📅 Original date posted:2022-08-20
📝 Original message:@vjudeu
> Miners can game this system by moving their own coins in 100% fees
transactions, just to produce more coins. You have one million BTC? No
problem, just move them as fees, and you just created 100k BTC out of thin
air, just because you are a wealthy miner.
Hmm, I believe you're right about that. If a miner can make 1 BTC of fees
by honestly mining + 0.1 BTC of inflation, they could instead make 2 BTC by
mining their own transactions with 20 BTC of fees. That does sound very
gameable. I rescind my suggestion.
One could imagine modifications to that suggestion that attempts to make it
more difficult to game directly. For example, if an average sum of
fees/block was calculated over a window (eg 2 weeks, 2 months, etc) and 10%
of that was released in coinbase rewards, you would eliminate the
possibility for individual miners to game the system. However, you would
then have to consider the group of miners as a whole - since they all have
an interest in increasing their revenues, it certainly seems like a
dangerous incentive that could lead to runaway inflation. So perhaps even
extensions of my suggestion are too gameable to be safe.
But my point still stands that tail emission is not a permanent solution.
One permanent solution would be some constant inflation *rate *(eg
0.1%/year). Given that the necessary security is a function of the total
value of the currency, perhaps that would be a reasonable natural way to
scale security as needed.
Again tho, I haven't seen any convincing evidence that any solution like
this will likely be necessary at all. Total collected fees will also scale
up as bitcoin grows, probably quadratically (since the value of the network
grows quadratically). I'm rather more inclined to think collected fees will
get far *too* high - ie substantially higher than needed to pay for
sufficient blockchain security.
On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 1:48 PM aliashraf.btc At protonmail via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi Peter, everyone
> This issue has been discussed thoroughly in bitcointalk, general
> discussions are more suited to forums, I believe, still ....
>
> First and foremost, it is more than obvious that bitcoin block subsidy
> algorithm is a total disaster, not just for the zero subsidy security
> consequences, but also for the overly rewarding scheme that favors (few)
> first-runners against (masses of) people who join later, a policy that
> looks to be a cheap marketing trick rather than a decent strategic
> monetary, system design, no matter how natural it is presumed nowadays,
> after being implemented by Bitcoin.
>
> For now, the brilliance of the idea behind Bitcoin and the enthusiasm have
> compensated for its bizzar, upside-down inflation policy, in practice as
> newcomers have been paying the price to lucky first-runners and adopting
> anyway.
> Is it happening for low block subsidy? Is it going to be solved somehow? I
> don't think so.
>
> With subsidy still being the major (like 90%) portion of the block reward,
> there is an equalizer factor pushing equilibrium by paying security costs
> on behalf of current coin owners.Note that every single new bitcoin paid as
> subsidy is actually paid by the rest of the wallets proportional to their
> balance.
> Other than its direct contribution to security, once understood as a
> ballance-based taxing scheme, it is a crucial mechanism for re-distribution
> of wealth because to compensate for their costs, unlike speculators (who
> are among the worst adopters of Bitcoin, and unfortunately the most
> influencers), miners are used to dumping their coins, providing more fair
> opportunities for people to join.
> So, halving and the hard cap, put both adoption and security as risk, It
> is why, unlike "believers", I'm deeply concerned about a future with low
> block subsidy because it puts both security and adoption in an awkward
> situation.
>
> Additionally, It is not considered an engineering practice by any measure
> to speculate about the security of a system that we abundantly recommend to
> friends, family for joining.
> We need proofs, security proof, ease of adaptation proof, etc.,
> Fantasies are not proofs, having faith in a magical incentive mechanism
> that fixes everything is not an argument, let alone being a proof.
> Incentives are irrelevant, rules, schemes, projects, and so fort, matter.
> There are always incentives in games, but rules are in charge of
> determining the fate.
> Without rules, there is no game, flawed schemes and rules move the game
> behind its equilibrium to fail eventually.
>
> I've not to mention the unfeasibility of tempering Bitcoin's basic
> consensus rules, Bitcoin rules are not subject to change specially when it
> comes to something that is widely considered a basic characteristic, a
> Schelling point, and so forth.
>
> So, it is the paradoxical situation: we are exposed to, on one hand, it is
> a deficiency and on the other hand it is inevitable because is critically
> hard-code to Bitcoin, advertised more than any feature as its identity.
> But it is our job, isn't it? Dealing with the impossible and taking care
> of it, but I think before reaching to that point we have to settle the
> basics.:
>
>
> 1. There is a problem with long term security and adoption
> consequences.
