📅 Original date posted:2018-05-10
📝 Original message:
On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 9:18 AM, Jim Posen <jim.posen at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hmm, I'm not quite following the situation. What do you mean by "directs
> normal traffic"? Since the sender constructs the entire circuit, routing
> nodes do not get any discretion over which nodes to forward a payment to,
<facepalm>
> only whether to forward or fail. What an attacker could do is perform a loop
> attack and send a payment to another node that they control and delay the
> payment on the receiving end. Note that the sending node loses no
> reputation, only the receiving node. Since the hops being attacked are the
> ones in the middle and they are faithfully enforcing the reputation
> protocol, the receiving node's reputation should be penalized properly,
> making it unlikely the attack will succeed in a second attempt.
So the attacker can purchase reputation for the sacrificial node by
sending them legitimate payments, and then spend that reputation (at
the mutual expense of hops) by delaying targeted transactions. But my
question about obscuring the collusion by artificially lowering
reported risk was nonsense based on misunderstanding. Thanks for
helping me understand.
Chris Gough
Chris Gough [ARCHIVE] /
npub10h…wngqk
2023-06-09 12:50:27
in reply to nevent1q…dd8g
Author Public Key
npub10h8s4dep5ujutdsv4ps6ejyzq90va90ad3cg7us8fchlrjtgly0qywngqkPublished at
2023-06-09 12:50:27Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-05-10\n📝 Original message:\nOn Fri, May 11, 2018 at 9:18 AM, Jim Posen \u003cjim.posen at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e Hmm, I'm not quite following the situation. What do you mean by \"directs\n\u003e normal traffic\"? Since the sender constructs the entire circuit, routing\n\u003e nodes do not get any discretion over which nodes to forward a payment to,\n\n\u003cfacepalm\u003e\n\n\u003e only whether to forward or fail. What an attacker could do is perform a loop\n\u003e attack and send a payment to another node that they control and delay the\n\u003e payment on the receiving end. Note that the sending node loses no\n\u003e reputation, only the receiving node. Since the hops being attacked are the\n\u003e ones in the middle and they are faithfully enforcing the reputation\n\u003e protocol, the receiving node's reputation should be penalized properly,\n\u003e making it unlikely the attack will succeed in a second attempt.\n\nSo the attacker can purchase reputation for the sacrificial node by\nsending them legitimate payments, and then spend that reputation (at\nthe mutual expense of hops) by delaying targeted transactions. But my\nquestion about obscuring the collusion by artificially lowering\nreported risk was nonsense based on misunderstanding. Thanks for\nhelping me understand.\n\nChris Gough",
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