📅 Original date posted:2015-07-01
📝 Original message:
>There is no such central processor though in this case to enforce the
reputation of lightening nodes.
There's no reason why there couldn't be.
Tor, for example, has nine "directory authorities." They attempt to reach
nodes in the Tor network, and record whether they're available. Then, they
vote among themselves to produce a directory consensus, and they all sign
it. Lightning could use a similar system. Unlike Tor, we don't need to
require everyone to use the same directory authorities, either.
On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Nick ODell <nickodell at gmail.com> wrote:
> >There is no such central processor though in this case to enforce the
> reputation of lightening nodes.
>
> There's no reason why there couldn't be.
>
> Tor, for example, has nine "directory authorities." They attempt to reach
> nodes in the Tor network, and record whether they're available. Then, they
> vote among themselves to produce a directory consensus, and they all sign
> it. Lightning could use a similar system. Unlike Tor, we don't need to
> require everyone to use the same directory authority, either.
>
> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 10:31 AM, Kevin Greene <kgreenek at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Blargh. The dumb solution here is to just shrug and say that you have to
>> trust these processors to be highly available, and never try to do
>> re-routing. That's pretty much equivalent to what would happen if one of
>> the banks in the visa network had networking issues for example.
>>
>> The big difference here though is that visa will kick you out of the
>> network if you're a bank that's consistently not meeting their
>> strict SLA's, and that keeps the network honest. There is no such central
>> processor though in this case to enforce the reputation of lightening
>> nodes.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 29, 2015, Stephen Morse <stephencalebmorse at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Rusty,
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 2:41 AM, Rusty Russell <rusty at rustcorp.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, C can just get the preimage from E and collude to steal the funds,
>>>> which is a nasty failure mode.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> This scenario may even happen non-maliciously, if C has an honest outage
>>> and attempts to pick up where it left off on each of its channels. To fix
>>> the non-malicious case, C could get a refund from E (a new signed
>>> transaction with a lower lock time), if C knows he has been offline for
>>> longer than B's willingness to wait before re-routing. But this isn't
>>> perfect, or even good, because E cannot know that C isn't just trying to
>>> get a refund even though they have taken the payment from B. In fact, C is
>>> guaranteed the payment from B, since they have the pre-image.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Delaying the entire payment is a poor option; can anyone see a better
>>>> one?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Like you say, delaying the payment seems like a bad way to go, as then
>>> the payments wouldn't be quite "Lightning" fast anymore. 99% of the payment
>>> could be re-routed though. Perhaps the 99% could be re-routed, while A
>>> waits for C to rejoin. Or if multiple paths are being used to process the
>>> payment, just redistribute the remaining payments allotted for the broken
>>> path among the other functioning paths.
>>>
>>> The bigger problem here seems to be that the incentives are slightly
>>> skewed in favor of dishonestly. One can minimize the impact of that
>>> dishonesty by breaking the payment into smaller chunks and across diverse
>>> paths, but this comes at the cost of bandwidth and speed. Some sort of a
>>> rating system could come into play possibly, if nothing can be
>>> cryptographically worked out.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Stephen
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Lightning-dev mailing list
>> Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>>
>>
>
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Nick ODell [ARCHIVE] /
npub192…qwur0
2023-06-09 12:43:29
in reply to nevent1q…lnag
Author Public Key
npub192dh6dprqsvsrdeche436s9xunwnlyzpu7jl5j3d83nz62tgznrsnqwur0Published at
2023-06-09 12:43:29Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-07-01\n📝 Original message:\n\u003eThere is no such central processor though in this case to enforce the\nreputation of lightening nodes.\n\nThere's no reason why there couldn't be.\n\nTor, for example, has nine \"directory authorities.\" They attempt to reach\nnodes in the Tor network, and record whether they're available. Then, they\nvote among themselves to produce a directory consensus, and they all sign\nit. Lightning could use a similar system. Unlike Tor, we don't need to\nrequire everyone to use the same directory authorities, either.\n\nOn Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Nick ODell \u003cnickodell at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e \u003eThere is no such central processor though in this case to enforce the\n\u003e reputation of lightening nodes.\n\u003e\n\u003e There's no reason why there couldn't be.\n\u003e\n\u003e Tor, for example, has nine \"directory authorities.\" They attempt to reach\n\u003e nodes in the Tor network, and record whether they're available. Then, they\n\u003e vote among themselves to produce a directory consensus, and they all sign\n\u003e it. Lightning could use a similar system. Unlike Tor, we don't need to\n\u003e require everyone to use the same directory authority, either.\n\u003e\n\u003e On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 10:31 AM, Kevin Greene \u003ckgreenek at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Blargh. The dumb solution here is to just shrug and say that you have to\n\u003e\u003e trust these processors to be highly available, and never try to do\n\u003e\u003e re-routing. That's pretty much equivalent to what would happen if one of\n\u003e\u003e the banks in the visa network had networking issues for example.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e The big difference here though is that visa will kick you out of the\n\u003e\u003e network if you're a bank that's consistently not meeting their\n\u003e\u003e strict SLA's, and that keeps the network honest. There is no such central\n\u003e\u003e processor though in this case to enforce the reputation of lightening\n\u003e\u003e nodes.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e On Monday, June 29, 2015, Stephen Morse \u003cstephencalebmorse at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Hi Rusty,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 2:41 AM, Rusty Russell \u003crusty at rustcorp.com.au\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Yes, C can just get the preimage from E and collude to steal the funds,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e which is a nasty failure mode.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e This scenario may even happen non-maliciously, if C has an honest outage\n\u003e\u003e\u003e and attempts to pick up where it left off on each of its channels. To fix\n\u003e\u003e\u003e the non-malicious case, C could get a refund from E (a new signed\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction with a lower lock time), if C knows he has been offline for\n\u003e\u003e\u003e longer than B's willingness to wait before re-routing. But this isn't\n\u003e\u003e\u003e perfect, or even good, because E cannot know that C isn't just trying to\n\u003e\u003e\u003e get a refund even though they have taken the payment from B. In fact, C is\n\u003e\u003e\u003e guaranteed the payment from B, since they have the pre-image.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Delaying the entire payment is a poor option; can anyone see a better\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e one?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Like you say, delaying the payment seems like a bad way to go, as then\n\u003e\u003e\u003e the payments wouldn't be quite \"Lightning\" fast anymore. 99% of the payment\n\u003e\u003e\u003e could be re-routed though. Perhaps the 99% could be re-routed, while A\n\u003e\u003e\u003e waits for C to rejoin. Or if multiple paths are being used to process the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e payment, just redistribute the remaining payments allotted for the broken\n\u003e\u003e\u003e path among the other functioning paths.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The bigger problem here seems to be that the incentives are slightly\n\u003e\u003e\u003e skewed in favor of dishonestly. One can minimize the impact of that\n\u003e\u003e\u003e dishonesty by breaking the payment into smaller chunks and across diverse\n\u003e\u003e\u003e paths, but this comes at the cost of bandwidth and speed. Some sort of a\n\u003e\u003e\u003e rating system could come into play possibly, if nothing can be\n\u003e\u003e\u003e cryptographically worked out.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Best,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Stephen\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e Lightning-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20150701/83839504/attachment.html\u003e",
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