📅 Original date posted:2012-01-31
📝 Original message:> Cool design. It seems resilient to many attacks. A Sybil attack
> coming from a large botnet (which controls addresses in many ranges)
> can still fill all buckets in both tables, I think. As far as I can
> tell, that wasn't possible with the old design.
Given the randomness in Pieter's design, that seems extremely unlikely
/ difficult to do. Is it possible to do a back-of-the-envelope
calculation to figure out what percentage of nodes on the network an
attacker would have to control to have a (say) 1% chance of a
successful Sybil attack?
I like this change; I'd like to pull it for the 0.6 release.
I've also been wondering if it is time to remove the IRC bootstrapping
mechanism; it would remove a fair bit of code and we'd stop getting
reports that various ISPs tag bitcoin as malware. When testing the
list of built-in bootstrapping IP addresses I always connect fairly
quickly, and the DNS seeding hosts seems to be working nicely, too.
--
--
Gavin Andresen
Gavin Andresen [ARCHIVE] /
npub1s4…d44kw
2023-06-07 03:00:33
in reply to nevent1q…fkgl
Author Public Key
npub1s4lj77xuzcu7wy04afcr487f0r3za0f8n2775xrpkld2sv639mjqsd44kwPublished at
2023-06-07 03:00:33Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2012-01-31\n📝 Original message:\u003e Cool design. It seems resilient to many attacks. A Sybil attack\n\u003e coming from a large botnet (which controls addresses in many ranges)\n\u003e can still fill all buckets in both tables, I think. As far as I can\n\u003e tell, that wasn't possible with the old design.\n\nGiven the randomness in Pieter's design, that seems extremely unlikely\n/ difficult to do. Is it possible to do a back-of-the-envelope\ncalculation to figure out what percentage of nodes on the network an\nattacker would have to control to have a (say) 1% chance of a\nsuccessful Sybil attack?\n\nI like this change; I'd like to pull it for the 0.6 release.\n\nI've also been wondering if it is time to remove the IRC bootstrapping\nmechanism; it would remove a fair bit of code and we'd stop getting\nreports that various ISPs tag bitcoin as malware. When testing the\nlist of built-in bootstrapping IP addresses I always connect fairly\nquickly, and the DNS seeding hosts seems to be working nicely, too.\n\n-- \n--\nGavin Andresen",
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