bfd at cock.lu [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: π
Original date posted:2017-01-06 π Original message:With a credit card you ...
π
Original date posted:2017-01-06
π Original message:With a credit card you have an institution worth billions of dollars
asserting that a payment has been made, with the option that it may be
retracted under special circumstances by the card issuer.
Unconfirmed Bitcoin transactions with a SPV client has you trusting
that the un-authenticated DNS seed lookup has not been tampered with,
the connection to the random node that you connect to has not been
tampered with, and that the seed nor the node are attempting to
manipulate you.
The two scenarios arenβt even remotely comparable.
On 2017-01-04 00:56, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> It's easy enough to mark a transaction as "pending". People with bank
> accounts are familiar with the concept.
>
> Although the risk of accepting gossip information from multiple random
> peers, in the case where the sender does not control the receivers
> network is still minimal. Random node operators have no incentive to
> send fake transactions, and would need to control all the nodes a
> client connects to, and find a non-false-positive address belonging to
> the victims wallet.
>
> It's not impossible, but it's non trivial, would only temporarily show
> a pending transaction, and provide no benefit to the node operator.
> There are much juicier targets for an attacker with the ability to
> sybil attack the entire bitcoin p2p network.
>
> Aaron
>
> On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 11:47 PM Jonas Schnelli <dev at jonasschnelli.ch>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi
>>
>>> Unconfirmed transactions are incredibly important for real world
>> use.
>>
>>> Merchants for instance are willing to accept credit card payments
>> of
>>
>>> thousands of dollars and ship the goods despite the fact that the
>>
>>> transaction can be reversed up to 60 days later. There is a very
>> large
>>
>>> cost to losing the ability to have instant transactions in many or
>>
>>> even most situations. This cost is typically well above the fraud
>> risk.
>>
>>>
>>
>>> It's important to recognize that bitcoin serves a wide variety of
>> use
>>
>>> cases with different profiles for time sensitivity and fraud risk.
>>
>>>
>>
>> I agree that unconfirmed transactions are incredibly important, but
>> not
>>
>> over SPV against random peers.
>>
>> If you offer users/merchants a feature (SPV 0-conf against random
>>
>> peers), that is fundamentally insecure, it will β sooner or later
>> β lead
>>
>> to some large scale fiasco, hurting Bitcoins reputation and trust
>> from
>>
>> merchants.
>>
>> Merchants using and trusting 0-conf SPV transactions (retrieved from
>>
>> random peers) is something we should **really eliminate** through
>>
>> education and by offering different solution.
>>
>> There are plenty, more sane options. If you can't run your own
>> full-node
>>
>> as a merchant (trivial), maybe co-use a wallet-service with
>> centralized
>>
>> verification (maybe use two of them), I guess Copay would be one of
>>
>> those wallets (as an example). Use them in watch-only mode.
>>
>> For end-users SPV software, I think it would be recommended to...
>>
>> ... disable unconfirmed transactions during SPV against random peers
>>
>> ... enable unconfirmed transactions when using SPV against a trusted
>>
>> peer with preshared keys after BIP150
>>
>> ... if unconfirmed transactions are disabled, show how it can be
>> enabled
>>
>> (how to run a full-node [in a box, etc.])
>>
>> ... educate, inform users that a transaction with no confirmation
>> can be
>>
>> "stopped" or "redirected" any time, also inform about the risks
>> during
>>
>> low-conf phase (1-5).
>>
>> I though see the point that it's nice to make use of the "incoming
>>
>> funds..." feature in SPV wallets. But β for the sake of stability
>> and
>>
>> (risk-)scaling β we may want to recommend to scarify this feature
>> and β
>>
>> in the same turn β to use privacy-preserving BFD's.
