yanmaani at cock.li [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: π
Original date posted:2021-03-03 π Original message:On 2021-03-03 20:48, Chris ...
π
Original date posted:2021-03-03
π Original message:On 2021-03-03 20:48, Chris Belcher wrote:
> On 03/03/2021 17:30, yanmaani at cock.li wrote:
>> Is that supposed to be a good thing? "We should do X because it'll
>> work"
>> doesn't prove X is actually good. These things can be evil, but they
>> can
>> also be legitimate opposition to a change. Taking away the power of a
>> "social media blitz" is not guaranteed to be a good thing!
> It is good that social media drama can only make its own followers fork
> away. In bitcoin people represent themselves, if they want certain
> rules
> enforced they should have to actually tell their software to do that.
> The problem with BIP8 is that social media drama has a incentive to
> promote brinksmanship.
Tell their software to do it, yes, but fork it? That seems like a big
"I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that" moment. If I tell Bitcoin
Core to do something, it seems like a bad thing that it would favor the
Core devs' wishes ("Get Taproot done") over mine.
>> That will only work for really egregious changes. In practice, most
>> people will trust Core on all other (non-egregious) decisions, because
>> of the inertia inherent in disobeying them.
[...]
>> You're right in suggesting that it will work, but the reason why it
>> will
>> work is because nobody wants to disobey Core. It seems immoral to
>> exploit this fact.
> It is not correct to say that this will work because "nobody will
> disobey Core". In reality it will work because basically everyone
> either
> wants taproot or has no opinion about taproot.
Both can be true at the same time. This is going to work because
basically nobody opposes Taproot. But if you did have some people
opposing Taproot, it would still work, because nobody would want to
disobey Core.
> Your argument depends heavily on the word "egregious". I've shown that
> for harmful changes like censorship can be resisted by the bitcoin
> community. Can you come up with an example of a bad change which won't
> be resisted?
Example 1: There is currently a specific mining pool planning to
blacklist addresses on sanctions lists. If they were to
convince/bribe/threaten Core to soft-fork so as to burn one specific
UTXO worth $1, the only direct victim of that would be the holder of
that UTXO, who loses only $1 from it.
Example 2: A soft fork to decrease the block size by 0.1%.
If we assume that the current block size is optimal and censorship is
bad, it seems simultaneously true that
1) it would be bad to decrease the block size or to burn that UTXO
2) nobody would be wiling to fight a war over a 0.1% decrease or a $1
loss to one guy
You might say that these are minor changes. Sure. But that's what I'm
saying: if the change is big ("egregious") enough to seriously
inconvenience people, they would fight it, but if it's trivial (thought
still bad), the inertia of Core would force them to accept it.
> Here's another example of an easily-resisted change: A Core team that's
> been compromised might do a flag-day UASF where transactions are only
> confirmed if they pay a minimum of 1000 sat/vbyte in miner fee. The
> community could resist this by doing a counter-UASF where a transaction
> paying just 1 sat/vbyte is required to be included in the first block
> after the flay day.
(Nitpick: Miners would probably not support it, because less people
would be willing to pay that fee.)
Sure, and this change would be resisted because it seriously
inconveniences people. But what if it's just 2sat/vbyte?
>> At least you shouldn't hard-code it and require dissenters to fork
>> away.
>> I exhort you to consider making all this controversial stuff settings
>> that can be changed by RPC command or command-line flag; set the
>> default
>> value sure, but requiring a fork to change it is, in my opinion,
>> oppressive.
> What alternative do you suggest? If you advocate allowing miners to
> activate soft forks then that still won't protect users. Because miners
> won't save users in my above example of a 1000 sat/vbyte price floor,
> in
> fact miners would see their income greatly increased if the soft fork
> was successful. So in fact the ability to do a counter-UASF is always
> what actually protected users, miner protection is nothing something to
> count on.
I don't disagree. The ability to do a counter-UASF should also be added,
if it's envisioned somebody might want to do that.
