the astounding insecure /e/OS.

2024-07-09 12:05:03

- reply

Private Phone Shop site directly states they're targeting one of our team members with harassment because they're on the autism spectrum. They try to fit this into a narrative that the person they're targeting is insane and should be harassed, and support other people doing it.

2024-07-09 11:52:05

Private Phone Shop LLC was selling end-of-life and near end-of-life devices with GrapheneOS to users while using our trademarks throughout their site. We asked them to stop selling devices older than Pixel 6. They ignored us, then blocked us and have been attacking us since then.

2024-07-02 19:43:54

- reply

Their messaging service is simply Matrix. Matrix is not a good private messaging system because it doesn't encrypt any metadata or even emoji reactions, and all that metadata is stored on each server for each room: room members, power levels, time/size/sender of messages, etc.

2024-07-02 16:45:02

- reply

Unplugged in also infringing on the open source licensing multiple projects including DivestOS where they ripped off their AV from without attribution. They even still use DivestOS servers without permission. SkewedZeppelin is lead developer of DivestOS (URLs are in alt text):
https://grapheneos.social/system/media_attachments/files/112/717/901/835/513/037/original/b5294dbb52389d46.png

2024-07-02 16:44:06

- reply

2/2:
https://x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1808159435245646046

2024-07-02 16:43:58

- reply

Since they posted huge tweets, we replied with our own huge tweets with inline quotes of everything they wrote for ease of understanding:
1/2:
https://x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1804634097442324989

2024-06-03 16:46:28

- reply

These are the same false narratives used by authoritarians trying to outlaw end-to-end encryption cannot be trusted to lead a project supposedly helping people maintain their privacy. These false narratives shouldn't be coming from the leader of a project called "Privacy Guides".

2024-06-03 16:46:10

- reply

Tools from Cellebrite and NSO are also heavily used to go after journalists, political opponents, activists, etc. It is true that these tools are almost entirely used by states. It's completely untrue that they're only used by law enforcement let alone only against criminals.

2024-06-03 16:46:02

- reply

One of the primary uses for Cellebrite's tools is violating the rights of people travelling by plane or crossing borders. It's clearly violating legally enshrined rights in many of the countries it's done, so in fact Cellebrite sells their product to people breaking the law...

2024-06-03 16:45:55

- reply

GrapheneOS focusing on protecting users from forensic data extraction and remote compromise with tools from companies like Cellebrite and NSO absolutely doesn't mean we're trying to protect criminals. Jonah claiming these tools are only used by law enforcement is 100% nonsense.

2024-06-03 16:45:51

- reply

Jonah Aragon and Henry Fisher are directly responsible for the 3 swatting attacks by one of their supporters aimed at killing a GrapheneOS project member. Despite that, they're both still trying to direct harassment towards them and further escalating their fabrications/bullying.

2024-06-03 16:45:42

- reply

Multiple members of the Privacy Guides project quit due to Jonah's corruption and extensive involvement in attacks on the GrapheneOS project. For some context, Jonah is one of the core Techlore project members and has been heavily involved in their harassment for multiple years.

2024-06-03 16:45:36

- reply

We've removed our previous thread only because Jonah edited the linked comment to direct harassment towards a specific GrapheneOS project member he has a long history of targeting with fabricated stories as part of bullying. That's why we've posted a new thread as a replacement.

2024-06-03 16:45:30

- reply

A mod banned us from the server with the justification that we were making forensics harder and claimed the server exists to help law enforcement and forensic data extraction. The chat history is still there for anyone who wants to proof Jonah Aragon is once again lying about us.

2024-06-03 16:45:22

- reply

GrapheneOS had been repeatedly mentioned in their channel on mobile devices forensics. We posted a link to https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11860-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-the-wild-fixed-based-on-grapheneos-reports which is on-topic for the channel, useful and relates to past discussions. We also provided some corrections for past discussions about GrapheneOS.

