📅 Original date posted:2014-08-20
📝 Original message:Excuse the ignorance, but there is something I’m not getting in this discussion.
Given it’s a published protocol, with available source code running on an open P2P network, why would any messages between nodes benefit from being encrypted? Surely all the data being processed by the network is known to any persistent client node(s)?
Seems like that solution is orthogonal to the root problem, where attackers could monitor the network and deduce IP addresses by e.g. mapping senders of transactions.
From: Peter Todd
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2014 9:28 AM
To: William Yager, bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
On 19 August 2014 21:19:43 GMT-04:00, William Yager <will.yager at gmail.com> wrote:
>On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>> In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by
>default
>> adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.
>
>
>Enabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely
>huge
>attack surface.
Hence my suggestion of separating that surface by using the standalone Tor binary, which runs under a different user to the Bitcoin Core binary.
>And you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable to
>Bitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect
>is
>pretty much useless for us.
First of all, without encryption we're leaking significant amounts of information to any passive attacker trying to trace the origin of Bitcoin transactions, a significant privacy risk.
Secondly the upcoming v0.10's fee estimation implementation is quite vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Authentication and encryption are needed to make it secure from ISP-level targeting to ensure that your view of the network is representative. Tor support used in parallel with native connection is ideal here, as neither the Tor network nor your ISP alone can Sybil attack you. It's notable that Bitcoinj has already implemented Tor support for these same reasons.
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Un Ix [ARCHIVE] /
npub1mx…45sm0
2023-06-07 15:25:25
in reply to nevent1q…6ucm
Author Public Key
npub1mxy8zdeg4txh8se7ugkrfhyfwxevsggcrce4ydmnkz6pn25jzwrqu45sm0Published at
2023-06-07 15:25:25Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-08-20\n📝 Original message:Excuse the ignorance, but there is something I’m not getting in this discussion.\n\n\nGiven it’s a published protocol, with available source code running on an open P2P network, why would any messages between nodes benefit from being encrypted? Surely all the data being processed by the network is known to any persistent client node(s)? \n\n\nSeems like that solution is orthogonal to the root problem, where attackers could monitor the network and deduce IP addresses by e.g. mapping senders of transactions.\n\n \n\n\n\nFrom: Peter Todd\nSent: Wednesday, August 20, 2014 9:28 AM\nTo: William Yager, bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\n\n\n\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\n\n\nOn 19 August 2014 21:19:43 GMT-04:00, William Yager \u003cwill.yager at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003eOn Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by\n\u003edefault\n\u003e\u003e adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003eEnabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely\n\u003ehuge\n\u003eattack surface.\n\nHence my suggestion of separating that surface by using the standalone Tor binary, which runs under a different user to the Bitcoin Core binary.\n\n\u003eAnd you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable to\n\u003eBitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect\n\u003eis\n\u003epretty much useless for us.\n\nFirst of all, without encryption we're leaking significant amounts of information to any passive attacker trying to trace the origin of Bitcoin transactions, a significant privacy risk.\n\nSecondly the upcoming v0.10's fee estimation implementation is quite vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Authentication and encryption are needed to make it secure from ISP-level targeting to ensure that your view of the network is representative. Tor support used in parallel with native connection is ideal here, as neither the Tor network nor your ISP alone can Sybil attack you. It's notable that Bitcoinj has already implemented Tor support for these same reasons.\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: APG v1.1.1\n\niQFQBAEBCAA6BQJT8/mSMxxQZXRlciBUb2RkIChsb3cgc2VjdXJpdHkga2V5KSA8\ncGV0ZUBwZXRlcnRvZGQub3JnPgAKCRAZnIM7qOfwhRZjCAC4PSpQ68qgtFMR77xf\nzXZLr/iMKX6yyJwXRj+vGi+0Ng/sv9NlYjYnDeflom37WlpGo/sCOFcVWImhnS2d\nkUFoUH92iXwRuEt/SN/LrHghkLWOxtVu9wa49eS/piGZFF3JWllk82MgdBZ6vjNw\nB6WuInEIurK+h8rUbAi2HjFkxVN0K0SsrFt/P0tHj10ABcMealBRoJh2Jx7fLNdS\nuTKddqeLyThEpLGNti3k+lhwQ2dA5RUBq6q3GUS/hWvTHRnU+viGMJSYv62LXRN5\nt87BXRY/R9UBpnudf3TIlPtOuIWcv2LhlXVjvbDDQqwJkvB3Qf4ejE3RZ28S5IUr\nOBQH\n=Gy7X\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nSlashdot TV. \nVideo for Nerds. Stuff that matters.\nhttp://tv.slashdot.org/\n_______________________________________________\nBitcoin-development mailing list\nBitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\nhttps://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140820/7c07c29c/attachment.html\u003e",
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