> 2. It is built deeply to bitcoin consensus rules, and considered a
> critical
> 3. It is not going to disappear magically, neither it will be
> addressed by whales, etc.
> 4. The 21M cap, halving, and generally, Bitcoin consensus, is not
> subject to change.
>
>
> Don't panic, it is not exactly a catch-22 situation. Tip:
> It is always possible to help a system without aggressive intervention,
> either by smart tweaks or by supporting it using other system(s).
>
> Cheers, Ali Ashraf
>
>
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Tuesday, August 16th, 2022 at 8:35 PM, Peter via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Jaroslaw,
>
>
>
> In the Prisoner's Dilemma the prisoners cannot communicate. In Bitcoin
> large holders are able to communicate with each other. Also, prisoners need
> not make an all or nothing decision in Bitcoin. Miners can join and leave
> the network freely over time. You can change your decision based on the
> decision of others.
>
>
> The Bitcoin design is such that security is volatile but the issuance of
> blocks is timely and evened out to a 10 minutes average even after the
> reward is exhausted.
>
>
> The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions
> is enough to motivate human nature. Transaction initiators have an
> incentive to mine and run full nodes for personal interest.
>
>
> >Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while
> he/she can sell this energy for the market price.
>
>
> The law in most jurisdictions prevents the resale of spare electricity
> unless an expensive license is obtained (and in most cases no license is
> available as the government maintains a monopoly). Mining with waste
> electricity is reducing losses. Another incentive to motivate human nature.
>
>
> Bitcoin holders can be enfranchised into any new system. So, no need for
> bike shedding the original design which is a Schelling Point.
>
>
> Regards
>
> Peter Kroll
>
> pointbiz/ BTCCuracao
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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Billy Tetrud [ARCHIVE] /
npub1xq…tcnns
2023-06-07 23:12:44
in reply to nevent1q…r8ws
Author Public Key
npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnnsPublished at
2023-06-07 23:12:44Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2022-08-20\n📝 Original message:@vjudeu\n\u003e Miners can game this system by moving their own coins in 100% fees\ntransactions, just to produce more coins. You have one million BTC? No\nproblem, just move them as fees, and you just created 100k BTC out of thin\nair, just because you are a wealthy miner.\n\nHmm, I believe you're right about that. If a miner can make 1 BTC of fees\nby honestly mining + 0.1 BTC of inflation, they could instead make 2 BTC by\nmining their own transactions with 20 BTC of fees. That does sound very\ngameable. I rescind my suggestion.\n\nOne could imagine modifications to that suggestion that attempts to make it\nmore difficult to game directly. For example, if an average sum of\nfees/block was calculated over a window (eg 2 weeks, 2 months, etc) and 10%\nof that was released in coinbase rewards, you would eliminate the\npossibility for individual miners to game the system. However, you would\nthen have to consider the group of miners as a whole - since they all have\nan interest in increasing their revenues, it certainly seems like a\ndangerous incentive that could lead to runaway inflation. So perhaps even\nextensions of my suggestion are too gameable to be safe.\n\nBut my point still stands that tail emission is not a permanent solution.\nOne permanent solution would be some constant inflation *rate *(eg\n0.1%/year). Given that the necessary security is a function of the total\nvalue of the currency, perhaps that would be a reasonable natural way to\nscale security as needed.\n\nAgain tho, I haven't seen any convincing evidence that any solution like\nthis will likely be necessary at all. Total collected fees will also scale\nup as bitcoin grows, probably quadratically (since the value of the network\ngrows quadratically). I'm rather more inclined to think collected fees will\nget far *too* high - ie substantially higher than needed to pay for\nsufficient blockchain security.\n\n\n\n\nOn Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 1:48 PM aliashraf.btc At protonmail via bitcoin-dev\n\u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi Peter, everyone\n\u003e This issue has been discussed thoroughly in bitcointalk, general\n\u003e discussions are more suited to forums, I believe, still ....\n\u003e\n\u003e First and foremost, it is more than obvious that bitcoin block subsidy\n\u003e algorithm is a total disaster, not just for the zero subsidy security\n\u003e consequences, but also for the overly rewarding scheme that favors (few)\n\u003e first-runners against (masses of) people who join later, a policy that\n\u003e looks to be a cheap marketing trick rather than a decent strategic\n\u003e monetary, system design, no matter how natural it is presumed nowadays,\n\u003e after being implemented by Bitcoin.\n\u003e\n\u003e For now, the brilliance of the idea behind Bitcoin and the enthusiasm have\n\u003e compensated for its bizzar, upside-down inflation policy, in practice as\n\u003e newcomers have been paying the price to lucky first-runners and adopting\n\u003e anyway.