đź“… Original date posted:2012-12-03
đź“ť Original message:On 12/03/2012 10:02 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> (1) Make client software aggressive about sweeping up dust inputs:
> "Any time a transaction is created that has change keep adding in
> extra inputs— smallest to largest— until an additional one would
> increase the cost of the transaction by 0.0001 BTC or more" — the only
> major complication is doing this without concurrently harming privacy
> which is why it's not done yet in the reference client.
FYI, Armory uses exactly this logic to try to clean up dust outputs in
the user's transactions. However, there's enough conditions on it, that
I don't know how often it triggers. Recommendations are welcome for how
to improve it.
Right now, if the transaction has less than 5 inputs, there exists dust
UTXOs from addresses already included in the transaction, and those
UTXOs are sufficiently small in priority, then the Armory will add them
to the input side and increase the change accordingly. Looking it just
made me realize I lost the last condition of making sure the tx already
has a change output -- don't want to turn a free tx into a fee-needed tx
just to do this. (reorganized the code
<https://github.com/etotheipi/BitcoinArmory/blob/master/armoryengine.py#L5279>;
recently, and must have fell through the cracks).
Perhaps it could be improved by cleaning up dust from *any* address by
default (not just ones already included in the tx), with the option for
the user to disable that behavior. After all, anonymity was never a
core feature of the network -- I think it makes sense that the logic
would reduce anonymity by default in exchange for a cleaner network,
with a clear option to "opt-out" of that logic if user cares. I think
most users don't actually care...
-Alan
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Alan Reiner [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sm…mnq7h
2023-06-07 10:44:42
in reply to nevent1q…cntp
Author Public Key
npub1sm6zhjmk5scuz294jmpkw99wwwjzetjgwp4fu4gn6utqgdz87hkqamnq7hPublished at
2023-06-07 10:44:42Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2012-12-03\n📝 Original message:On 12/03/2012 10:02 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:\n\u003e (1) Make client software aggressive about sweeping up dust inputs:\n\u003e \"Any time a transaction is created that has change keep adding in\n\u003e extra inputs— smallest to largest— until an additional one would\n\u003e increase the cost of the transaction by 0.0001 BTC or more\" — the only\n\u003e major complication is doing this without concurrently harming privacy\n\u003e which is why it's not done yet in the reference client.\n\n\nFYI, Armory uses exactly this logic to try to clean up dust outputs in\nthe user's transactions. However, there's enough conditions on it, that\nI don't know how often it triggers. Recommendations are welcome for how\nto improve it.\n\nRight now, if the transaction has less than 5 inputs, there exists dust\nUTXOs from addresses already included in the transaction, and those\nUTXOs are sufficiently small in priority, then the Armory will add them\nto the input side and increase the change accordingly. Looking it just\nmade me realize I lost the last condition of making sure the tx already\nhas a change output -- don't want to turn a free tx into a fee-needed tx\njust to do this. (reorganized the code\n\u003chttps://github.com/etotheipi/BitcoinArmory/blob/master/armoryengine.py#L5279\u003e\nrecently, and must have fell through the cracks).\n\nPerhaps it could be improved by cleaning up dust from *any* address by\ndefault (not just ones already included in the tx), with the option for\nthe user to disable that behavior. After all, anonymity was never a\ncore feature of the network -- I think it makes sense that the logic\nwould reduce anonymity by default in exchange for a cleaner network,\nwith a clear option to \"opt-out\" of that logic if user cares. I think\nmost users don't actually care...\n\n-Alan\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20121203/d0a9abab/attachment.html\u003e",
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