Event JSON
{
"id": "ec219f4ca428008bbb301a5e205d44fb261fc47deac94994f2735da01c2f2800",
"pubkey": "ee92147d6e346ee1b35d7eee21b012f8bb1f944fab17b3c169f62e6e8dcea88c",
"created_at": 1703059632,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"p",
"2d3f3dff27251bb1957bad295dac242489a3cae6c6e839774d1ad8cb204d8371",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub"
],
[
"p",
"af0a5bee8b727954aba0b8afeb738b73367a020b024b5497c51bd6b496aa0cb4",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub"
],
[
"e",
"33bc97217f11ba173c258160a3f00cbd3619b2ca3d4e63be31bcca39a4afed5b",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub",
"reply"
],
[
"proxy",
"https://diaspodon.fr/users/ptl/statuses/111611716060642813",
"activitypub"
]
],
"content": "nostr:npub195lnmle8y5dmr9tm4554mtpyyjy68jhxcm5rja6drtvvkgzdsdcszh4d7a et c'est grâce aux mots de passe stockés dans Google que le piratage Okta a pu avoir lieu\n\n\"To gain access to that service account, the attacker compromised an Okta employee. The employee logged into the service account while they were signed in to their personal Google profile in Chrome on their Okta-managed laptop. That meant that the credentials of the service account were stored in the employee’s personal Google account.\"\n\nhttps://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2023/11/okta-breach-happened-after-employee-logged-into-personal-google-account/amp",
"sig": "e09a61fe7f79adf264e4246df8c7630595fce75de548e8c9b82dda536b3b4c75eb63a179c997d59453fdcd0d83c5be2e84af26e357b75c62dc614bb8c155cfc4"
}