📅 Original date posted:2014-04-01
📝 Original message:Chris,
Thank you for taking the time to look at my proposal.
1) pay to addresses are not fixed - ie you can have a different address for
> each transaction (which is why BIP70 is necessary to allow per transaction
> addresses via https.)
>
This is certainly true for a "published" address; however a new address
(and URL) can be generated for each one-off peer-to-peer transaction.
However, I'd expect that most of the time this use case will be handed by
BIP70. Still, this could allow someone to implement a authenticated,
non-repudiable payment request without having to go through the hassle of a
full BIP70 implementation.
> 2) unless you are already aware of the public key of the signature, you
> do not know if the signature is made by the person you think it is supposed
> to be from. See recent concern over fake key for Gavin Andresen. Ie a
> signature can always be verified with a valid public key, the question is
> was it the real person's key. That is what WoT tried to resolve with
> so-called "signing parties", nowadays keys posted to a public forum by a
> known user, but it's not a standard and not ideal.
>
My proposal leverages the existing SSL key system (yes, PKI), so there is a
reasonable expectation that if the signature verifies, it came from the
party indicated on the cert. While SSL (and the PKI system underpinning
it) have its faults, the example you highlighted was specifically a problem
with WoT, not PKI. Can a compromised web server cause payments to be made
to the wrong party? Of course-- but that's already true. And that's not
something BIP70 solves (or attempts to solve) either.
(To explain [better than I could] why I feel PKI is a pragmatic solution, I
defer to Mike Hearn 's article:
https://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912aa7)
--Daryl
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Daryl Banttari [ARCHIVE] /
npub1hy…anxjy
2023-06-07 15:16:52
in reply to nevent1q…nsq6
Author Public Key
npub1hy6n0vel7vfmwt5nuetrphh50wwevzg7p063tkreasnj8j03nlpqwanxjySeen on
wss://relay.noswhere.comPublished at
2023-06-07 15:16:52Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-04-01\n📝 Original message:Chris,\n\nThank you for taking the time to look at my proposal.\n\n1) pay to addresses are not fixed - ie you can have a different address for\n\u003e each transaction (which is why BIP70 is necessary to allow per transaction\n\u003e addresses via https.)\n\u003e\n\nThis is certainly true for a \"published\" address; however a new address\n(and URL) can be generated for each one-off peer-to-peer transaction.\n However, I'd expect that most of the time this use case will be handed by\nBIP70. Still, this could allow someone to implement a authenticated,\nnon-repudiable payment request without having to go through the hassle of a\nfull BIP70 implementation.\n\n\n\u003e 2) unless you are already aware of the public key of the signature, you\n\u003e do not know if the signature is made by the person you think it is supposed\n\u003e to be from. See recent concern over fake key for Gavin Andresen. Ie a\n\u003e signature can always be verified with a valid public key, the question is\n\u003e was it the real person's key. That is what WoT tried to resolve with\n\u003e so-called \"signing parties\", nowadays keys posted to a public forum by a\n\u003e known user, but it's not a standard and not ideal.\n\u003e\n\nMy proposal leverages the existing SSL key system (yes, PKI), so there is a\nreasonable expectation that if the signature verifies, it came from the\nparty indicated on the cert. While SSL (and the PKI system underpinning\nit) have its faults, the example you highlighted was specifically a problem\nwith WoT, not PKI. Can a compromised web server cause payments to be made\nto the wrong party? Of course-- but that's already true. And that's not\nsomething BIP70 solves (or attempts to solve) either.\n\n(To explain [better than I could] why I feel PKI is a pragmatic solution, I\ndefer to Mike Hearn 's article:\nhttps://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912aa7)\n\n--Daryl\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140401/2764dfac/attachment.html\u003e",
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