2024-06-03 16:45:11

- reply

Jonah Aragon followed up by pushing a fabricated story claiming we joined a private Discord server used by law enforcement to antagonize them.
The reality is we joined the public Digital Forensics and Incident Response server to participate in discussion about GrapheneOS there.

2024-06-03 16:45:04

Yesterday, we made a post linking to the leader of Privacy Guides (Jonah Aragon) repeatedly pushing the false claim GrapheneOS is marketing itself as making people untouchable by law enforcement and trying to appeal to criminals. It's a thoroughly dishonest attempt to harm us.

2024-06-02 15:46:27

- reply

Our upcoming 2-factor fingerprint unlock will make using a strong passphrase as primary unlock method practical via fingerprint+PIN secondary unlock instead of fingerprint-only. Great for people who want to avoid relying on secure element throttling but don't want fp-only unlock.

2024-06-02 14:41:12

- reply

Default is "Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock" to avoid locking users out of devices with a broken touchscreen. The main threat model for this is defending the device until the auto-reboot timer started when the screen is locked gets user data back at rest.

2024-06-02 14:29:51

- reply

We've also finally added documentation on our USB-C port control to our features page:
https://grapheneos.org/features#usb-c-port-control
Most users can set this to "Charging-only when locked" without a loss of functionality or even "Charging-only" if you don't use USB accessories, DisplayPort or MTP.

2024-06-02 14:28:05

Latest release of GrapheneOS finally shipped the long awaited duress PIN/password implementation. If you have a spare device, we recommend trying it out.
We've added initial documentation to the features page:
https://grapheneos.org/features#duress
It near instantly wipes and shuts down.

2024-06-02 13:00:34

Leader of the Privacy Guides project is now pushing the narrative privacy/security are only for criminals:
https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/claims-made-by-forensics-companies-their-capabilities-and-how-grapheneos-fares/18445/7
Everyone with integrity already left the Privacy Guides project a while ago due to their heavy involvement in harassing GrapheneOS project members.

2024-06-01 07:22:17

GrapheneOS version 2024053100 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024053100
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/13155-grapheneos-version-2024053100-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-06-01 03:57:30

GrapheneOS has been working towards providing accessibility for blind users so we include our own build of TalkBack. We plan to include a text-to-speech (TTS) app and Setup Wizard integration to make it usable out-of-the-box. We can't do much to make installing more accessible.

2024-05-23 23:55:07

Vanadium version 125.0.6422.113.0 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/125.0.6422.113.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/12994-vanadium-version-125064221130-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #browser

2024-05-22 02:16:10

Vanadium version 125.0.6422.72.0 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/125.0.6422.72.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/12933-vanadium-version-12506422720-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #browser

2024-05-21 22:54:54

https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112481434513090992
The latest release of GrapheneOS adds the first piece of our ongoing work on duress/panic features. It makes standard factory resets including by device admin APIs wipe the device near instantly before it reboots to recovery to wipe and format it.

2024-05-07 20:35:24

We've pre-ordered a Pixel 8a for our official device testing farm. They push the Android Open Source Project tags and stock OS factory images on the official release day. Should take us a couple hours to add support for it. We'll build, test and make an official release quickly.

2024-05-03 16:45:32

We'll be blacklisting mailbox.org and websites using it for email hosting for registration on discuss.grapheneos.org and as an alert email for attestation.app. They're blocking emails from our mail server for a convoluted, nonsensical reason and won't stop.

2024-04-22 18:39:07

- reply

One of the two issues (DNS) has spread to discussions about VPN apps elsewhere. Responsibility for blocking leaks is shared between the OS and VPN apps. It's a good thing that the OS provides standard infrastructure for this. Since the OS controls most of it, we can improve this.

2024-04-22 18:36:22

- reply

We're actively looking into these issues. Local network multicast not being blocked as expected is likely an OS bug caused by special handling of multicast. DNS issue may be another missed special case or a race condition, but it's possible the apps are handling it incorrectly.

