David A. Harding [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: š
Original date posted:2022-11-11 š Original message:On 2022-11-07 11:17, Peter ...
š
Original date posted:2022-11-11
š Original message:On 2022-11-07 11:17, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> We can ensure with high probability that the transaction can be
> cancelled/mined
> at some point after N blocks by pre-signing a transaction, with
> nLockTime set
> sufficiently far into the future, spending one or more inputs of the
> transaction with a sufficiently high fee that it would replace
> transaction(s)
> attempting to exploit Rule #3 pinning (note how the package limits in
> Bitcoin
> Core help here).
This implies a floor on the funds involved in a contract. For example,
if the pinning transaction is 100,000 vbytes at a feerate of 1 sat/vb,
the minimum contract amount must be a bit over 100,000 sats (about $17
USD at current prices). However, participants in a contract not meant
to settle immediately probably need to assume the worst case future
pinning, for example where transactions paying even 100 sat/vb won't be
mined promptly; in which case the minimum contract amount becomes
something like $1,700 USD.
That seems sub-optimal to me.
-Dave
Published at
2023-06-07 23:16:49Event JSON
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Original date posted:2022-11-11\nš Original message:On 2022-11-07 11:17, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e We can ensure with high probability that the transaction can be \n\u003e cancelled/mined\n\u003e at some point after N blocks by pre-signing a transaction, with \n\u003e nLockTime set\n\u003e sufficiently far into the future, spending one or more inputs of the\n\u003e transaction with a sufficiently high fee that it would replace \n\u003e transaction(s)\n\u003e attempting to exploit Rule #3 pinning (note how the package limits in \n\u003e Bitcoin\n\u003e Core help here).\n\nThis implies a floor on the funds involved in a contract. For example, \nif the pinning transaction is 100,000 vbytes at a feerate of 1 sat/vb, \nthe minimum contract amount must be a bit over 100,000 sats (about $17 \nUSD at current prices). However, participants in a contract not meant \nto settle immediately probably need to assume the worst case future \npinning, for example where transactions paying even 100 sat/vb won't be \nmined promptly; in which case the minimum contract amount becomes \nsomething like $1,700 USD.\n\nThat seems sub-optimal to me.\n\n-Dave",
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