📅 Original date posted:2015-02-05
📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Commit protocol provides both better user experience and better security.
Dňa 6. februára 2015 1:49:12 CET používateľ Paul Puey <paul at airbitz.co> napísal:
>The trust can be considered bootstrapped by visual verification of the
>address prefix. If we are really concerned about someone jamming a
>Bluetooth signal in a coffeeshop then the UI can encourage verification
>of the prefix. Much like how regular Bluetooth requires 'pairing' via
>entering a 4-6 digit code.
>
>
>
>Paul Puey CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc
>619.850.8624 | http://airbitz.co | San Diego
>
>
>
>
>On Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>
>On 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak wrote:
>>> A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can resolve
>the
>>> integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the broadcast
>>> coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is much
>>> worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted.
>>>
>>> This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other
>>> security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication,
>desktop,
>>> datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly
>correlate
>>> transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment
>request
>>> must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do.
>>
>> What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would
>> generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would send
>> back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If
>> receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol
>> (see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is hard to
>> spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?
>
>Hi Martin,
>
>The problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key.
>A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable identity
>associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret
>(such
>as a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that secret
>over a public channel.
>
>You can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network using a
>trusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are
>already doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is subject to
>attack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's
>decentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some
>scenarios.
>
>e
- --
Odoslané z môjho Android zariadenia pomocou K-9 Mail.
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Martin Habovštiak [ARCHIVE] /
npub186…y2s83
2023-06-07 15:29:52
in reply to nevent1q…rqyq
Author Public Key
npub186h7xm74e8dqvz64kzhx8aq3j47lwf3emlxl7w8j0d0thrth65vs9y2s83Published at
2023-06-07 15:29:52Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-02-05\n📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\nCommit protocol provides both better user experience and better security.\n\nDňa 6. februára 2015 1:49:12 CET používateľ Paul Puey \u003cpaul at airbitz.co\u003e napísal:\n\u003eThe trust can be considered bootstrapped by visual verification of the\n\u003eaddress prefix. If we are really concerned about someone jamming a\n\u003eBluetooth signal in a coffeeshop then the UI can encourage verification\n\u003eof the prefix. Much like how regular Bluetooth requires 'pairing' via\n\u003eentering a 4-6 digit code.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003ePaul Puey CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc\n\u003e619.850.8624 | http://airbitz.co | San Diego\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003eOn Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, Eric Voskuil \u003ceric at voskuil.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003eOn 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can resolve\n\u003ethe\n\u003e\u003e\u003e integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the broadcast\n\u003e\u003e\u003e coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is much\n\u003e\u003e\u003e worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other\n\u003e\u003e\u003e security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication,\n\u003edesktop,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly\n\u003ecorrelate\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment\n\u003erequest\n\u003e\u003e\u003e must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would\n\u003e\u003e generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would send\n\u003e\u003e back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If\n\u003e\u003e receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol\n\u003e\u003e (see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is hard to\n\u003e\u003e spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?\n\u003e\n\u003eHi Martin,\n\u003e\n\u003eThe problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key.\n\u003eA MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable identity\n\u003eassociated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret\n\u003e(such\n\u003eas a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that secret\n\u003eover a public channel.\n\u003e\n\u003eYou can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network using a\n\u003etrusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are\n\u003ealready doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is subject to\n\u003eattack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's\n\u003edecentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some\n\u003escenarios.\n\u003e\n\u003ee\n\n- --\nOdoslané z môjho Android zariadenia pomocou K-9 Mail.\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: APG v1.1.1\n\niI8EAREKADcFAlTUD/AwHE1hcnRpbiBIYWJvdmF0aWFrIDxtYXJ0aW4uaGFib3Zz\ndGlha0BnbWFpbC5jb20+AAoJED6C3NvqapyUPwgA/0eVlJYeA3fYmVb1zVA8j1l/\nkjOhc9CIDYL9ifk8N0t/AP4mC4CwmZoNXqr24le5WdYeBeyHMiDMtJrRfwQkN1LG\ndQ==\n=pY76\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----",
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