2024-04-22 18:34:05

One of our community members has been doing testing of Android VPN apps to check for leaks. They've found and reported 2 issues where leak blocking functionality doesn't appear to work as intended: one occurs with local network multicast and the other with DNS while VPN is down.

2024-04-22 16:12:31

- reply

@npub1j44…xp9h If you aren't using Alpha, it's not really relevant to you. It's why we have the Alpha channel. It also doesn't impact the vast majority of users in Alpha, only 3 reports so far.

2024-04-22 15:52:01

We found another regression introduced by a recent f2fs change in the Linux 5.15 LTS branch so we'll have to make another release for Pixel 8 and Pixel 8 Pro before it can reach Beta. Only 2 users doing Alpha channel testing ran into this and one has confirmed reverting it works.

2024-04-16 17:20:06

- reply

Linux SYN cookies rely on TCP timestamps to store full options. If timestamps are disabled as Windows does by default, window scaling and SACK are lost. Not having scaling is horrific (only 65535 bytes in transit at a time). Timestamps are useful so it hurts a bit with them too.

2024-04-16 17:19:53

- reply

Synproxy uses Linux SipHash-based SYN cookies for stateless establishment of TCP connections, but unlike typical SYN cookies it happens at the firewall layer. On success, it injects an ESTABLISHED state connection into conntrack and spoofs the TCP handshake to backend server.

2024-04-16 17:19:44

- reply

Implementing connection limits with nftables required coming up with a good approach to avoid spoofed SYN packets counting towards the limits or bypassing the limits by filling the sets. It also required using synproxy to prevent conntrack table exhaustion, but only when needed.

2024-04-04 22:33:29

We posted about https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11860-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-the-wild-fixed-based-on-grapheneos-reports on the Digital Forensics Discord (https://discord.gg/digitalforensics) used by DFIR students, law enforcement, Cellebrite, etc. It's on-topic and they've regularly talked about GrapheneOS but they got upset about it and banned our project account. 🤷‍♂️

2024-04-03 20:22:05

- reply

See our thread at https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112204428984003954 for more details. It was added to prevent extracting data via fastboot mode vulnerabilities exploited in the wild. There are now 3 features on our list of hardware requirements where we played a major role in getting them added to Pixels.

2024-04-03 20:21:37

Reset attack mitigation for firmware-based boot modes such as fastboot mode has been added as one of our requirements for GrapheneOS support:
https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices
It shipped as part of this month's firmware updates for Pixels based on our proposal. Other OEMs should add it.

2024-03-26 13:49:11

Google is publicly working on a fix for the factory reset vulnerability we reported:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/frameworks/base/+/3008138
Currently, apps using device admin API to wipe do not provide any security against a local attacker since you can interrupt them. Forensic companies are aware of this.

2024-03-18 22:22:58

- reply

@npub18sx…svu2 We still have extended support for the Pixel 5 and will for a while longer but that does not mean you should use it. Get a used Pixel 7a or 6a. Even a Pixel 6a still has more support remaining than the Pixel 5 did on the day it was launched since the Pixel 6 moved to 5 years of support from launch instead of only 3 years. Pixel 8 has moved to 7 years of support from launch. 7 years of support essentially solved this problem.

2024-03-18 22:20:53

- reply

@npub18sx…svu2 There's no operating system which will provide you with full security patches for the Pixel 5. You should replace it. GrapheneOS will continue providing extended support releases and then later legacy extended support releases until we feel that it's doing more harm than good. People should move to a fully supported device rather than using extended support, which cannot provide full security patches regardless of what's done.

2024-03-16 01:26:46

GrapheneOS is much different from CalyxOS and /e/OS. GrapheneOS is a hardened OS with substantial privacy/security improvements:
https://grapheneos.org/features
CalyxOS and /e/OS are not hardened operating systems. They greatly reduce security vs. AOSP via added attack surface, rolled back security and slow patches. We don't have much in common with them.

2024-03-13 13:54:12

Android is moving towards completing one of the areas of verified boot which currently only works in GrapheneOS. They never adopted fully adopted verifying out-of-band system APK updates with fs-verity and then disabled it. They're moving towards using APK Signature Scheme v4.

