📅 Original date posted:2017-09-30
📝 Original message:> Op 30 sep. 2017, om 06:49 heeft Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> het volgende geschreven:
>
>> On 09/29/2017 02:03 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote:
>> Paper wallets are a safety hazard, insecure, and generally not advisable.
>>
>
> I have to agree with Luke.
> And I would also extend those concerns to BIP39 plaintext paper backups.
>
> IMO, private keys should be generated and used (signing) on a trusted, minimal and offline hardware/os. They should never leave the device over the channel used for the signing I/O. Users should have no way to view or export the private keys (expect for the seed backup). Backups should be encrypted (whoever finds the paper backup should need a second factor to decrypt) and the restore process should be footgun-safe (especially the lost-passphrase deadlock).
I believe BIP39 does an excellent job at reducing the amount of bitcoin permanently lost. Stolen funds can at least in theory be retrieved at some future date. There's a trade-off between having a backup process that is secure and one that people actually use. I don't know the right answer, and tend to agree it's better left to individual wallets to decide.
Sjors
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Sjors Provoost [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ux…7wq7p
2023-06-07 18:06:42
in reply to nevent1q…qjj3
Author Public Key
npub1uxks6rvrzqljyfp92sffgqypf8fpts0pv2dshvmmnrse76v0avlqy7wq7pPublished at
2023-06-07 18:06:42Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-09-30\n📝 Original message:\u003e Op 30 sep. 2017, om 06:49 heeft Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e het volgende geschreven:\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e On 09/29/2017 02:03 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Paper wallets are a safety hazard, insecure, and generally not advisable.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e I have to agree with Luke.\n\u003e And I would also extend those concerns to BIP39 plaintext paper backups.\n\u003e \n\u003e IMO, private keys should be generated and used (signing) on a trusted, minimal and offline hardware/os. They should never leave the device over the channel used for the signing I/O. Users should have no way to view or export the private keys (expect for the seed backup). Backups should be encrypted (whoever finds the paper backup should need a second factor to decrypt) and the restore process should be footgun-safe (especially the lost-passphrase deadlock).\n\nI believe BIP39 does an excellent job at reducing the amount of bitcoin permanently lost. Stolen funds can at least in theory be retrieved at some future date. There's a trade-off between having a backup process that is secure and one that people actually use. I don't know the right answer, and tend to agree it's better left to individual wallets to decide.\n\nSjors\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 833 bytes\nDesc: Message signed with OpenPGP\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170930/d70b17b5/attachment-0001.sig\u003e",
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