š
Original date posted:2020-02-26
š Original message:As a replacement for paper, something like this makes sense v.s. what you
do with a ledger presently.
However, shamir's shares notoriously have the issue that the key does exist
plaintext on a device at some point.
Non-interactive multisig has the benefit of being able to sign transactions
without having keys in the same room/place/device ever.
--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 9:14 AM Contact Team via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
> Seed phrase security has been a subject of discussion for a long time now.
> Though there are varying opinions on the subject but the conflict usually
> arises due to different security models used by different individuals. The
> general practice in the space has been to use paper or metal engraving
> options to secure seed phrase but those too act as a single point of
> failure when secure storage is concerned. The hardware wallets, no matter
> whether use a secure element or not can be hacked either through basic
> glitching or through bigger schemes state enforced backdoors in the closed
> soured SE used.
>
> The option that Cypherock (Cypherock X1 Wallet) is working on removes a
> single point of failure when it comes to storage of seed phrases. It uses 2
> of 4 (with the option of setting up custom threshold limit) Shamir Secret
> Sharing to split the seed phrase into 4 different shares. Each share gets
> stored in a PIN ( hardware enforced ) Card with an EAL 6+ secure element.
> The user would need any 2 of these 4 cyCards to recover the seed or make a
> transaction. Ideally they should all be stored at different locations and
> this added security through distribution makes losing seed phrase highly
> improbable. We have decoupled storage and computation aspect of a hardware
> wallet. More information can be obtained from cypherock.com. The purpose
> of this mail is to get feedback from the community. Let us know if there is
> any feedback, we would love it.
>
> Thanks
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200226/5c9f93c7/attachment-0001.html>;
Jeremy [ARCHIVE] /
npub1q8ā¦8qwta
2023-06-07 18:23:06
in reply to nevent1qā¦d205
Author Public Key
npub1q86n5vtxkwerzwfqza3hwls8pl8764244464talfqy2vpj0qaz6q38qwtaPublished at
2023-06-07 18:23:06Event JSON
{
"id": "2fad6a8ed590cd9dc8a4afcd0ef47af0cb80abc7e018193c4cff03e67780efb7",
"pubkey": "01f53a3166b3b23139201763777e070fcfed5555ad7555f7e90114c0c9e0e8b4",
"created_at": 1686162186,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"2e412073fcb7b954d7028782db5c67dec0ff0fdafce1b8b553549564363fb21c",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"e2b4542f497a9e640ca7f82aae55f9d4f59b4ab859352d913c4b865d6817ff77",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"26b0c02973971781ec10ab825e9a88356d1e1968fe7e200adec1ec88df651a8f"
]
],
"content": "š
Original date posted:2020-02-26\nš Original message:As a replacement for paper, something like this makes sense v.s. what you\ndo with a ledger presently.\n\nHowever, shamir's shares notoriously have the issue that the key does exist\nplaintext on a device at some point.\n\nNon-interactive multisig has the benefit of being able to sign transactions\nwithout having keys in the same room/place/device ever.\n--\n@JeremyRubin \u003chttps://twitter.com/JeremyRubin\u003e\n\u003chttps://twitter.com/JeremyRubin\u003e\n\n\nOn Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 9:14 AM Contact Team via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi Everyone,\n\u003e Seed phrase security has been a subject of discussion for a long time now.\n\u003e Though there are varying opinions on the subject but the conflict usually\n\u003e arises due to different security models used by different individuals. The\n\u003e general practice in the space has been to use paper or metal engraving\n\u003e options to secure seed phrase but those too act as a single point of\n\u003e failure when secure storage is concerned. The hardware wallets, no matter\n\u003e whether use a secure element or not can be hacked either through basic\n\u003e glitching or through bigger schemes state enforced backdoors in the closed\n\u003e soured SE used.\n\u003e\n\u003e The option that Cypherock (Cypherock X1 Wallet) is working on removes a\n\u003e single point of failure when it comes to storage of seed phrases. It uses 2\n\u003e of 4 (with the option of setting up custom threshold limit) Shamir Secret\n\u003e Sharing to split the seed phrase into 4 different shares. Each share gets\n\u003e stored in a PIN ( hardware enforced ) Card with an EAL 6+ secure element.\n\u003e The user would need any 2 of these 4 cyCards to recover the seed or make a\n\u003e transaction. Ideally they should all be stored at different locations and\n\u003e this added security through distribution makes losing seed phrase highly\n\u003e improbable. We have decoupled storage and computation aspect of a hardware\n\u003e wallet. More information can be obtained from cypherock.com. The purpose\n\u003e of this mail is to get feedback from the community. Let us know if there is\n\u003e any feedback, we would love it.\n\u003e\n\u003e Thanks\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200226/5c9f93c7/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
"sig": "ef77f22eae6142e946c34f1f6156cfd18d6eddd553fae07e8c7b0aaffbaed01a5cb166e3c7972275eee5dc44bef7fc4f6fbd2db22b84fc4eb36898d7ed6b7129"
}