📅 Original date posted:2015-05-31
📝 Original message:> On 31 May 2015, at 13:52, Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Chun Wang <1240902 at gmail.com <mailto:1240902 at gmail.com>> wrote:
> If someone propagate a 20MB block, it will take at best 6 seconds for
> us to receive to verify it at current configuration, result of one
> percent orphan rate increase.
>
> That orphan rate increase will go to whoever is producing the 20MB blocks, NOT you.
There's an interesting incentives question if the mining fees ever become large enough to be interesting. Given two potential blocks on which to build then for the best interests of the system we'd want miners to select the block that confirmed the largest number of transactions since that puts less pressure on the network later. This is at odds with the incentives for our would-be block maker though because the incentive for mining would be to use whichever block left the largest potential fees available; that's generally going to be the smaller of the two.
This, of course, only gets worse as the block reward reduces and fees become the dominant way for miners to be paid (and my hypothesis that eventually this could lead to miners trying to deliberately orphan earlier blocks to "steal" fees because the fixed block reward is no longer the dominant part of their income).
When coupled with the block propagation delay problem increasing the risk of orphan races I'm pretty sure that this actually leads to miners having an incentive to continually mine smaller blocks, and that's aside from the question of whether smaller blocks will push up fees (which also benefits miners).
Cheers,
Dave
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Dave Hudson [ARCHIVE] /
npub1re…679nu
2023-06-07 15:36:00
in reply to nevent1q…c0xn
Author Public Key
npub1re22dhneg8azw7z3979njqn2sp4gxzp4703g62tsrvmsvnj76heqj679nuPublished at
2023-06-07 15:36:00Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-05-31\n📝 Original message:\u003e On 31 May 2015, at 13:52, Gavin Andresen \u003cgavinandresen at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Chun Wang \u003c1240902 at gmail.com \u003cmailto:1240902 at gmail.com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e If someone propagate a 20MB block, it will take at best 6 seconds for\n\u003e us to receive to verify it at current configuration, result of one\n\u003e percent orphan rate increase.\n\u003e \n\u003e That orphan rate increase will go to whoever is producing the 20MB blocks, NOT you.\n\nThere's an interesting incentives question if the mining fees ever become large enough to be interesting. Given two potential blocks on which to build then for the best interests of the system we'd want miners to select the block that confirmed the largest number of transactions since that puts less pressure on the network later. This is at odds with the incentives for our would-be block maker though because the incentive for mining would be to use whichever block left the largest potential fees available; that's generally going to be the smaller of the two.\n\nThis, of course, only gets worse as the block reward reduces and fees become the dominant way for miners to be paid (and my hypothesis that eventually this could lead to miners trying to deliberately orphan earlier blocks to \"steal\" fees because the fixed block reward is no longer the dominant part of their income).\n\nWhen coupled with the block propagation delay problem increasing the risk of orphan races I'm pretty sure that this actually leads to miners having an incentive to continually mine smaller blocks, and that's aside from the question of whether smaller blocks will push up fees (which also benefits miners). \n\n\nCheers,\nDave\n\n\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150531/2622fb5b/attachment.html\u003e",
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