Yifu Guo [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-02-09 📝 Original message:Happy Lunar New Year ...

📅 Original date posted:2016-02-09
📝 Original message:Happy Lunar New Year Everyone!

Gavin,

> I suspect there ARE a significant percentage of un-maintained full
> nodes-- probably 30 to 40%. Losing those nodes will not be a problem, for
> three reasons:


The notion of large set ( 30% to 40% ) of un-maintained full nodes are not
evident on the network. below is data based on a personal snap shot taken
around Dec, 2015. with the following assumptions.
1) nodes running non standard version strings are considered a preference
by the node operator and are not included.
2) nodes below 0.10 are counted as so called "un-maintained" even though
they also can be a choice of the node operator.

Satoshi:0.9.3, 105
Satoshi:0.8.6, 74
Satoshi:0.9.1, 49
Satoshi:0.9.2.1, 42
Satoshi:0.8.5, 39
Satoshi:0.8.1, 35
Satoshi:0.9.5, 14
Satoshi:0.8.3, 12
Satoshi:0.9.4, 10
Satoshi:0.9.99, 10
Satoshi:0.9.0, 5
Satoshi:0.9.2, 5
Satoshi:0.8.0, 4
Satoshi:0.8.99, 1
Satoshi:0.8.4, 1

There are 406 nodes total that falls under the un-maintained category,
which is below 10% of the network.
Luke also have some data here that shows similar results.
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/versions.txt

> The network could shrink by 60% and it would still have plenty of open
> connection slots


I'm afraid we have to agree to disagree if you think dropping support for
60% of the nodes on the network when rolling out an upgrade is the sane
default.

>
> > People are committing to spinning up thousands of supports-2mb-nodes
> during the grace period.


thousands of nodes?! where did you get this figure? who are these people?
*Please* elaborate.

> We could wait a year and pick up maybe 10 or 20% more.


I don't understand this statement at all, please explicate.

