📅 Original date posted:2015-07-27
📝 Original message:
On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 11:58:12AM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> The asymmetric risk is as much a feature as a problem: with the
> dual-anchor proposal, either side could abort with no penalty and make
> the other side wait for the escape timeout anyway.
Cool, I think this works.
Yeah non-cooperation risks in this model aren't that big of a deal,
because the channel is going to be closed out anyway if they're not
cooperative -- they could always refuse to route payments, and then
everyone's going to get their money back.
> We've handwaved over the incentives for channel creation so far; they're
> tied with routing, and not immediately clear to me. But it doesn't seem
> unreasonable that if you connect to a hub, you front the funds.
Yeah, there's likely some weird asymmetric economic incentive things
going on. If both channels are established with the same person, it
should be fairly clean, though. I think there will probably be some
measure of trust/reputation involved with pre-payment of the time-value
for the channel (shorter with OP_CSV, but still non-zero).
OP_CSV still requires BIP 62, though. It's possible to construct a model
with OP_CLTV without BIP 62 (described in a post earlier today) using
single-funder with some OP_CLTV'd output which returns the full balance
to the original funder at a date very far in the future after the
expiration of all Commitments and its dependent outputs.
--
Joseph Poon
Joseph Poon [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ej…p9cq8
2023-06-09 12:43:48
in reply to nevent1q…e34n
Author Public Key
npub1ej6vep7y2km5l6awukffelg8yeppkth2vjkjk9jypd5w336rxggs3p9cq8Published at
2023-06-09 12:43:48Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-07-27\n📝 Original message:\nOn Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 11:58:12AM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:\n\u003e The asymmetric risk is as much a feature as a problem: with the\n\u003e dual-anchor proposal, either side could abort with no penalty and make\n\u003e the other side wait for the escape timeout anyway.\n\nCool, I think this works.\n\nYeah non-cooperation risks in this model aren't that big of a deal,\nbecause the channel is going to be closed out anyway if they're not\ncooperative -- they could always refuse to route payments, and then\neveryone's going to get their money back.\n\n\u003e We've handwaved over the incentives for channel creation so far; they're\n\u003e tied with routing, and not immediately clear to me. But it doesn't seem\n\u003e unreasonable that if you connect to a hub, you front the funds.\n\nYeah, there's likely some weird asymmetric economic incentive things\ngoing on. If both channels are established with the same person, it\nshould be fairly clean, though. I think there will probably be some\nmeasure of trust/reputation involved with pre-payment of the time-value\nfor the channel (shorter with OP_CSV, but still non-zero).\n\nOP_CSV still requires BIP 62, though. It's possible to construct a model\nwith OP_CLTV without BIP 62 (described in a post earlier today) using\nsingle-funder with some OP_CLTV'd output which returns the full balance\nto the original funder at a date very far in the future after the\nexpiration of all Commitments and its dependent outputs.\n\n-- \nJoseph Poon",
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