đ
Original date posted:2015-08-17
đ Original message:On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>From the point of view of a
> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and volunteers
> running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil attacking the IP address
> space is pretty easy in comparison to aquiring hashing power sufficient
> to create false confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former
> will likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway.
> Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just trusting
> anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power. (and getting that is
> surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)
Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a
non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To attack an
spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, you would not only
need to Sybil them but also summon a massive amount of hashing power to
create a chain of headers (while forgoing the opportunity to mine valid
blocks with that hash power).
But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full node and give
them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan fork)? The failure model
doesn't seem specific to spv to me.
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Chris Pacia [ARCHIVE] /
npub1jpâŚkn8jw
2023-06-07 15:47:39
in reply to nevent1qâŚ8qvm
Author Public Key
npub1jp0jnnq2jxcjy76nrt5dssvmpynt4f9psdelp3vxj0y0xtpxl7jqhkn8jwPublished at
2023-06-07 15:47:39Event JSON
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"content": "đ
Original date posted:2015-08-17\nđ Original message:On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, \"Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev\" \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003eFrom the point of view of a\n\u003e wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and volunteers\n\u003e running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil attacking the IP address\n\u003e space is pretty easy in comparison to aquiring hashing power sufficient\n\u003e to create false confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former\n\u003e will likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway.\n\u003e Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just trusting\n\u003e anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power. (and getting that is\n\u003e surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)\n\nCan you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a\nnon-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To attack an\nspv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, you would not only\nneed to Sybil them but also summon a massive amount of hashing power to\ncreate a chain of headers (while forgoing the opportunity to mine valid\nblocks with that hash power).\n\nBut could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full node and give\nthem a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan fork)? The failure model\ndoesn't seem specific to spv to me.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150817/6a9455df/attachment.html\u003e",
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