Joseph Poon [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-08-11 📝 Original message: On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-08-11
📝 Original message:
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 09:26:43PM +0200, Mats Jerratsch wrote:
> > At Commitment 20, the channel state is 0 BTC to Alice and 1 to Bob.
> > At commitment 31, the channel state is 1 BTC to Alice and 0 to Bob.
> >
> > Alice is the client and Bob is the server.
> >
> > Presume Alice deicdes to be a jerk! She broadcasts a mutated (re-signed)
> > version of Commitment 20. The server is out 1 BTC! This is now a hostage
> > negotiation.
>
> But the 1 BTC of Commitment 20 goes straight to Bob (and not to a
> multi-sig address). Mutating a channel transaction only hurts the
> party that is doing the mutation. This is why RBF is a major problem,
> if it ever gets deployed.
Sorry, I usually use Bob as the attacker in my examples and Alice as the
client, so I got mixed up there. I meant:
At Commitment 20, the channel state is 1 BTC to Alice and 0 to Bob.
At commitment 31, the channel state is 0 BTC to Alice and 1 to Bob.
In this case, if Alice attacks Bob she's not out any money, but Bob has
funds locked up in a 2-of-2. Bob must now negotiate with Alice to get
his money back. Alice will probably want some 'convenience fee'.
>
> > Let's presume that you set up some kind of reserve requirement instead:
> > At Commitment 20, the channel state is 0.05 BTC to Alice and 0.95 to Bob.
> > At commitment 31, the channel state is 0.95 BTC to Alice and 0.05 to Bob.
> >
> > Again, Alice deicdes to be a jerk! She broadcasts a mutated (re-signed)
> > version of Commitment 20. The server is out 0.95 BTC! But wait, you say,
> > Alice might be out 0.05 of her own BTC. This model breaks down because
> > it's still a hostage scenario! Alice tells Bob, "hey, I know I have 0.05
> > BTC stuck here (and you have 0.9 stuck), but I'm rich. I don't care how
> > long it takes, how about you give me a 'tax' of 0.1 BTC. You'll get your
> > money back... well most of it, just sign this transaction where I get
> > 0.15".
>
> The same as above, if she resignes commitment 20, she is losing 0.05
> BTC, while Bob does still get the 0.95 BTC.
At Commitment 20, the channel state is 0.95 BTC to Alice and 0.05 to Bob.
At commitment 31, the channel state is 0.05 BTC to Alice and 0.95 to Bob.
> There is a problem with channel histories, where Alice holds all the
> funds at one point, and Bob holds all the funds at some later point,
> as open payments are not as secure as those settled balances. I
> mitigate this by setting a hard requirement on the spendable amount. I
> will describe this in more detail soon.
You can't mitigate this by setting some reserve requirement, though. So
long as Alice has more money than Bob, she can do it. If Alice is 10x
richer than Bob, she doesn't *care* and she knows Bob will eventually
give up. "Two-party escrow" doesn't work because one party can have more
money and less time-value than another. Time-value is not a universal
value.
--
Joseph Poon
Published at
2023-06-09 12:43:58Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-08-11\n📝 Original message:\nOn Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 09:26:43PM +0200, Mats Jerratsch wrote:\n\u003e \u003e At Commitment 20, the channel state is 0 BTC to Alice and 1 to Bob.\n\u003e \u003e At commitment 31, the channel state is 1 BTC to Alice and 0 to Bob.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Alice is the client and Bob is the server.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Presume Alice deicdes to be a jerk! She broadcasts a mutated (re-signed)\n\u003e \u003e version of Commitment 20. The server is out 1 BTC! This is now a hostage\n\u003e \u003e negotiation.\n\u003e \n\u003e But the 1 BTC of Commitment 20 goes straight to Bob (and not to a\n\u003e multi-sig address). Mutating a channel transaction only hurts the\n\u003e party that is doing the mutation. This is why RBF is a major problem,\n\u003e if it ever gets deployed.\n\nSorry, I usually use Bob as the attacker in my examples and Alice as the\nclient, so I got mixed up there. I meant:\nAt Commitment 20, the channel state is 1 BTC to Alice and 0 to Bob.\nAt commitment 31, the channel state is 0 BTC to Alice and 1 to Bob.\n\nIn this case, if Alice attacks Bob she's not out any money, but Bob has\nfunds locked up in a 2-of-2. Bob must now negotiate with Alice to get\nhis money back. Alice will probably want some 'convenience fee'.\n\n\u003e \n\u003e \u003e Let's presume that you set up some kind of reserve requirement instead:\n\u003e \u003e At Commitment 20, the channel state is 0.05 BTC to Alice and 0.95 to Bob.\n\u003e \u003e At commitment 31, the channel state is 0.95 BTC to Alice and 0.05 to Bob.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Again, Alice deicdes to be a jerk! She broadcasts a mutated (re-signed)\n\u003e \u003e version of Commitment 20. The server is out 0.95 BTC! But wait, you say,\n\u003e \u003e Alice might be out 0.05 of her own BTC. This model breaks down because\n\u003e \u003e it's still a hostage scenario! Alice tells Bob, \"hey, I know I have 0.05\n\u003e \u003e BTC stuck here (and you have 0.9 stuck), but I'm rich. I don't care how\n\u003e \u003e long it takes, how about you give me a 'tax' of 0.1 BTC. You'll get your\n\u003e \u003e money back... well most of it, just sign this transaction where I get\n\u003e \u003e 0.15\".\n\u003e \n\u003e The same as above, if she resignes commitment 20, she is losing 0.05\n\u003e BTC, while Bob does still get the 0.95 BTC.\n\nAt Commitment 20, the channel state is 0.95 BTC to Alice and 0.05 to Bob.\nAt commitment 31, the channel state is 0.05 BTC to Alice and 0.95 to Bob.\n\n\u003e There is a problem with channel histories, where Alice holds all the\n\u003e funds at one point, and Bob holds all the funds at some later point,\n\u003e as open payments are not as secure as those settled balances. I\n\u003e mitigate this by setting a hard requirement on the spendable amount. I\n\u003e will describe this in more detail soon.\n\nYou can't mitigate this by setting some reserve requirement, though. So\nlong as Alice has more money than Bob, she can do it. If Alice is 10x\nricher than Bob, she doesn't *care* and she knows Bob will eventually\ngive up. \"Two-party escrow\" doesn't work because one party can have more\nmoney and less time-value than another. Time-value is not a universal\nvalue.\n\n-- \nJoseph Poon",
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