📅 Original date posted:2016-08-16
📝 Original message:On Aug 17, 2016 00:23, "Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> If one's goal is to mess with an transaction to prevent it from being
mined, it is more effective to just not relay the transaction rather than
to mess with the witness. Given two transactions with the same txid and
different witness data, miners and good nodes ought to mine/relay the
version with the lower cost (smaller?) witness data.
That implies that everyone will see both versions and be able to make that
choice. Unfortunately, those two versions will be definition be in conflict
with each other, and thus only one will end up paying a fee. We're can't
relay two transactions for the price of one, or we'd expose the p2p network
to a very cheap DDoS attack: just send increasingly small versions of the
same transaction.
Segwit's third party mallebility protection makes it not an issue for
dependent contracts if transactions are mauled (=apparently the verb
related to malleability), but there are still good reasons for senders not
to gratuitously make their transactions extensible in size or other
resources.
--
Pieter
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Pieter Wuille [ARCHIVE] /
npub1tj…jtl6r
2023-06-07 17:52:56
in reply to nevent1q…9aux
Author Public Key
npub1tjephawh7fdf6358jufuh5eyxwauzrjqa7qn50pglee4tayc2ntqcjtl6rPublished at
2023-06-07 17:52:56Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-08-16\n📝 Original message:On Aug 17, 2016 00:23, \"Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev\" \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e If one's goal is to mess with an transaction to prevent it from being\nmined, it is more effective to just not relay the transaction rather than\nto mess with the witness. Given two transactions with the same txid and\ndifferent witness data, miners and good nodes ought to mine/relay the\nversion with the lower cost (smaller?) witness data.\n\nThat implies that everyone will see both versions and be able to make that\nchoice. Unfortunately, those two versions will be definition be in conflict\nwith each other, and thus only one will end up paying a fee. We're can't\nrelay two transactions for the price of one, or we'd expose the p2p network\nto a very cheap DDoS attack: just send increasingly small versions of the\nsame transaction.\n\nSegwit's third party mallebility protection makes it not an issue for\ndependent contracts if transactions are mauled (=apparently the verb\nrelated to malleability), but there are still good reasons for senders not\nto gratuitously make their transactions extensible in size or other\nresources.\n\n--\nPieter\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20160817/2c5284a7/attachment.html\u003e",
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