š
Original date posted:2014-01-16
š Original message:quote:
> > but then you remove the implication that a node has to give both public
> > and private IPs to a peer. If it's part of a batch of "addr"s, it could be
> > my own hidden service ID, but it could also be one that I learned from
> > someone else and is now propagating, for anyone to bootstrap with Tor
> > hidden service peers if they'd like.
> >
>
> Hmm. So you mean that we pick a set of peers we believe to not be sybils of
> each other, but they might give us hidden services run by other people? I
> need to think about that. If they're getting the hidden services just from
> addr announcements themselves, then you just punt the issue up a layer -
> what stops me generating 10000 hidden service keys that all map to my same
> malicious node, announcing them, and then waiting for the traffic to
> arrive? If clearnet nodes inform of their own hidden service IDs, that
> issue is avoided.
>
Considering that the clearnet sybil protection also relies on scaling
up the resource requirements for an attacker, why not require hidden
service addresses following a certain pattern, like a fixed prefix?
Essentially also a PoW scheme...
> My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of
> clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what.
What would you consider as the main merits of clearnet nodes?
Best regards,
Isidor
Isidor Zeuner [ARCHIVE] /
npub1wzā¦2jvxz
2023-06-07 15:12:09
in reply to nevent1qā¦0n8f
Author Public Key
npub1wz2sm8h4ylh9dn28688vjzwrmhaxnh3jl04p8jk3qeq7umwf8cus72jvxzPublished at
2023-06-07 15:12:09Event JSON
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Original date posted:2014-01-16\nš Original message:quote:\n\u003e \u003e but then you remove the implication that a node has to give both public\n\u003e \u003e and private IPs to a peer. If it's part of a batch of \"addr\"s, it could be\n\u003e \u003e my own hidden service ID, but it could also be one that I learned from\n\u003e \u003e someone else and is now propagating, for anyone to bootstrap with Tor\n\u003e \u003e hidden service peers if they'd like.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Hmm. So you mean that we pick a set of peers we believe to not be sybils of\n\u003e each other, but they might give us hidden services run by other people? I\n\u003e need to think about that. If they're getting the hidden services just from\n\u003e addr announcements themselves, then you just punt the issue up a layer -\n\u003e what stops me generating 10000 hidden service keys that all map to my same\n\u003e malicious node, announcing them, and then waiting for the traffic to\n\u003e arrive? If clearnet nodes inform of their own hidden service IDs, that\n\u003e issue is avoided.\n\u003e\n\nConsidering that the clearnet sybil protection also relies on scaling\nup the resource requirements for an attacker, why not require hidden\nservice addresses following a certain pattern, like a fixed prefix?\nEssentially also a PoW scheme...\n\n\u003e My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of\n\u003e clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what.\n\nWhat would you consider as the main merits of clearnet nodes?\n\nBest regards,\n\nIsidor",
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