š
Original date posted:2013-11-05
š Original message:That sounds like selfish mining, and the magic number is 25%. That's the
minimal pool size.
Today the threshold is 0% with good connectivity.
If I misunderstood your point, please elaborate.
Ittay
On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > Please see below our BIP for raising the selfish mining threshold.
> > Looking forward to your comments.
>
> <snip>
>
> > 2. No new vulnerabilities introduced:
> > Currently the choice among equal-length chains is done arbitrarily,
> > depending on network topology. This arbitrariness is a source of
> > vulnerability. We replace it with explicit randomness, which is at the
> > control of the protocol. The change does not introduce executions that
> were
> > not possible with the old protocol.
>
> Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for pointing this out, but the random
> choice solution does in fact introduce a vulnerability in that it
> creates incentives for pools over a certain size to withhold blocks
> rather than immediately broadcasting all blocks found.
>
> The problem is that when the pool eventually choses to reveal the block
> they mined, 50% of the hashing power switches, thus splitting the
> network. Like the original attack this can be to their benefit. For
> pools over a certain size this strategy is profitable even without
> investing in a low-latency network; Maxwell or someone else can chime in
> with the details for deriving that threshold.
>
> I won't get a chance to for a few hours, but someone should do the
> analysis on a deterministic switching scheme.
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000005e25ca9b9fe62bdd6e8a2b4527ad61753dd2113c268bec707
>
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Ittay [ARCHIVE] /
npub1n8ā¦637cg
2023-06-07 15:08:53
in reply to nevent1qā¦2ewd
Author Public Key
npub1n8ytpf4jzavm7hl9t5zksuefcguu6k3frvztqqc4kgcdkwduqesq0637cgPublished at
2023-06-07 15:08:53Event JSON
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Original date posted:2013-11-05\nš Original message:That sounds like selfish mining, and the magic number is 25%. That's the\nminimal pool size.\nToday the threshold is 0% with good connectivity.\n\nIf I misunderstood your point, please elaborate.\n\nIttay\n\n\n\nOn Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote:\n\u003e \u003e Hello,\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Please see below our BIP for raising the selfish mining threshold.\n\u003e \u003e Looking forward to your comments.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003csnip\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 2. No new vulnerabilities introduced:\n\u003e \u003e Currently the choice among equal-length chains is done arbitrarily,\n\u003e \u003e depending on network topology. This arbitrariness is a source of\n\u003e \u003e vulnerability. We replace it with explicit randomness, which is at the\n\u003e \u003e control of the protocol. The change does not introduce executions that\n\u003e were\n\u003e \u003e not possible with the old protocol.\n\u003e\n\u003e Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for pointing this out, but the random\n\u003e choice solution does in fact introduce a vulnerability in that it\n\u003e creates incentives for pools over a certain size to withhold blocks\n\u003e rather than immediately broadcasting all blocks found.\n\u003e\n\u003e The problem is that when the pool eventually choses to reveal the block\n\u003e they mined, 50% of the hashing power switches, thus splitting the\n\u003e network. Like the original attack this can be to their benefit. For\n\u003e pools over a certain size this strategy is profitable even without\n\u003e investing in a low-latency network; Maxwell or someone else can chime in\n\u003e with the details for deriving that threshold.\n\u003e\n\u003e I won't get a chance to for a few hours, but someone should do the\n\u003e analysis on a deterministic switching scheme.\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e 0000000000000005e25ca9b9fe62bdd6e8a2b4527ad61753dd2113c268bec707\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20131105/b28e776d/attachment.html\u003e",
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