>>
>> </jonas>
Published at
2023-06-07 17:55:09Event JSON
{
"id": "2917f09e13e989fb6a3bb72f11836f3c7d1c909ba31013846b6cea8885a7cc63",
"pubkey": "db760dade1185adc64d6fc9226d5fc4fa6c1e29ac791042a019c7e8c4917470c",
"created_at": 1686160509,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"12de089a3e4ccbe31128a134586c26b5a984bf25231ca8b54e0116dac53ecb14",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"8b8c83f74d3c29f14c65be6e9df392a066a442d3f90b28a174ef9b23f27651e7",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"ee0fa66772f633411e4432e251cfb15b1c0fe8cd8befd8b0d86eb302402a8b4a"
]
],
"content": "π
Original date posted:2017-01-06\nπ Original message:With a credit card you have an institution worth billions of dollars\nasserting that a payment has been made, with the option that it may be\nretracted under special circumstances by the card issuer.\n\nUnconfirmed Bitcoin transactions with a SPV client has you trusting\nthat the un-authenticated DNS seed lookup has not been tampered with,\nthe connection to the random node that you connect to has not been\ntampered with, and that the seed nor the node are attempting to\nmanipulate you.\n\nThe two scenarios arenβt even remotely comparable.\n\n\nOn 2017-01-04 00:56, Aaron Voisine wrote:\n\u003e It's easy enough to mark a transaction as \"pending\". People with bank\n\u003e accounts are familiar with the concept.\n\u003e \n\u003e Although the risk of accepting gossip information from multiple random\n\u003e peers, in the case where the sender does not control the receivers\n\u003e network is still minimal. Random node operators have no incentive to\n\u003e send fake transactions, and would need to control all the nodes a\n\u003e client connects to, and find a non-false-positive address belonging to\n\u003e the victims wallet.\n\u003e \n\u003e It's not impossible, but it's non trivial, would only temporarily show\n\u003e a pending transaction, and provide no benefit to the node operator.\n\u003e There are much juicier targets for an attacker with the ability to\n\u003e sybil attack the entire bitcoin p2p network.\n\u003e \n\u003e Aaron\n\u003e \n\u003e On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 11:47 PM Jonas Schnelli \u003cdev at jonasschnelli.ch\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Hi\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e Unconfirmed transactions are incredibly important for real world\n\u003e\u003e use.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e Merchants for instance are willing to accept credit card payments\n\u003e\u003e of\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e thousands of dollars and ship the goods despite the fact that the\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction can be reversed up to 60 days later. There is a very\n\u003e\u003e large\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e cost to losing the ability to have instant transactions in many or\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e even most situations. This cost is typically well above the fraud\n\u003e\u003e risk.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e It's important to recognize that bitcoin serves a wide variety of\n\u003e\u003e use\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e cases with different profiles for time sensitivity and fraud risk.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e I agree that unconfirmed transactions are incredibly important, but\n\u003e\u003e not\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e over SPV against random peers.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e If you offer users/merchants a feature (SPV 0-conf against random\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e peers), that is fundamentally insecure, it will β sooner or later\n\u003e\u003e β lead\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e to some large scale fiasco, hurting Bitcoins reputation and trust\n\u003e\u003e from\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e merchants.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Merchants using and trusting 0-conf SPV transactions (retrieved from\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e random peers) is something we should **really eliminate** through\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e education and by offering different solution.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e There are plenty, more sane options. If you can't run your own\n\u003e\u003e full-node\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e as a merchant (trivial), maybe co-use a wallet-service with\n\u003e\u003e centralized\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e verification (maybe use two of them), I guess Copay would be one of\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e those wallets (as an example). Use them in watch-only mode.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e For end-users SPV software, I think it would be recommended to...\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e ... disable unconfirmed transactions during SPV against random peers\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e ... enable unconfirmed transactions when using SPV against a trusted\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e peer with preshared keys after BIP150\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e ... if unconfirmed transactions are disabled, show how it can be\n\u003e\u003e enabled\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e (how to run a full-node [in a box, etc.])\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e ... educate, inform users that a transaction with no confirmation\n\u003e\u003e can be\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \"stopped\" or \"redirected\" any time, also inform about the risks\n\u003e\u003e during\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e low-conf phase (1-5).\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e I though see the point that it's nice to make use of the \"incoming\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e funds...\" feature in SPV wallets. But β for the sake of stability\n\u003e\u003e and\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e (risk-)scaling β we may want to recommend to scarify this feature\n\u003e\u003e and β\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e in the same turn β to use privacy-preserving BFD's.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \u003c/jonas\u003e",
"sig": "d62b5b265f07b561cec73c06e158c912d10086122fa67a8bca43628610436fca92b8a88e64a2796a89ded3d999de55c971afed33148cea0941f55e11895a186e"
}