Basically, I think that Core should provide users with the tools to
express their views and to exercise their economic power, and they could
give them default values according to what they think best.
However, they shouldn't force people to use a forked client if they want
to disobey them. That would be to abuse the power vested in the
development group.
>> On 2021-03-03 14:39, Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>> Enter flag day activation. With a flag day there can be no
>>> brinksmanship. A social media blitz cant do anything except have its
>>> own
>>> followers fork away. Crucially, miner signalling cant be used to
>>> change
>>> the activation date for nodes that didn't choose to and just
>>> passively
>>> follow signalling. Changing the activation date requires all those
>>> users
>>> to actually run different node software.
>>
>>
>>> What if one day the Core developer team uses the flag
>>> day method to do something bad? The bitcoin user
>>> community who wants to resist this can create their own
>>> counter-soft-fork full node. This forces a chain
>>> split. The real bitcoin which most people follow will be
>>> the chain without censorship.
>>
>> [edited for brevity]
>>
>>
>> What you suggest may be an efficient way to ram taproot through, but
>> is
>> it inherently good? Nothing is free. This seems like de-facto forcing
>> people to go along with you, because you're convinced you're right. In
>> this case, you are, but you'd be convinced you'd be right even if you
>> weren't so.
>>
>>
>>
>> (Also consider some compromise, such as ">95% miner support before
>> flag
>> day or >33% on flag day")
>>
>> Best wishes
>> Yanmaani
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Original date posted:2021-03-03\nπ Original message:On 2021-03-03 20:48, Chris Belcher wrote:\n\u003e On 03/03/2021 17:30, yanmaani at cock.li wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Is that supposed to be a good thing? \"We should do X because it'll \n\u003e\u003e work\"\n\u003e\u003e doesn't prove X is actually good. These things can be evil, but they \n\u003e\u003e can\n\u003e\u003e also be legitimate opposition to a change. Taking away the power of a\n\u003e\u003e \"social media blitz\" is not guaranteed to be a good thing!\n\u003e It is good that social media drama can only make its own followers fork\n\u003e away. In bitcoin people represent themselves, if they want certain \n\u003e rules\n\u003e enforced they should have to actually tell their software to do that.\n\u003e The problem with BIP8 is that social media drama has a incentive to\n\u003e promote brinksmanship.\n\nTell their software to do it, yes, but fork it? That seems like a big \n\"I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that\" moment. If I tell Bitcoin \nCore to do something, it seems like a bad thing that it would favor the \nCore devs' wishes (\"Get Taproot done\") over mine.\n\n\u003e\u003e That will only work for really egregious changes. In practice, most\n\u003e\u003e people will trust Core on all other (non-egregious) decisions, because\n\u003e\u003e of the inertia inherent in disobeying them.\n[...]\n\u003e\u003e You're right in suggesting that it will work, but the reason why it \n\u003e\u003e will\n\u003e\u003e work is because nobody wants to disobey Core. It seems immoral to\n\u003e\u003e exploit this fact.\n\n\u003e It is not correct to say that this will work because \"nobody will\n\u003e disobey Core\". In reality it will work because basically everyone \n\u003e either\n\u003e wants taproot or has no opinion about taproot.\n\nBoth can be true at the same time. This is going to work because \nbasically nobody opposes Taproot. But if you did have some people \nopposing Taproot, it would still work, because nobody would want to \ndisobey Core.\n\n\u003e Your argument depends heavily on the word \"egregious\". I've shown that\n\u003e for harmful changes like censorship can be resisted by the bitcoin\n\u003e community. Can you come up with an example of a bad change which won't\n\u003e be resisted?\n\nExample 1: There is currently a specific mining pool planning to \nblacklist addresses on sanctions lists. If they were to \nconvince/bribe/threaten Core to soft-fork so as to burn one specific \nUTXO worth $1, the only direct victim of that would be the holder of \nthat UTXO, who loses only $1 from it.\n\nExample 2: A soft fork to decrease the block size by 0.1%.