📅 Original date posted:2017-07-12
📝 Original message:Hi Greg,
>Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal
bitcoins, something they cannot do currently.
If I put my coins in an anyone can spend output, a miner will take them.
They can do this today. I suggest you try it if you don't believe me :-).
You have to be more specific with contract types instead of generically
talking about 'all contracts ever'.
> Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security
guarantees. This you have not denied.
I think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using
drivechains. Other outputs such as P2PKH/Multisig etc are unaffected by a
drivechain output. As Pieter Wuille stated earlier in this thread (and Paul
has stated all along), drivechain outputs have a different security model
than other contracts. Namely they are controlled by miners. I think we can
all agree this is unfortunate, but it is the current reality we live in. I
look forward to the day we can solve the 'ownership' problem so we can have
trustless interoperable blockchains, but that day is not today.
As a reminder, most users will not have to go through the drivechain
withdrawal process. Most withdrawals will be done via atomic swaps.
>There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic
fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.
Care to share? I'm unaware if there is.
>
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/014600.html
Everyone should re-read this email though, this is something that could
happen. Paul's design makes it so that if this occurs it is *VERY* obvious.
I guess we can argue if there is any difference between an obvious robbery
vs a hidden robbery, but I think if we have to pick one or the other the
choice is clear to me. Other designs (that I'm aware of) for sidechains had
attack vectors that weren't so obvious.
-Chris
On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Paul,
>
> There is a difference between replying to an email, and addressing the
> issues that were brought up in it.
>
> I did read your reply, and I chose not to respond to it because it did not
> address anything I said.
>
> Here's an example:
>
> It would not be accurate to say that miners have "total" control. Miners
> do control the destination of withdrawals, but they do not control the
> withdrawal-duration nor the withdrawal-frequency.
>
> So, if miners wish to 'steal' from a sidechain, they _can_ initiate a
> theft, but they can not change the fact that their malfeasance will be
> [a] obvious, and [b] on display for a long period of time.
>
>
> Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal
> bitcoins, something they cannot do currently.
>
> You next tried to equate three different types of theft, what you called
> "Classic Theft", "Channel Theft", and "Drivechain Theft", saying:
>
> I do not think that any of the three stands out as being categorically
> worse than the others
>
>
> To anyone who understands bitcoin, there is a very clear, unmistakeable
> difference between double-spending ("Classic Theft"), and *ownership* of
> the private key controlling the bitcoins.
>
> Similarly, to anyone who understands bitcoin, there is also a very clear,
> unmistakeable difference between censorship ("Channel Theft"), and
> *ownership* of the private key controlling the bitcoins.
>
> The entire email was a very long-form way of admitting to all of the
> issues that were raised in the previous email, while making it sound like
> you had addressed the issues.
>
> I am not sure how else to respond to that email, given that none of the
> issues were really addressed.
>
> Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security guarantees.
> This you have not denied.
>
> There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic
> fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.
>
> Kind regards,
> Greg Slepak
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
> the NSA.
>
> On Jul 11, 2017, at 3:57 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/11/2017 6:41 PM, Tao Effect wrote:
>
> Dear Paul,
>
> Drivechain has several issues that you've acknowledged but have not,
> IMO, adequately (at all really) addressed [1].
>
>
> I replied to your email at length, at [2]. You should read that email,
> and then reply to it with your outstanding objections, if you still have
> them (per the usual customs of a mailing list).
>
> [2]
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/
> 2017-June/014609.html
>
> Adopting DC would be an irreversible course of action,
>
>
> This is false -- it is easily reversible with a second soft fork.
>
> Also, I would say to everyone that, (in my opinion as the OP) this
> conversation will go off-topic if it veers exclusively into 'drivechain
> review'.
