📅 Original date posted:2017-06-06
📝 Original message:> Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on,
In order to *get to that point*, you need >51%.
Not only that, but, if you started out with <51%, then you need >>51% in order to *catch up* and replace the large number of blocks added to the legacy chain in the mean time.
So, since >51% is _required_ for BIP148 to succeed (and likely >>51%)... you might as well do as SegWit did originally, or lower the threshold to 80% or something (as BIP91 does).
Without replay protection at the outset, BIP148, as far as I can tell, isn't a threat to miners.
--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.
> On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:29 PM, Kekcoin <kekcoin at protonmail.com <mailto:kekcoin at protonmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on, as the non-148 chain would have been reorganized into oblivion.
>
>
> Sent with ProtonMail <https://protonmail.com/>; Secure Email.
>
>> -------- Original Message --------
>> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable
>> Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:26 AM
>> UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:26 AM
>> From: contact at taoeffect.com <mailto:contact at taoeffect.com>
>> To: Kekcoin <kekcoin at protonmail.com <mailto:kekcoin at protonmail.com>>
>> Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au <mailto:aj at erisian.com.au>>, bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>>
>>
>> I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot."
>>
>> If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious one.
>>
>> --
>> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.
>>
>>> On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <kekcoin at protonmail.com <mailto:kekcoin at protonmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot.
>>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170606/99784c2b/attachment-0001.html>;
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 801 bytes
Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170606/99784c2b/attachment-0001.sig>;
Tao Effect [ARCHIVE] /
npub1r0…vdpg3
2023-06-07 18:02:28
in reply to nevent1q…de0l
Author Public Key
npub1r0g954grld59fuphzsypmuuhpdunq67f729afmp44h2mxvth2hts4vdpg3Published at
2023-06-07 18:02:28Event JSON
{
"id": "805299b273ea44113c1024d91d833d4c75b278318731eb52a8828dd06d49aebe",
"pubkey": "1bd05a5503fb6854f03714081df3970b79306bc9f28bd4ec35add5b3317755d7",
"created_at": 1686160948,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"753128ff5203f7385f15743651b80e2131d69a7ed154ad15484c1ff10dea468c",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"aae535f65a297d8e00cb00463eb15de5e51177944da657785e67e41d1d7c3dbc",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"2d272e6c463fa727a30075c3ed5c8a190036906ed39b99c44574197c7fd0c9aa"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-06-06\n📝 Original message:\u003e Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on,\n\nIn order to *get to that point*, you need \u003e51%.\n\nNot only that, but, if you started out with \u003c51%, then you need \u003e\u003e51% in order to *catch up* and replace the large number of blocks added to the legacy chain in the mean time.\n\nSo, since \u003e51% is _required_ for BIP148 to succeed (and likely \u003e\u003e51%)... you might as well do as SegWit did originally, or lower the threshold to 80% or something (as BIP91 does).\n\nWithout replay protection at the outset, BIP148, as far as I can tell, isn't a threat to miners.\n\n--\nPlease do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.\n\n\u003e On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:29 PM, Kekcoin \u003ckekcoin at protonmail.com \u003cmailto:kekcoin at protonmail.com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on, as the non-148 chain would have been reorganized into oblivion.\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e Sent with ProtonMail \u003chttps://protonmail.com/\u003e Secure Email.\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e -------- Original Message --------\n\u003e\u003e Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable\n\u003e\u003e Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:26 AM\n\u003e\u003e UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:26 AM\n\u003e\u003e From: contact at taoeffect.com \u003cmailto:contact at taoeffect.com\u003e\n\u003e\u003e To: Kekcoin \u003ckekcoin at protonmail.com \u003cmailto:kekcoin at protonmail.com\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Anthony Towns \u003caj at erisian.com.au \u003cmailto:aj at erisian.com.au\u003e\u003e, bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org \u003cmailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org \u003cmailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e I don't know what you mean by \"render the replay threat moot.\"\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious one.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e\u003e Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin \u003ckekcoin at protonmail.com \u003cmailto:kekcoin at protonmail.com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact that using \"post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain\" to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (\u003e100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e \n\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170606/99784c2b/attachment-0001.html\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 801 bytes\nDesc: Message signed with OpenPGP\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170606/99784c2b/attachment-0001.sig\u003e",
"sig": "e67387ecef8911759248506a0e6a5ebb35e37b96f0972cb6de1d75b8a7da01ed3585c6c82103c7f58d7b8cbeb5beea47516efd43401fa7a527e824afe2903a58"
}