Scott Roberts [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: đ
Original date posted:2017-10-12 đ Original message:ZmnSCPxj wrote: > Thus ...
đ
Original date posted:2017-10-12
đ Original message:ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> Thus even if the unwanted chain provides 2 tokens as fee per block,
> whereas the wanted chain provides 1 token as fee per block, if the
> unwanted chain tokens are valued at 1/4 the wanted chain tokens, miners
> will still prefer the wanted chain regardless.
This is a good point I was not thinking about, but your math assumes
1/2 price for a coin that can do 2x more transactions. Holders like
Roger Ver have an interest in low price and more transactions. A coin
with 2x more transactions, 22% lower price, and 22% lower fees per
coin transferred will attract more merchants, customers, and miners
(they get 50% more total fees) and this will in turn attract more
hodlers and devs. This assumes it outweighs hodler security concerns.
Merchants and customers, to the extent they are not long term hodlers,
are not interested in price as much as stability, so they are somewhat
at odds with hodlers.
Bitcoin consensus truth is based on "might is right". Buyers and
sellers of goods and services ("users") can shift some might to miners
via fees, to the chagrin of hodlers who have more interest in security
and price increases. Some hodlers think meeting user needs is the
source of long term value. Others think mining infrastructure is. You
seem to require hodlers to correctly identify and rely solely on good
developers. Whatever combination of these is the case, bad money can
still drive out good, especially if the market determination is not
efficient.
A faster measurement of hashrate for difficulty enables the economic
determination to be more efficient and correct. It prevents the
biggest coin from bullying forks that have better ideas. Conversely,
it prevents miners from switching to an inferior coin simply because
it provides them with more "protection money" from fees that enables
them to bully Bitcoin Core out of existence, even in the presence of a
slightly larger hodler support.
Devs are a governing authority under the influence of users, hodlers,
and miners. Miners are like banks lobbying government for higher total
fees. Hodlers are the new 1%, holding 90% of the coin, lobbying both
devs and users for security, but equally interested in price
increases. Users are "the people" that devs need to protect against
both hodlers and miners. They do not care about price as long as it is
stable. They do not want to become the 99% owning 10% of the coin or
have to pay unecessary fees merely for their coin to be the biggest
bully on the block. A faster responding difficulty will take a lot of
hot air out of the bully. It prevents miners from being able to
dictate that only coins with high fees are allowed. They are less
able to destroy small coins that have a fast defense.
The 1% and banks would starve the people that feed them to death if
they were allowed complete control of the government. Are hodlers and
miners any wiser? Devs need to strive for an expansion of the coin
quantity to keep value constant which is the foundation of the 5
characteristics of an ideal currency. Therefore devs should seek
peaceful and sustainable forks of bitcoin. This will enable constant
value, security, and low transaction fees per coin transfer. Alts
aside, the current situation of discouraging forks forbids constant
value via limited quantity. It also forces a choice between high
security and low fees. Forks with a faster difficulty will be more
capable of retaining value.
Users, devs, hodlers, and miners are naturally aligned and at odds in
different ways. A flow chart of the checks and balances should enable
better development towards a self-controlling feedback system, but the
goals need to be known before it could be designed and implemented.
Hodlers say price increases is the goal. Users say efficient transfer
of value. Miners say fees (at least that's the end game after mining).
I'm with users despite trying to be the 1% (which reminds me of a book
about how people often vote based on feeling good about their morality
and concern for society as a whole, despite it being contrary to their
personal best interests if that vote wins.)
Published at
2023-06-07 18:07:07Event JSON
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Original date posted:2017-10-12\nđ Original message:ZmnSCPxj wrote:\n\u003e Thus even if the unwanted chain provides 2 tokens as fee per block,\n\u003e whereas the wanted chain provides 1 token as fee per block, if the\n\u003e unwanted chain tokens are valued at 1/4 the wanted chain tokens, miners\n\u003e will still prefer the wanted chain regardless.\n\nThis is a good point I was not thinking about, but your math assumes\n1/2 price for a coin that can do 2x more transactions. Holders like\nRoger Ver have an interest in low price and more transactions. A coin\nwith 2x more transactions, 22% lower price, and 22% lower fees per\ncoin transferred will attract more merchants, customers, and miners\n(they get 50% more total fees) and this will in turn attract more\nhodlers and devs. This assumes it outweighs hodler security concerns.\nMerchants and customers, to the extent they are not long term hodlers,\nare not interested in price as much as stability, so they are somewhat\nat odds with hodlers.\n\nBitcoin consensus truth is based on \"might is right\". Buyers and\nsellers of goods and services (\"users\") can shift some might to miners\nvia fees, to the chagrin of hodlers who have more interest in security\nand price increases. Some hodlers think meeting user needs is the\nsource of long term value. Others think mining infrastructure is. You\nseem to require hodlers to correctly identify and rely solely on good\ndevelopers. Whatever combination of these is the case, bad money can\nstill drive out good, especially if the market determination is not\nefficient.\n\nA faster measurement of hashrate for difficulty enables the economic\ndetermination to be more efficient and correct. It prevents the\nbiggest coin from bullying forks that have better ideas. Conversely,\nit prevents miners from switching to an inferior coin simply because\nit provides them with more \"protection money\" from fees that enables\nthem to bully Bitcoin Core out of existence, even in the presence of a\nslightly larger hodler support.\n\nDevs are a governing authority under the influence of users, hodlers,\nand miners. Miners are like banks lobbying government for higher total\nfees. Hodlers are the new 1%, holding 90% of the coin, lobbying both\ndevs and users for security, but equally interested in price\nincreases. Users are \"the people\" that devs need to protect against\nboth hodlers and miners. They do not care about price as long as it is\nstable. They do not want to become the 99% owning 10% of the coin or\nhave to pay unecessary fees merely for their coin to be the biggest\nbully on the block. A faster responding difficulty will take a lot of\nhot air out of the bully. It prevents miners from being able to\ndictate that only coins with high fees are allowed. They are less\nable to destroy small coins that have a fast defense.\n\nThe 1% and banks would starve the people that feed them to death if\nthey were allowed complete control of the government. Are hodlers and\nminers any wiser? Devs need to strive for an expansion of the coin\nquantity to keep value constant which is the foundation of the 5\ncharacteristics of an ideal currency. Therefore devs should seek\npeaceful and sustainable forks of bitcoin. This will enable constant\nvalue, security, and low transaction fees per coin transfer. Alts\naside, the current situation of discouraging forks forbids constant\nvalue via limited quantity. It also forces a choice between high\nsecurity and low fees. Forks with a faster difficulty will be more\ncapable of retaining value.\n\nUsers, devs, hodlers, and miners are naturally aligned and at odds in\ndifferent ways. A flow chart of the checks and balances should enable\nbetter development towards a self-controlling feedback system, but the\ngoals need to be known before it could be designed and implemented.\nHodlers say price increases is the goal. Users say efficient transfer\nof value. Miners say fees (at least that's the end game after mining).\nI'm with users despite trying to be the 1% (which reminds me of a book\nabout how people often vote based on feeling good about their morality\nand concern for society as a whole, despite it being contrary to their\npersonal best interests if that vote wins.)",
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