📅 Original date posted:2017-02-25
📝 Original message:If people split their bitcoins in multiple addresses, then maybe there
would be no need to worry(?), because the computational cost would be
higher than what the attacker would get.
>From Google:
https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html
*Here are some numbers that give a sense of how large scale this
computation was: *
- *Nine quintillion (9,223,372,036,854,775,808) SHA1 computations in
total*
- *6,500 years of CPU computation to complete the attack first phase*
- *110 years of GPU computation to complete the second phase*
https://bitinfocharts.com/top-100-richest-bitcoin-addresses.html
Richest address: 124,178 BTC ($142,853,079 USD)
On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 6:40 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 03:34:33PM -0600, Steve Davis wrote:
> > Yea, well. I don’t think it is ethical to post instructions without an
> associated remediation (BIP) if you don’t see the potential attack.
>
> I can't agree with you at all there: we're still at the point where the
> computational costs of such attacks limit their real-world impact, which is
> exactly when you want the *maximum* exposure to what they are and what the
> risks are, so that people develop mitigations.
>
> Keeping details secret tends to keep the attacks out of public view, which
> might be a good trade-off in a situation where the attacks are immediately
> practical and the need to deploy a fix is well understood. But we're in the
> exact opposite situation.
>
> > I was rather hoping that we could have a fuller discussion of what the
> best practical response would be to such an issue?
>
> Deploying segwit's 256-bit digests is a response that's already fully
> coded and
> ready to deploy, with the one exception of a new address format. That
> address
> format is being actively worked on, and could be deployed relatively
> quickly if
> needed.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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Leandro Coutinho [ARCHIVE] /
npub193…w8y7x
2023-06-07 17:56:46
in reply to nevent1q…ydxl
Author Public Key
npub193zsep73u9swc6nknsuulvf283fd4sz3kphpq8s3y5y4eeg0x8tsnw8y7xSeen on
wss://relay.noswhere.comPublished at
2023-06-07 17:56:46Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-02-25\n📝 Original message:If people split their bitcoins in multiple addresses, then maybe there\nwould be no need to worry(?), because the computational cost would be\nhigher than what the attacker would get.\n\n\n\u003eFrom Google:\nhttps://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html\n\n*Here are some numbers that give a sense of how large scale this\ncomputation was: *\n\n - *Nine quintillion (9,223,372,036,854,775,808) SHA1 computations in\n total*\n - *6,500 years of CPU computation to complete the attack first phase*\n - *110 years of GPU computation to complete the second phase*\n\n\nhttps://bitinfocharts.com/top-100-richest-bitcoin-addresses.html\nRichest address: 124,178 BTC ($142,853,079 USD)\n\n\n\nOn Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 6:40 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 03:34:33PM -0600, Steve Davis wrote:\n\u003e \u003e Yea, well. I don’t think it is ethical to post instructions without an\n\u003e associated remediation (BIP) if you don’t see the potential attack.\n\u003e\n\u003e I can't agree with you at all there: we're still at the point where the\n\u003e computational costs of such attacks limit their real-world impact, which is\n\u003e exactly when you want the *maximum* exposure to what they are and what the\n\u003e risks are, so that people develop mitigations.\n\u003e\n\u003e Keeping details secret tends to keep the attacks out of public view, which\n\u003e might be a good trade-off in a situation where the attacks are immediately\n\u003e practical and the need to deploy a fix is well understood. But we're in the\n\u003e exact opposite situation.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e I was rather hoping that we could have a fuller discussion of what the\n\u003e best practical response would be to such an issue?\n\u003e\n\u003e Deploying segwit's 256-bit digests is a response that's already fully\n\u003e coded and\n\u003e ready to deploy, with the one exception of a new address format. That\n\u003e address\n\u003e format is being actively worked on, and could be deployed relatively\n\u003e quickly if\n\u003e needed.\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170225/3c3e4b53/attachment.html\u003e",
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