📅 Original date posted:2016-02-26
📝 Original message:
Hi Bryan,
On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 07:34:24PM -0600, Bryan Bishop wrote:
> Well if you are bothering to draft up a BIP about that SIGHASH flag,
> then perhaps also consider some other SIGHASH flag types as well while
> you are at it?
I'll take a look at those proposals when drafting the BIP. I think for
LN, there is a single clean way to achieve outsourcability, but may be
compatible with other arrangements. I'm somewhat averse to proposing too
much flexibility before there's clear use-cases, though. However, if
others do have uses/examples for other sighash flags, I'd be very
interested while drafting this BIP!
> FWIW there was some concern about replay using SIGHAHS_NOINPUT or something:
> http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-wizards/2015-04-07.log
Yeah, I think the nice thing about SegWit is that you resolve
malleability without worrying about replay attacks in the event of key
reuse. That's why I think it's only safe to do this new sighash type
inside segwit itself -- if you only wanted protection against
malleability you'd use segwit, and not touch this new sighash type
(you'd only use the new sighash flag if you actually need its features).
--
Joseph Poon
Joseph Poon [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ej…p9cq8
2023-06-09 12:45:45
in reply to nevent1q…99jf
Author Public Key
npub1ej6vep7y2km5l6awukffelg8yeppkth2vjkjk9jypd5w336rxggs3p9cq8Published at
2023-06-09 12:45:45Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-02-26\n📝 Original message:\nHi Bryan,\n\nOn Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 07:34:24PM -0600, Bryan Bishop wrote:\n\u003e Well if you are bothering to draft up a BIP about that SIGHASH flag,\n\u003e then perhaps also consider some other SIGHASH flag types as well while\n\u003e you are at it?\n\nI'll take a look at those proposals when drafting the BIP. I think for\nLN, there is a single clean way to achieve outsourcability, but may be\ncompatible with other arrangements. I'm somewhat averse to proposing too\nmuch flexibility before there's clear use-cases, though. However, if\nothers do have uses/examples for other sighash flags, I'd be very\ninterested while drafting this BIP!\n\n\u003e FWIW there was some concern about replay using SIGHAHS_NOINPUT or something:\n\u003e http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-wizards/2015-04-07.log\n\nYeah, I think the nice thing about SegWit is that you resolve\nmalleability without worrying about replay attacks in the event of key\nreuse. That's why I think it's only safe to do this new sighash type\ninside segwit itself -- if you only wanted protection against\nmalleability you'd use segwit, and not touch this new sighash type\n(you'd only use the new sighash flag if you actually need its features).\n\n-- \nJoseph Poon",
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