Pieter Wuille [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: π
Original date posted:2017-07-11 π Original message:On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at ...
π
Original date posted:2017-07-11
π Original message:On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin at gmail.com> wrote:
> Pieter,
>
> I think that you have misrepresented Chris' view by taking it out of
> context. His complete quote reads "If drivechains are successful they should
> be viewed as the way we scale -- not hard forking the protocol." Chris is
> comparing Drivechains/sidechains to a hard fork.
I apologize here; I didn't mean to misrepresent his viewpoint.
> You went on to "disagree", but every point of contention you introduced was
> something that would apply to both drivechain-sourced capacity and
> hardfork-sourced capacity. Neither improves scalability, and both allow
> users only the opportunity to select a different security model. If I
> understand you, the point at which a security model does not become
> "interesting" to you, would be the exact same point in the drivechain and
> hardfork worlds. Both, at any rate, have the same effect on "validation cost
> to auditors".
If you're talking about the extreme case where every full node in the
increased capacity single chain model corresponds to a node that
validates both chains and all transfers between them in the
drivechains, I agree. At that point they become nearly equivalent in
terms of ease of adoption, resource costs, and capacity.
However, I don't think that is a realistic expectation. When
considering drivechains as a capacity increase, I believe most people
think about a situation where there are many chains that give an
increased capacity combined, but not everyone verifies all of them.
This is what I meant with uninteresting security model, as it requires
increased miner trust for preventing the other chains' coins from
being illegally transferred to the chain you're operating on.
Regardless, people are free experiment and adopt such an approach. The
nice thing about it not being a hardfork is that it does not require
network-wide consensus to deploy. However, I don't think they offer a
security model that should be encouraged, and thus doesn't have a
place on a roadmap.
> Since their sidechain coins cannot appreciate in value relative
> to the mainchain coins, users would only opt-in if they felt that they were
> sufficiently compensated for any and all risks. Hence, it is difficult to
> list this item as a drawback when, to the user, it is a strict improvement
> (at least, by any epistemological standard that I can think of). If you have
> new objections to these claims, I'm sure we would all benefit from hearing
> them, myself most of all.
Am I right in summarizing your point here as "This approach cannot
hurt, because if it were insecure, people can choose to not use it."?
I'm not sure I agree with that, as network effects or misinformation
may push users beyond what is reasonable.
Cheers,
--
Pieter
Published at
2023-06-07 18:04:13Event JSON
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Original date posted:2017-07-11\nπ Original message:On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Paul Sztorc \u003ctruthcoin at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e Pieter,\n\u003e\n\u003e I think that you have misrepresented Chris' view by taking it out of\n\u003e context. His complete quote reads \"If drivechains are successful they should\n\u003e be viewed as the way we scale -- not hard forking the protocol.\" Chris is\n\u003e comparing Drivechains/sidechains to a hard fork.\n\nI apologize here; I didn't mean to misrepresent his viewpoint.\n\n\u003e You went on to \"disagree\", but every point of contention you introduced was\n\u003e something that would apply to both drivechain-sourced capacity and\n\u003e hardfork-sourced capacity. Neither improves scalability, and both allow\n\u003e users only the opportunity to select a different security model. If I\n\u003e understand you, the point at which a security model does not become\n\u003e \"interesting\" to you, would be the exact same point in the drivechain and\n\u003e hardfork worlds. Both, at any rate, have the same effect on \"validation cost\n\u003e to auditors\".\n\nIf you're talking about the extreme case where every full node in the\nincreased capacity single chain model corresponds to a node that\nvalidates both chains and all transfers between them in the\ndrivechains, I agree. At that point they become nearly equivalent in\nterms of ease of adoption, resource costs, and capacity.\n\nHowever, I don't think that is a realistic expectation. When\nconsidering drivechains as a capacity increase, I believe most people\nthink about a situation where there are many chains that give an\nincreased capacity combined, but not everyone verifies all of them.\nThis is what I meant with uninteresting security model, as it requires\nincreased miner trust for preventing the other chains' coins from\nbeing illegally transferred to the chain you're operating on.\n\nRegardless, people are free experiment and adopt such an approach. The\nnice thing about it not being a hardfork is that it does not require\nnetwork-wide consensus to deploy. However, I don't think they offer a\nsecurity model that should be encouraged, and thus doesn't have a\nplace on a roadmap.\n\n\u003e Since their sidechain coins cannot appreciate in value relative\n\u003e to the mainchain coins, users would only opt-in if they felt that they were\n\u003e sufficiently compensated for any and all risks. Hence, it is difficult to\n\u003e list this item as a drawback when, to the user, it is a strict improvement\n\u003e (at least, by any epistemological standard that I can think of). If you have\n\u003e new objections to these claims, I'm sure we would all benefit from hearing\n\u003e them, myself most of all.\n\nAm I right in summarizing your point here as \"This approach cannot\nhurt, because if it were insecure, people can choose to not use it.\"?\nI'm not sure I agree with that, as network effects or misinformation\nmay push users beyond what is reasonable.\n\nCheers,\n\n-- \nPieter",
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