\n\nIf we assume that the current block size is optimal and censorship is \nbad, it seems simultaneously true that\n1) it would be bad to decrease the block size or to burn that UTXO\n2) nobody would be wiling to fight a war over a 0.1% decrease or a $1 \nloss to one guy\n\nYou might say that these are minor changes. Sure. But that's what I'm \nsaying: if the change is big (\"egregious\") enough to seriously \ninconvenience people, they would fight it, but if it's trivial (thought \nstill bad), the inertia of Core would force them to accept it.\n\n\u003e Here's another example of an easily-resisted change: A Core team that's\n\u003e been compromised might do a flag-day UASF where transactions are only\n\u003e confirmed if they pay a minimum of 1000 sat/vbyte in miner fee. The\n\u003e community could resist this by doing a counter-UASF where a transaction\n\u003e paying just 1 sat/vbyte is required to be included in the first block\n\u003e after the flay day.\n\n(Nitpick: Miners would probably not support it, because less people \nwould be willing to pay that fee.)\n\nSure, and this change would be resisted because it seriously \ninconveniences people. But what if it's just 2sat/vbyte?\n\n\u003e\u003e At least you shouldn't hard-code it and require dissenters to fork \n\u003e\u003e away.\n\u003e\u003e I exhort you to consider making all this controversial stuff settings\n\u003e\u003e that can be changed by RPC command or command-line flag; set the \n\u003e\u003e default\n\u003e\u003e value sure, but requiring a fork to change it is, in my opinion,\n\u003e\u003e oppressive.\n\u003e What alternative do you suggest? If you advocate allowing miners to\n\u003e activate soft forks then that still won't protect users. Because miners\n\u003e won't save users in my above example of a 1000 sat/vbyte price floor, \n\u003e in\n\u003e fact miners would see their income greatly increased if the soft fork\n\u003e was successful. So in fact the ability to do a counter-UASF is always\n\u003e what actually protected users, miner protection is nothing something to\n\u003e count on.\n\nI don't disagree. The ability to do a counter-UASF should also be added, \nif it's envisioned somebody might want to do that.\n\nBasically, I think that Core should provide users with the tools to \nexpress their views and to exercise their economic power, and they could \ngive them default values according to what they think best.\n\nHowever, they shouldn't force people to use a forked client if they want \nto disobey them. That would be to abuse the power vested in the \ndevelopment group.\n\n\u003e\u003e On 2021-03-03 14:39, Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Enter flag day activation. With a flag day there can be no\n\u003e\u003e\u003e brinksmanship. A social media blitz cant do anything except have its \n\u003e\u003e\u003e own\n\u003e\u003e\u003e followers fork away. Crucially, miner signalling cant be used to \n\u003e\u003e\u003e change\n\u003e\u003e\u003e the activation date for nodes that didn't choose to and just \n\u003e\u003e\u003e passively\n\u003e\u003e\u003e follow signalling. Changing the activation date requires all those \n\u003e\u003e\u003e users\n\u003e\u003e\u003e to actually run different node software.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e What if one day the Core developer team uses the flag\n\u003e\u003e\u003e day method to do something bad? The bitcoin user\n\u003e\u003e\u003e community who wants to resist this can create their own\n\u003e\u003e\u003e counter-soft-fork full node. This forces a chain\n\u003e\u003e\u003e split. The real bitcoin which most people follow will be\n\u003e\u003e\u003e the chain without censorship.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e [edited for brevity]\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e What you suggest may be an efficient way to ram taproot through, but \n\u003e\u003e is\n\u003e\u003e it inherently good? Nothing is free. This seems like de-facto forcing\n\u003e\u003e people to go along with you, because you're convinced you're right. In\n\u003e\u003e this case, you are, but you'd be convinced you'd be right even if you\n\u003e\u003e weren't so.\n\u003e\u003e \n\n\u003e\u003e \n\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e (Also consider some compromise, such as \"\u003e95% miner support before \n\u003e\u003e flag\n\u003e\u003e day or \u003e33% on flag day\")\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Best wishes\n\u003e\u003e Yanmaani",
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