Mike Hearn [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2014-06-18 📝 Original message:> > I think that's true if ...
📅 Original date posted:2014-06-18
📝 Original message:>
> I think that's true if you assume that the instant provider list is based
> on a by hand created list of accepted instant providers. That's how VISA
> works now and that's why I was asking for an approach where the
> trusted_instant_providers list is scalable because that seems very
> dangerous.
>
Supporting it in the protocol is easy. Building such a thing: that's hard.
Decentralised automated reputation systems are complex and subtle.
I don't feel strongly about whether the field should be "optional" or
"repeated", 100% of implementations in the forseeable future would just
look at the first item and ignore the rest. But if later someone did crack
this problem it would lead to a simple upgrade path. So perhaps you're
right and the protobuf should allow multiple signatures. It means a new
sub-message to wrap the pki_type, pki_data and signature fields into one,
and then making that repeated.
Up to Lawrence.
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Published at
2023-06-07 15:22:42Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-06-18\n📝 Original message:\u003e\n\u003e I think that's true if you assume that the instant provider list is based\n\u003e on a by hand created list of accepted instant providers. That's how VISA\n\u003e works now and that's why I was asking for an approach where the\n\u003e trusted_instant_providers list is scalable because that seems very\n\u003e dangerous.\n\u003e\n\nSupporting it in the protocol is easy. Building such a thing: that's hard.\nDecentralised automated reputation systems are complex and subtle.\n\nI don't feel strongly about whether the field should be \"optional\" or\n\"repeated\", 100% of implementations in the forseeable future would just\nlook at the first item and ignore the rest. But if later someone did crack\nthis problem it would lead to a simple upgrade path. So perhaps you're\nright and the protobuf should allow multiple signatures. It means a new\nsub-message to wrap the pki_type, pki_data and signature fields into one,\nand then making that repeated.\n\nUp to Lawrence.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140618/cc609821/attachment.html\u003e",
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