📅 Original date posted:2015-08-07
📝 Original message:It won't work as you thought. If a miner has 95% of hashing power, he
would have 95% of chance to find the next block and collect the penalty.
In long term, he only needs to pay 5% penalty. It's clearly biased
against small miners.
Instead, you should require the miners to burn the penalty. Whether this
is a good idea is another issue.
Wes Green via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-08-06 19:52 寫到:
> Bitcoin is built on game theory. Somehow we seem to have forgotten
> that and are trying to fix our "block size issue" with magic numbers,
> projected percentage growth of bandwidth speeds, time limits, etc...
> There are instances where these types of solutions make sense, but
> this doesn't appear to be one of them. Lets return to game theory.
>
> Proposal: Allow any miner to, up to, double the block size at any
> given time - but penalize them. Using the normal block reward,
> whatever percentage increase the miner makes over the previous limit
> is taken from both the normal reward and fees. The left over is
> rewarded to the next miner that finds a block.
>
> If blocks stay smaller for an extended period of time, it goes back
> down to the previous limit/ x amount decrease/% decrease (up for
> debate)
>
> Why would this work?: Miners only have incentive to do raise the limit
> when they feel there is organic growth in the network. Spam attacks,
> block bloat etc would have to be dealt with as it is currently. There
> is no incentive to raise the size for spam because it will subside and
> the penalty will have been for nothing when the attack ends and block
> size goes back down.
>
> I believe it would have the nice side effect of forcing miners to hold
> the whole block chain. I believe SPV does not allow you to see all the
> transactions in a block and be able to calculate if you should be
> adding more to your reward transaction if the last miner made the
> blocks bigger. Because of this, the miners would also have an eye on
> blockchain size and wont want it getting huge too fast (outsize of
> Moore's law of Nielsen's Law). Adding to the gamification.
>
> This system would encourage block size growth due to organic growth
> and the penalty would encourage it to be slow as to still keep reward
> high and preserve ROE.
>
> What this would look like: The miners start seeing what looks like
> natural network growth, and make the decision (or program an
> algorithm, the beauty is it leaves the "how" up to the miners) to
> increase the blocksize. They think that, in the long run, having
> larger blocks will increase their revenue and its worth taking the hit
> now for more fees later. They increase the size to 1.25 MB. As a
> result, they reward would be 18.75 (75%). The miner fees were .5BTC.
> The miner fees are also reduced to .375BTC. Everyone who receives that
> block can easily calculate 1) if the previous miner gave themselves
> the proper reward 2) what the next reward should be if they win it.
> Miners now start building blocks with a 31.25 reward transaction and
> miner fee + .125.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
jl2012 at xbt.hk [ARCHIVE] /
npub1kc…wjfw4
2023-06-07 17:33:29
in reply to nevent1q…my89
Author Public Key
npub1kc0zulxt7j4a0ayhzhrz7jk84y7tm4026qcky7w97hlfkxxap24qnwjfw4Published at
2023-06-07 17:33:29Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-08-07\n📝 Original message:It won't work as you thought. If a miner has 95% of hashing power, he \nwould have 95% of chance to find the next block and collect the penalty. \nIn long term, he only needs to pay 5% penalty. It's clearly biased \nagainst small miners.\n\nInstead, you should require the miners to burn the penalty. Whether this \nis a good idea is another issue.\n\nWes Green via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-08-06 19:52 寫到:\n\u003e Bitcoin is built on game theory. Somehow we seem to have forgotten\n\u003e that and are trying to fix our \"block size issue\" with magic numbers,\n\u003e projected percentage growth of bandwidth speeds, time limits, etc...\n\u003e There are instances where these types of solutions make sense, but\n\u003e this doesn't appear to be one of them. Lets return to game theory.\n\u003e \n\u003e Proposal: Allow any miner to, up to, double the block size at any\n\u003e given time - but penalize them. Using the normal block reward,\n\u003e whatever percentage increase the miner makes over the previous limit\n\u003e is taken from both the normal reward and fees. The left over is\n\u003e rewarded to the next miner that finds a block.\n\u003e \n\u003e If blocks stay smaller for an extended period of time, it goes back\n\u003e down to the previous limit/ x amount decrease/% decrease (up for\n\u003e debate)\n\u003e \n\u003e Why would this work?: Miners only have incentive to do raise the limit\n\u003e when they feel there is organic growth in the network. Spam attacks,\n\u003e block bloat etc would have to be dealt with as it is currently. There\n\u003e is no incentive to raise the size for spam because it will subside and\n\u003e the penalty will have been for nothing when the attack ends and block\n\u003e size goes back down.\n\u003e \n\u003e I believe it would have the nice side effect of forcing miners to hold\n\u003e the whole block chain. I believe SPV does not allow you to see all the\n\u003e transactions in a block and be able to calculate if you should be\n\u003e adding more to your reward transaction if the last miner made the\n\u003e blocks bigger. Because of this, the miners would also have an eye on\n\u003e blockchain size and wont want it getting huge too fast (outsize of\n\u003e Moore's law of Nielsen's Law). Adding to the gamification.\n\u003e \n\u003e This system would encourage block size growth due to organic growth\n\u003e and the penalty would encourage it to be slow as to still keep reward\n\u003e high and preserve ROE.\n\u003e \n\u003e What this would look like: The miners start seeing what looks like\n\u003e natural network growth, and make the decision (or program an\n\u003e algorithm, the beauty is it leaves the \"how\" up to the miners) to\n\u003e increase the blocksize. They think that, in the long run, having\n\u003e larger blocks will increase their revenue and its worth taking the hit\n\u003e now for more fees later. They increase the size to 1.25 MB. As a\n\u003e result, they reward would be 18.75 (75%). The miner fees were .5BTC.\n\u003e The miner fees are also reduced to .375BTC. Everyone who receives that\n\u003e block can easily calculate 1) if the previous miner gave themselves\n\u003e the proper reward 2) what the next reward should be if they win it.\n\u003e Miners now start building blocks with a 31.25 reward transaction and\n\u003e miner fee + .125.\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev",
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