š
Original date posted:2018-12-18
š Original message:On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 03:08:26AM +0800, Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >> If it's not safer in practice, we've spent a little extra complexity
> >> committing to a subset of the script in each signature to no gain. If
> >> it is safer in practice, we've prevented people from losing funds. I'm
> >> all for less complexity, but not for that tradeoff.
> >
> > There are many complexities we could add, each of which would prevent
> > loss of funds in some theoretical case.
>
> Every security measures are overkill, until someone get burnt. If these security measures are really effective, no one will get burnt. The inevitable conclusion is: every effective security measures are overkill.
This isn't really a security issue, it's a software reliability issue. And
you're making a trade-off between complexity of the core protocol and
complexity of wallet software.
A core protocol failure has high costs for every single Bitcoin user; a wallet
software failure affects a much smaller number of people. So I'd be inclined to
prioritise core protocol simplicity rather than stamping out one of many, many,
ways that wallet software can screw up and lose money.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] /
npub1m2ā¦a2np2
2023-06-07 18:15:41
in reply to nevent1qā¦8kv4
Author Public Key
npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2Published at
2023-06-07 18:15:41Event JSON
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"content": "š
Original date posted:2018-12-18\nš Original message:On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 03:08:26AM +0800, Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e If it's not safer in practice, we've spent a little extra complexity\n\u003e \u003e\u003e committing to a subset of the script in each signature to no gain. If\n\u003e \u003e\u003e it is safer in practice, we've prevented people from losing funds. I'm\n\u003e \u003e\u003e all for less complexity, but not for that tradeoff.\n\u003e \u003e \n\u003e \u003e There are many complexities we could add, each of which would prevent\n\u003e \u003e loss of funds in some theoretical case.\n\u003e \n\u003e Every security measures are overkill, until someone get burnt. If these security measures are really effective, no one will get burnt. The inevitable conclusion is: every effective security measures are overkill.\n\nThis isn't really a security issue, it's a software reliability issue. And\nyou're making a trade-off between complexity of the core protocol and\ncomplexity of wallet software.\n\nA core protocol failure has high costs for every single Bitcoin user; a wallet\nsoftware failure affects a much smaller number of people. So I'd be inclined to\nprioritise core protocol simplicity rather than stamping out one of many, many,\nways that wallet software can screw up and lose money.\n\n-- \nhttps://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 488 bytes\nDesc: not available\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20181217/d4893b80/attachment-0001.sig\u003e",
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