📅 Original date posted:2014-05-18
📝 Original message:The problem with not involving any electronics is that somebody needs to
generate a recoverable private key that we have to trust haven't recovered
the private key.
The only plausible solution is multisignature P2SH addresses where you
trust several independent entities to not collude instead, where you
combine their paper notes into one piece. And then you still don't know if
all the private keys are recoverable to you (failed print?).
- Sent from my phone
Den 18 maj 2014 20:48 skrev "Alex Kotenko" <alexykot at gmail.com>:
> Erm, few things here.
> - I can't see really how to embed electronics capable to run an SPV
> client into printed paper. I know that passive NFC tags can be printed on
> paper, but not actual chips and/or power modules. So we are talking about a
> completely different things here.
> - even with paper notes printed proprietarily by some business the notes
> itself still can have routes for independent blockchain-based verification,
> and you won't need to trust anybody to test it. You will have to trust
> security of the notes itself, but this is same as when you trust the phone
> manufacturer when you're putting your bitcoin wallet on it.
>
> So really I see only issues of technical security in here, and this is
> the problem I'm seeking solutions for.
>
>
> Best regards,
> Alex Kotenko
>
>
> 2014-05-18 14:50 GMT+01:00 Natanael <natanael.l at gmail.com>:
>
>> Now you are talking about Trusted Platform Modules. Like smartcards,
>> actually. Devices that won't leak their keys but let the holder spend the
>> coins. It could even have it's own simple SPV wallet client to make it
>> easier to handle. And they'd use the attestation features provided by the
>> TPM to prove the software it's unmodified top the current holder.
>>
>> But then you still have to trust the manufacturer of the device, and you
>> have to trust it has no exploitable side channels.
>>
>> - Sent from my phone
>> Den 18 maj 2014 13:52 skrev "Alex Kotenko" <alexykot at gmail.com>:
>>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140518/5b4cc866/attachment.html>;
Natanael [ARCHIVE] /
npub179…lpmjt
2023-06-07 15:21:36
in reply to nevent1q…w48n
Author Public Key
npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjtPublished at
2023-06-07 15:21:36Event JSON
{
"id": "6dc548e7cafa18ba016db7116cba613b1a63e677ed18a6c468973a412972173e",
"pubkey": "f14f3c71a4e63a12c842e4a50471263ada4b6cfde093fcb6588693a726b9b018",
"created_at": 1686151296,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"d30b28e456bef274130eabcfd37469931101e35cbb7eae21abca740750812e9b",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"6921d5694de2397c3d992f211cc4722f2c654bac91188554ce1f66f23b0a5283",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"ac99e5ca3122fca258fbfcb6cb62d10d4dba423b3243251cbc0c4e0042656dec"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-05-18\n📝 Original message:The problem with not involving any electronics is that somebody needs to\ngenerate a recoverable private key that we have to trust haven't recovered\nthe private key.\n\nThe only plausible solution is multisignature P2SH addresses where you\ntrust several independent entities to not collude instead, where you\ncombine their paper notes into one piece. And then you still don't know if\nall the private keys are recoverable to you (failed print?).\n\n- Sent from my phone\nDen 18 maj 2014 20:48 skrev \"Alex Kotenko\" \u003calexykot at gmail.com\u003e:\n\n\u003e Erm, few things here.\n\u003e - I can't see really how to embed electronics capable to run an SPV\n\u003e client into printed paper. I know that passive NFC tags can be printed on\n\u003e paper, but not actual chips and/or power modules. So we are talking about a\n\u003e completely different things here.\n\u003e - even with paper notes printed proprietarily by some business the notes\n\u003e itself still can have routes for independent blockchain-based verification,\n\u003e and you won't need to trust anybody to test it. You will have to trust\n\u003e security of the notes itself, but this is same as when you trust the phone\n\u003e manufacturer when you're putting your bitcoin wallet on it.\n\u003e\n\u003e So really I see only issues of technical security in here, and this is\n\u003e the problem I'm seeking solutions for.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Best regards,\n\u003e Alex Kotenko\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e 2014-05-18 14:50 GMT+01:00 Natanael \u003cnatanael.l at gmail.com\u003e:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Now you are talking about Trusted Platform Modules. Like smartcards,\n\u003e\u003e actually. Devices that won't leak their keys but let the holder spend the\n\u003e\u003e coins. It could even have it's own simple SPV wallet client to make it\n\u003e\u003e easier to handle. And they'd use the attestation features provided by the\n\u003e\u003e TPM to prove the software it's unmodified top the current holder.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e But then you still have to trust the manufacturer of the device, and you\n\u003e\u003e have to trust it has no exploitable side channels.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e - Sent from my phone\n\u003e\u003e Den 18 maj 2014 13:52 skrev \"Alex Kotenko\" \u003calexykot at gmail.com\u003e:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140518/5b4cc866/attachment.html\u003e",
"sig": "3c3cfbe20d0557161ceeb1a40910c799fc074ddabc5e80e77b28f901b556a821d6f9708235ce41ee101120dce55e0aceb228d431360d19f3dcad58bf51a20360"
}