📅 Original date posted:2017-05-03
📝 Original message:Den 3 maj 2017 16:05 skrev "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,
> especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly
> available blocks.
Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker
uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a
random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?
IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set, Z%
patch/fill set to deter attacks
Then he uses Sybil attacks to obscure what's actually rare and not. Even
proof of storage isn't enough, you need proof of INDEPENDENT storage, which
is essentially impossible, as well as a way of determining which nodes are
run by the same people (all the AWS nodes should essentially count as one).
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Natanael [ARCHIVE] /
npub179…lpmjt
2023-06-07 18:00:42
in reply to nevent1q…lu4j
Author Public Key
npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjtPublished at
2023-06-07 18:00:42Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-05-03\n📝 Original message:Den 3 maj 2017 16:05 skrev \"Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev\" \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e:\n\n\u003e But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,\n\u003e especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly\n\u003e available blocks.\n\nWouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker\nuses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a\nrandom percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?\n\nIE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set, Z%\npatch/fill set to deter attacks\n\n\nThen he uses Sybil attacks to obscure what's actually rare and not. Even\nproof of storage isn't enough, you need proof of INDEPENDENT storage, which\nis essentially impossible, as well as a way of determining which nodes are\nrun by the same people (all the AWS nodes should essentially count as one).\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170503/c4844326/attachment.html\u003e",
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