\n\u003e Is it happening for low block subsidy? Is it going to be solved somehow? I\n\u003e don't think so.\n\u003e\n\u003e With subsidy still being the major (like 90%) portion of the block reward,\n\u003e there is an equalizer factor pushing equilibrium by paying security costs\n\u003e on behalf of current coin owners.Note that every single new bitcoin paid as\n\u003e subsidy is actually paid by the rest of the wallets proportional to their\n\u003e balance.\n\u003e Other than its direct contribution to security, once understood as a\n\u003e ballance-based taxing scheme, it is a crucial mechanism for re-distribution\n\u003e of wealth because to compensate for their costs, unlike speculators (who\n\u003e are among the worst adopters of Bitcoin, and unfortunately the most\n\u003e influencers), miners are used to dumping their coins, providing more fair\n\u003e opportunities for people to join.\n\u003e So, halving and the hard cap, put both adoption and security as risk, It\n\u003e is why, unlike \"believers\", I'm deeply concerned about a future with low\n\u003e block subsidy because it puts both security and adoption in an awkward\n\u003e situation.\n\u003e\n\u003e Additionally, It is not considered an engineering practice by any measure\n\u003e to speculate about the security of a system that we abundantly recommend to\n\u003e friends, family for joining.\n\u003e We need proofs, security proof, ease of adaptation proof, etc.,\n\u003e Fantasies are not proofs, having faith in a magical incentive mechanism\n\u003e that fixes everything is not an argument, let alone being a proof.\n\u003e Incentives are irrelevant, rules, schemes, projects, and so fort, matter.\n\u003e There are always incentives in games, but rules are in charge of\n\u003e determining the fate.\n\u003e Without rules, there is no game, flawed schemes and rules move the game\n\u003e behind its equilibrium to fail eventually.\n\u003e\n\u003e I've not to mention the unfeasibility of tempering Bitcoin's basic\n\u003e consensus rules, Bitcoin rules are not subject to change specially when it\n\u003e comes to something that is widely considered a basic characteristic, a\n\u003e Schelling point, and so forth.\n\u003e\n\u003e So, it is the paradoxical situation: we are exposed to, on one hand, it is\n\u003e a deficiency and on the other hand it is inevitable because is critically\n\u003e hard-code to Bitcoin, advertised more than any feature as its identity.\n\u003e But it is our job, isn't it? Dealing with the impossible and taking care\n\u003e of it, but I think before reaching to that point we have to settle the\n\u003e basics.:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e 1. There is a problem with long term security and adoption\n\u003e consequences.\n\u003e 2. It is built deeply to bitcoin consensus rules, and considered a\n\u003e critical\n\u003e 3. It is not going to disappear magically, neither it will be\n\u003e addressed by whales, etc.\n\u003e 4. The 21M cap, halving, and generally, Bitcoin consensus, is not\n\u003e subject to change.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Don't panic, it is not exactly a catch-22 situation. Tip:\n\u003e It is always possible to help a system without aggressive intervention,\n\u003e either by smart tweaks or by supporting it using other system(s).\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers, Ali Ashraf\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e ------- Original Message -------\n\u003e On Tuesday, August 16th, 2022 at 8:35 PM, Peter via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e Hi Jaroslaw,\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e In the Prisoner's Dilemma the prisoners cannot communicate. In Bitcoin\n\u003e large holders are able to communicate with each other. Also, prisoners need\n\u003e not make an all or nothing decision in Bitcoin. Miners can join and leave\n\u003e the network freely over time. You can change your decision based on the\n\u003e decision of others.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e The Bitcoin design is such that security is volatile but the issuance of\n\u003e blocks is timely and evened out to a 10 minutes average even after the\n\u003e reward is exhausted.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions\n\u003e is enough to motivate human nature. Transaction initiators have an\n\u003e incentive to mine and run full nodes for personal interest.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003eNoone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while\n\u003e he/she can sell this energy for the market price.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e The law in most jurisdictions prevents the resale of spare electricity\n\u003e unless an expensive license is obtained (and in most cases no license is\n\u003e available as the government maintains a monopoly). Mining with waste\n\u003e electricity is reducing losses. Another incentive to motivate human nature.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Bitcoin holders can be enfranchised into any new system. So, no need for\n\u003e bike shedding the original design which is a Schelling Point.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Regards\n\u003e\n\u003e Peter Kroll\n\u003e\n\u003e pointbiz/ BTCCuracao\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220820/84699ddb/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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