--
*Yifu Guo*
*"Life is an everlasting self-improvement."*

On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 10:37 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Responding to "28 days is not long enough" :
>
> I keep seeing this claim made with no evidence to back it up. As I said,
> I surveyed several of the biggest infrastructure providers and the btcd
> lead developer and they all agree "28 days is plenty of time."
>
> For individuals... why would it take somebody longer than 28 days to
> either download and restart their bitcoind, or to patch and then re-run
> (the patch can be a one-line change MAX_BLOCK_SIZE from 1000000 to 2000000)?
>
> For the Bitcoin Core project: I'm well aware of how long it takes to roll
> out new binaries, and 28 days is plenty of time.
>
> I suspect there ARE a significant percentage of un-maintained full nodes--
> probably 30 to 40%. Losing those nodes will not be a problem, for three
> reasons:
> 1) The network could shrink by 60% and it would still have plenty of open
> connection slots
> 2) People are committing to spinning up thousands of supports-2mb-nodes
> during the grace period.
> 3) We could wait a year and pick up maybe 10 or 20% more.
>
> I strongly disagree with the statement that there is no cost to a longer
> grace period. There is broad agreement that a capacity increase is needed
> NOW.
>
> To bring it back to bitcoin-dev territory: are there any TECHNICAL
> arguments why an upgrade would take a business or individual longer than 28
> days?
>
>
> Responding to Luke's message:
>
> On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 1:12 AM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > On Friday, February 05, 2016 8:51:08 PM Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
>> wrote:
>> >> Blog post on a couple of the constants chosen:
>> >> http://gavinandresen.ninja/seventyfive-twentyeight
>> >
>> > Can you put this in the BIP's Rationale section (which appears to be
>> mis-named
>> > "Discussion" in the current draft)?
>>
>
> I'll rename the section and expand it a little. I think standards
> documents like BIPs should be concise, though (written for implementors),
> so I'm not going to recreate the entire blog post there.
>
>
>> >
>> >> Signature operations in un-executed branches of a Script are not
>> counted
>> >> OP_CHECKMULTISIG evaluations are counted accurately; if the signature
>> for a
>> >> 1-of-20 OP_CHECKMULTISIG is satisified by the public key nearest the
>> top
>> >> of the execution stack, it is counted as one signature operation. If
>> it is
>> >> satisfied by the public key nearest the bottom of the execution stack,
>> it
>> >> is counted as twenty signature operations. Signature operations
>> involving
>> >> invalidly encoded signatures or public keys are not counted towards the
>> >> limit
>> >
>> > These seem like they will break static analysis entirely. That was a
>> noted
>> > reason for creating BIP 16 to replace BIP 12. Is it no longer a
>> concern? Would
>> > it make sense to require scripts to commit to the total accurate-sigop
>> count
>> > to fix this?
>>
>
> After implementing static counting and accurate counting... I was wrong.
> Accurate/dynamic counting/limiting is quick and simple and can be
> completely safe (the counting code can be told the limit and can
> "early-out" validation).
>
> I think making scripts commit to a total accurate sigop count is a bad
> idea-- it would make multisignature signing more complicated for zero
> benefit. E.g. if you're circulating a partially signed transaction to that
> must be signed by 2 of 5 people, you can end up with a transaction that
> requires 2, 3, 4, or 5 signature operations to validate (depending on which
> public keys are used to do the signing). The first signer might have no
> idea who else would sign and wouldn't know the accurate sigop count.
>
>
>> >
>> >> The amount of data hashed to compute signature hashes is limited to
>> >> 1,300,000,000 bytes per block.
>> >
>> > The rationale for this wasn't in your blog post. I assume it's based on
>> the
>> > current theoretical max at 1 MB blocks? Even a high-end PC would
>> probably take
>> > 40-80 seconds just for the hashing, however - maybe a lower limit would
>> be
>> > best?
>>
>
> It is slightly more hashing than was required to validate block number
> 364,422.
>
> There are a couple of advantages to a very high limit:
>
> 1) When the fork is over, special-case code for dealing with old blocks
> can be eliminated, because all old blocks satisfy the new limit.
>
> 2) More importantly, if the limit is small enough it might get hit by
> standard transactions, then block creation code (CreateNewBlock() /
> getblocktemplate / or some external transaction-assembling software) will
> have to solve an even more complicated bin-packing problem to optimize for
> fees paid.
>
> In practice, the 20,000 sigop limit will always be reached before
> MAX_BLOCK_SIGHASH.
>
>
>
>> >
>> >> Miners express their support for this BIP by ...
>> >
>> > But miners don't get to decide hardforks. How does the economy express
>> their
>> > support for it? What happens if miners trigger it without consent from
>> the
>> > economy?
>>
>
> "The economy" does support this.
>
>
>
>> >
>> > If you are intent on using the version bits to trigger the hardfork, I
>> suggest
>> > rephrasing this such that miners should only enable the bit when they
>> have
>> > independently confirmed economic support (this means implementations
>> need a
>> > config option that defaults to off).
>>
>
> Happy to add words about economic majority.
>
> Classic will not implement a command-line option (the act of running
> Classic is "I opt in"), but happy to add one for a pull request to Core,
> assuming Core would not see such a pull request as having any hostile
> intent.
>
>
> >
>> >> SPV (simple payment validation) wallets are compatible with this
>> change.
>> >
>> > Would prefer if this is corrected to "Light clients" or something.
>> Actual SPV
>> > wallets do not exist at this time, and would not be compatible with a
>> > hardfork.
>>
>
> Is there an explanation of SPV versus "Light Client" written somewhere
> more permanent than a reddit comment or forum post that I can point to?
>
>
>> >
>> >> In the short term, an increase is needed to continue the current
>> economic
>> >> policies with regards to fees and block space, matching market
>> expectations
>> >> and preventing market disruption.
>> >
>> > IMO this sentence is the most controversial part of your draft, and it
>> > wouldn't suffer a loss to remove it (or at least make it subjective).
>>
>
> Happy to remove.
>
>
>> > I would also prefer to see any hardfork:
>> >
>> > 1. Address at least the simple tasks on the hardfork wishlist (eg,
>> enable some
>> > disabled opcodes; fix P2SH for N-of->15 multisig; etc).
>>
>
> Those would be separate BIPs. (according to BIP 1, smaller is better)
>
> After this 2MB bump, I agree we need to agree on a process for the next
> hard fork to avoid all of the unnecessary drama.
>
> > 2. Be deployed as a soft-hardfork so as not to leave old nodes entirely
>> > insecure.
>>
>
> I haven't been paying attention to all of the
> "soft-hardfork/hard-softfork/etc" terminology so have no idea what you
> mean. Is THAT written up somewhere?
>
> --
> --
> Gavin Andresen
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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