📅 Original date posted:2015-09-30
📝 Original message:Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell at gmail.com> writes:
> I can, however, argue it the other way (and probably have in the
> past): The bit is easily checked by thin clients, so thin clients
> could use it to reject potentially ill-fated blocks from non-upgraded
> miners post switch (which otherwise they couldn't reject without
> inspecting the whole thing). This is an improvement over not forcing
> the bit, and it's why I was previously in favor of the way the
> versions were enforced. But, experience has played out other ways,
> and thin clients have not done anything useful with the version
> numbers.
>
> A middle ground might be to require setting the bit for a period of
> time after rule enforcing begins, but don't enforce the bit, just
> enforce validity of the block under new rules. Thus a thin client
> could treat these blocks with increased skepticism.
Introducing this later would trigger warnings on older clients, who
would consider the bit to represent a new soft fork :(
So if we want this middle ground, we should sew it in now, though it
adds a other state. Simplest is to have miners keep setting the bit for
another 2016 blocks. If we want to later, we can make this a consensus
rule.
"Bitcoin is hard, let's go shopping!" "With Bitcoin!" "..."
Rusty.
Rusty Russell [ARCHIVE] /
npub1zw…hkhpx
2023-06-07 17:42:07
in reply to nevent1q…5cnq
Author Public Key
npub1zw7cc8z78v6s3grujfvcv3ckpvg6kr0w7nz9yzvwyglyg0qu5sjsqhkhpxPublished at
2023-06-07 17:42:07Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-09-30\n📝 Original message:Gregory Maxwell \u003cgmaxwell at gmail.com\u003e writes:\n\u003e I can, however, argue it the other way (and probably have in the\n\u003e past): The bit is easily checked by thin clients, so thin clients\n\u003e could use it to reject potentially ill-fated blocks from non-upgraded\n\u003e miners post switch (which otherwise they couldn't reject without\n\u003e inspecting the whole thing). This is an improvement over not forcing\n\u003e the bit, and it's why I was previously in favor of the way the\n\u003e versions were enforced. But, experience has played out other ways,\n\u003e and thin clients have not done anything useful with the version\n\u003e numbers.\n\u003e\n\u003e A middle ground might be to require setting the bit for a period of\n\u003e time after rule enforcing begins, but don't enforce the bit, just\n\u003e enforce validity of the block under new rules. Thus a thin client\n\u003e could treat these blocks with increased skepticism.\n\nIntroducing this later would trigger warnings on older clients, who\nwould consider the bit to represent a new soft fork :(\n\nSo if we want this middle ground, we should sew it in now, though it\nadds a other state. Simplest is to have miners keep setting the bit for\nanother 2016 blocks. If we want to later, we can make this a consensus\nrule.\n\n\"Bitcoin is hard, let's go shopping!\" \"With Bitcoin!\" \"...\"\nRusty.",
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