📅 Original date posted:2015-02-25
📝 Original message:I definitely need to have an deeper understanding of that paper before
proceeding. Thanks for the reference!
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Andrew Lapp <lapp0 at purdue.edu> wrote:
> Having stakeholders "endorse" blocks has, according to you, the benefits
> of increasing the number of full nodes and making a 51% attack more
> expensive. It seems to me it would have the opposite effects and other
> negative side effects. Any stakeholder that has "won" could just be running
> an SPV client and be informed by a full node that they have won, then
> cooperate to collect the reward. You are mistaking proof of stake as a
> proof you are running a full node. At the same time, the network becomes
> cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount of the block reward that is
> paid to "endorsers". Another side effect is that miners would have a bigger
> economy of scale. The more stake a miner has, the more they can "endorse"
> their own blocks and not others blocks. I recommend reading this:
> https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf
>
> -Andrew Lapp
>
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Chris Page [ARCHIVE] /
npub1hf…c94zt
2023-06-07 15:31:23
in reply to nevent1q…j2pq
Author Public Key
npub1hfgwa873vhk8sps2sx3g3jh2atq0f6mga85g207ev7xt3q5cd3dqxc94ztPublished at
2023-06-07 15:31:23Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-02-25\n📝 Original message:I definitely need to have an deeper understanding of that paper before\nproceeding. Thanks for the reference!\n\nOn Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Andrew Lapp \u003clapp0 at purdue.edu\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Having stakeholders \"endorse\" blocks has, according to you, the benefits\n\u003e of increasing the number of full nodes and making a 51% attack more\n\u003e expensive. It seems to me it would have the opposite effects and other\n\u003e negative side effects. Any stakeholder that has \"won\" could just be running\n\u003e an SPV client and be informed by a full node that they have won, then\n\u003e cooperate to collect the reward. You are mistaking proof of stake as a\n\u003e proof you are running a full node. At the same time, the network becomes\n\u003e cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount of the block reward that is\n\u003e paid to \"endorsers\". Another side effect is that miners would have a bigger\n\u003e economy of scale. The more stake a miner has, the more they can \"endorse\"\n\u003e their own blocks and not others blocks. I recommend reading this:\n\u003e https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf\n\u003e\n\u003e -Andrew Lapp\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150225/196e294b/attachment.html\u003e",
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