Matt Corallo [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-12-02 📝 Original message:My issue is more that its ...

📅 Original date posted:2015-12-02
📝 Original message:My issue is more that its additional complexity and attack surface, and
for a very minor gain which should disappear with further optimization
elsewhere and less that we absolutely shouldn't add compression because
we're definitely gonna have issues.

On 12/02/15 20:16, Peter Tschipper via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Building a compressor from scratch may yeild some better compression
> ratios, or not, but having trust and faith in whether it will stand up
> against attack vectors another matter. LZO has been around for 20 years
> with very few problems and no current issues. Maybe something better
> can be built, but when and how much testing will need to be done before
> it can be trusted? Right now there is something that provides a benefit
> and in the future if something better is found it's not that difficult
> to add it. We could easily support multiple compression libraries.
>
>
> On 02/12/2015 10:57 AM, Emin Gün Sirer wrote:
>> Thanks Peter for the careful, quantitative work.
>>
>> I want to bring one additional issue to everyone's consideration,
>> related to the choice of the Lempel-Ziv family of compressors.
>>
>> While I'm not familiar with every single compression engine tested,
>> the Lempel-Ziv family of compressors are generally based on
>> "compression tables." Essentially, they assign a short unique number
>> to every new subsequence they encounter, and when they re-encounter a
>> sequence like "ab" in "abcdfdcdabcdfabcdf" they replace it with that
>> short integer (say, in this case, 9-bit constant 256). So this example
>> sequence may turn into "abcdfd<258 for cd><256 for ab><258 for
>> cd>f<261 for abc><259 for df>" which is slightly shorter than the
>> original (I'm doing this off the top of my head so the counts may be
>> off, but it's meant to be illustrative). Note that the sequence "abc"
>> got added into the table only after it was encountered twice in the
>> input.
>>
>> This is nice and generic and works well for English text where certain
>> letter sequences (e.g. "it" "th" "the" "this" "are" "there" etc) are
>> repeated often, but it is nowhere as compact as it could possibly be
>> for mostly binary data -- there are opportunities for much better
>> compression, made possible by the structured reuse of certain byte
>> sequences in the Bitcoin wire protocol.
>>
>> On a Bitcoin wire connection, we might see several related
>> transactions reorganizing cash in a set of addresses, and therefore,
>> several reuses of a 20-byte address. Or we might see a 200-byte
>> transaction get transmitted, followed by the same transaction,
>> repeated in a block. Ideally, we'd learn the sequence that may be
>> repeated later on, all at once (e.g. a Bitcoin address or a
>> transaction), and replace it with a short number, referring back to
>> the long sequence. In the example above, if we knew that "abcdf" was a
>> UNIT that would likely be repeated, we would put it into the
>> compression table as a whole, instead of relying on repetition to get
>> it into the table one extra byte at a time. That may let us compress
>> the original sequence down to "abcdfd<257 for cd><256 for abcdf><256
>> for abcdf>" from the get go.
>>
>> Yet the LZ variants I know of will need to see a 200-byte sequence
>> repeated **199 times** in order to develop a single, reusable,
>> 200-byte long subsequence in the compression table.
>>
>> So, a Bitcoin-specific compressor can perhaps do significantly better,
>> but is it a good idea? Let's argue both sides.
>>
>> Cons:
>>
>> On the one hand, Bitcoin-specific compressors will be closely tied to
>> the contents of messages, which might make it difficult to change the
>> wire format later on -- changes to the wire format may need
>> corresponding changes to the compressor. If the compressor cannot be
>> implemented cleanly, then the protocol-agnostic, off-the-shelf
>> compressors have a maintainability edge, which comes at the expense of
>> the compression ratio.
>>
>> Another argument is that compression algorithms of any kind should be
>> tested thoroughly before inclusion, and brand new code may lack the
>> maturity required. While this argument has some merit, all outputs are
>> verified separately later on during processing, so
>> compression/decompression errors can potentially be detected. If the
>> compressor/decompressor can be structured in a way that isolates
>> bitcoind from failure (e.g. as a separate process for starters), this
>> concern can be remedied.
>>
>> Pros:
>>
>> The nature of LZ compressors leads me to believe that much higher
>> compression ratios are possible by building a custom, Bitcoin-aware
>> compressor. If I had to guess, I would venture that compression ratios
>> of 2X or more are possible in some cases. In some sense, the "O(1)
>> block propagation" idea that Gavin proposed a while ago can be seen as
>> extreme example of a Bitcoin-specific compressor, albeit one that
>> constrains the order of transactions in a block.
>>
>> Compression can buy us some additional throughput at zero cost, modulo
>> code complexity.
>> Given the amount of acrimonious debate over the block size we have all
>> had to endure, it seems
>> criminal to leave potentially free improvements on the table. Even if
>> the resulting code is
>> deemed too complex to include in the production client right now, it
>> would be good to understand
>> the potential for improvement.
>>
>> How to Do It
>>
>> If we want to compress Bitcoin, a programming challenge/contest would
>> be one of the best ways to find the best possible, Bitcoin-specific
>> compressor. This is the kind of self-contained exercise that bright
>> young hackers love to tackle. It'd bring in new programmers into the
>> ecosystem, and many of us would love to discover the limits of
>> compressibility for Bitcoin bits on a wire. And the results would be
>> interesting even if the final compression engine is not enabled by
>> default, or not even merged.
>>
>
>
>
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