2024-03-12 22:39:49

Vanadium version 122.0.6261.119.0 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/122.0.6261.119.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11457-vanadium-version-122062611190-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #browser

2024-03-12 14:24:38

- reply

@npub16ee…2qax Google Maps works fine alongside sandboxed Google Play. They're regular sandboxed apps unable to do more than other regular user installed apps. Our compatibility layer makes this work.

2024-03-12 14:24:00

- reply

@npub16ee…2qax The vast majority of Android apps can be used on GrapheneOS due to the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. GrapheneOS provides substantial privacy improvements such as Storage Scopes, Contact Scopes, Sensors toggle and much more to enable using whatever apps you want while preserving your privacy. More features are coming such as App Communication Scopes and similar features for Camera/Microphone/Location (provide video for camera, etc.).

2024-03-12 06:46:13

- reply

Our features page (https://grapheneos.org/features) needs massive updates to cover everything we've added and changed recently. We'll try to document most of the new major features there in the next few days. It also needs a lot of expansion for the existing features it already covers.

2024-03-12 05:25:11

GrapheneOS version 2024031100 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024031100
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11435-grapheneos-version-2024031100-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-03-10 05:16:29

GrapheneOS version 2024030900 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024030900
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11397-grapheneos-version-2024030900-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-03-07 21:45:39

GrapheneOS version 2024030700 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024030700
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11351-grapheneos-version-2024030700-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-03-07 21:44:21

- reply

@npub1zqk…08tc We plan to make "Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock" into the default.
We expect most people will want "Charging-only when locked" without the exception before first unlock for desktop use cases, etc.
If you don't use USB accessories, MTP, etc. then you can also disable it when unlocked via "Charging-only".
In certain circumstances, you can use "Off" to turn off even charging support while OS is booted. Can still charge with device powered off, in recovery, etc.

2024-03-07 16:01:58

- reply

Our USB-C port control feature is not possible through generic Linux kernel code. It requires device specific integration into the USB-C controller driver and USB HAL. It's an extremely valuable feature and supporting a small set of very secure hardware allows us to work on this.

2024-03-07 16:00:01

- reply

We've disabled USB peripherals while locked since June 2016. Android itself has USB gadget functionality (MTP, PTP, MIDI, Webcam, ADB, etc.) disabled by default. Standard Android USB toggle disables these, not USB data itself. There's also now DisplayPort alternate mode too.

2024-03-07 15:53:44

- reply

USB HAL was significantly changed in QPR2. A major part of of the port was porting our recently added USB-C control feature providing the ability to truly disable USB at a hardware level. Android 12+ USB HAL toggle being used elsewhere only disables high level USB features in OS.

2024-03-07 15:47:57

- reply

New 2024030700 is currently building across our 3 official build machines and will be available soon. The new release should be able to make it through Alpha channel testing to the Beta channel. If there are no serious issues after 24h of Beta testing, we'll move it to Stable.

2024-03-07 15:47:46

We're working on a revised release based on Android QPR2 with fixes for various regressions found by the early Alpha channel testers. We didn't keep the initial release in Alpha for long due to an issue impacting USB functionality on 6th gen Pixels.
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112051798319273743

2024-03-07 01:25:54

GrapheneOS version 2024030600 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024030600
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11336-grapheneos-version-2024030600-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-03-03 18:25:57

GrapheneOS version 2024030300 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2024030300
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11274-grapheneos-version-2024030300-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2024-02-24 18:57:29

- reply

@npub1lpz…p4e6 Similar videos existing doesn't mean it's a widespread issue. Many of the users posting these videos have made a lot of changes to settings including enabling developer options. These things aren't reproducible on the stock OS or GrapheneOS by the majority of people. There aren't any issues like this known to us.

2024-02-24 17:39:11

- reply

@npub1lpz…p4e6 We're not aware of this. Can you clarify what you mean?