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170712/828da31e/attachment-0001.html>;
Chris Stewart [ARCHIVE] /
npub1u0…dnn03
2023-06-07 18:04:18
in reply to nevent1q…vh6p
Author Public Key
npub1u03cz099kt69z9awg232rjvlt34azukpzkkvy5uqv64dj9j5fqtshdnn03Published at
2023-06-07 18:04:18Event JSON
{
"id": "e63769e1a85b9b8340d8db1648135bb2712be165f066e8a671d60ed8b961e08b",
"pubkey": "e3e3813ca5b2f45117ae42a2a1c99f5c6bd172c115acc2538066aad916544817",
"created_at": 1686161058,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"0dbbb3b4fffe9287047e58a8fa04c4b6c95589f2269ea5553f7cb2691feb3b03",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"0775d42650a727b32231420d7a5d712b5fc01b4df9420b4ce60545c4303d056f",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"1bd05a5503fb6854f03714081df3970b79306bc9f28bd4ec35add5b3317755d7"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-07-12\n📝 Original message:Hi Greg,\n\n\u003eHere, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal\nbitcoins, something they cannot do currently.\n\nIf I put my coins in an anyone can spend output, a miner will take them.\nThey can do this today. I suggest you try it if you don't believe me :-).\nYou have to be more specific with contract types instead of generically\ntalking about 'all contracts ever'.\n\n\u003e Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security\nguarantees. This you have not denied.\n\nI think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using\ndrivechains. Other outputs such as P2PKH/Multisig etc are unaffected by a\ndrivechain output. As Pieter Wuille stated earlier in this thread (and Paul\nhas stated all along), drivechain outputs have a different security model\nthan other contracts. Namely they are controlled by miners. I think we can\nall agree this is unfortunate, but it is the current reality we live in. I\nlook forward to the day we can solve the 'ownership' problem so we can have\ntrustless interoperable blockchains, but that day is not today.\n\nAs a reminder, most users will not have to go through the drivechain\nwithdrawal process. Most withdrawals will be done via atomic swaps.\n\n\u003eThere is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic\nfashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.\n\nCare to share? I'm unaware if there is.\n\n\u003e\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/014600.html\n\nEveryone should re-read this email though, this is something that could\nhappen. Paul's design makes it so that if this occurs it is *VERY* obvious.\nI guess we can argue if there is any difference between an obvious robbery\nvs a hidden robbery, but I think if we have to pick one or the other the\nchoice is clear to me. Other designs (that I'm aware of) for sidechains had\nattack vectors that weren't so obvious.\n\n-Chris\n\n\n\nOn Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Paul,\n\u003e\n\u003e There is a difference between replying to an email, and addressing the\n\u003e issues that were brought up in it.\n\u003e\n\u003e I did read your reply, and I chose not to respond to it because it did not\n\u003e address anything I said.\n\u003e\n\u003e Here's an example:\n\u003e\n\u003e It would not be accurate to say that miners have \"total\" control. Miners\n\u003e do control the destination of withdrawals, but they do not control the\n\u003e withdrawal-duration nor the withdrawal-frequency.\n\u003e\n\u003e So, if miners wish to 'steal' from a sidechain, they _can_ initiate a\n\u003e theft, but they can not change the fact that their malfeasance will be\n\u003e [a] obvious, and [b] on display for a long period of time.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal\n\u003e bitcoins, something they cannot do currently.\n\u003e\n\u003e You next tried to equate three different types of theft, what you called\n\u003e \"Classic Theft\", \"Channel Theft\", and \"Drivechain Theft\", saying:\n\u003e\n\u003e I do not think that any of the three stands out as being categorically\n\u003e worse than the others\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e To anyone who understands bitcoin, there is a very clear, unmistakeable\n\u003e difference between double-spending (\"Classic Theft\"), and *ownership* of\n\u003e the private key controlling the bitcoins.\n\u003e\n\u003e Similarly, to anyone who understands bitcoin, there is also a very clear,\n\u003e unmistakeable difference between censorship (\"Channel Theft\"), and\n\u003e *ownership* of the private key controlling the bitcoins.\n\u003e\n\u003e The entire email was a very long-form way of admitting to all of the\n\u003e issues that were raised in the previous email, while making it sound like\n\u003e you had addressed the issues.\n\u003e\n\u003e I am not sure how else to respond to that email, given that none of the\n\u003e issues were really addressed.\n\u003e\n\u003e Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security guarantees.\n\u003e This you have not denied.\n\u003e\n\u003e There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic\n\u003e fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.\n\u003e\n\u003e Kind regards,\n\u003e Greg Slepak\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with\n\u003e the NSA.\n\u003e\n\u003e On Jul 11, 2017, at 3:57 PM, Paul Sztorc \u003ctruthcoin at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e On 7/11/2017 6:41 PM, Tao Effect wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e Dear Paul,\n\u003e\n\u003e Drivechain has several issues that you've acknowledged but have not,\n\u003e IMO, adequately (at all really) addressed [1].\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I replied to your email at length, at [2]. You should read that email,\n\u003e and then reply to it with your outstanding objections, if you still have\n\u003e them (per the usual customs of a mailing list).\n\u003e\n\u003e [2]\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/\n\u003e 2017-June/014609.html\n\u003e\n\u003e Adopting DC would be an irreversible course of action,\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e This is false -- it is easily reversible with a second soft fork.\n\u003e\n\u003e Also, I would say to everyone that, (in my opinion as the OP) this\n\u003e conversation will go off-topic if it veers exclusively into 'drivechain\n\u003e review'.\n\u003e\n\u003e Paul\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170712/828da31e/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
"sig": "5b19bfd9c0912b1b1e23d068607515091210a49738614415204012603d6e5c7bdb2c9006f5b37fd4af8640d6d8c22c40c351169086c937e3bdd1dacdc324ff63"
}