📅 Original date posted:2015-05-10
📝 Original message:Le 11/05/2015 00:31, Mark Friedenbach a écrit :
> I'm on my phone today so I'm somewhat constrained in my reply, but the key
> takeaway is that the proposal is a mechanism for miners to trade subsidy
> for the increased fees of a larger block. Necessarily it only makes sense
> to do so when the marginal fee per KB exceeds the subsidy fee per KB. It
> correspondingly makes sense to use a smaller block size if fees are less
> than subsidy, but note that fees are not uniform and as the block shrinks
> the marginal fee rate goes up..
>
Oh I see, you expect the sign of the dE/dx to change depending on
whether fees exceed the subsidy. This is possible, but instead of the
linear identity, you have to increase the block size twice as fast as
the difficulty. In that case we would get (using the notations of my
previous email):
D' = D(1+x)
F' = F(1+2x)
and thus:
E' - E = x/(1+x)P(F-S)
The presence of the (F-S) factor means that the sign reversal occurs
when fees exceed subsidy.
> Limits on both the relative and absolute amount a miner can trade subsidy
> for block size prevent incentive edge cases as well as prevent a sharp
> shock to the current fee-poor economy (by disallowing adjustment below 1MB).
>
> Also the identity transform was used only for didactic purposes. I fully
> expect there to be other, more interesting functions to use.
Thomas Voegtlin [ARCHIVE] /
npub10f…7ej47
2023-06-07 15:34:03
in reply to nevent1q…47rx
Author Public Key
npub10f96gqrsu4qpygfgvuvzce47aavjvql703egfde0l2hua8dzpszs67ej47Published at
2023-06-07 15:34:03Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-05-10\n📝 Original message:Le 11/05/2015 00:31, Mark Friedenbach a écrit :\n\u003e I'm on my phone today so I'm somewhat constrained in my reply, but the key\n\u003e takeaway is that the proposal is a mechanism for miners to trade subsidy\n\u003e for the increased fees of a larger block. Necessarily it only makes sense\n\u003e to do so when the marginal fee per KB exceeds the subsidy fee per KB. It\n\u003e correspondingly makes sense to use a smaller block size if fees are less\n\u003e than subsidy, but note that fees are not uniform and as the block shrinks\n\u003e the marginal fee rate goes up..\n\u003e \n\nOh I see, you expect the sign of the dE/dx to change depending on\nwhether fees exceed the subsidy. This is possible, but instead of the\nlinear identity, you have to increase the block size twice as fast as\nthe difficulty. In that case we would get (using the notations of my\nprevious email):\n\nD' = D(1+x)\nF' = F(1+2x)\n\nand thus:\n\nE' - E = x/(1+x)P(F-S)\n\nThe presence of the (F-S) factor means that the sign reversal occurs\nwhen fees exceed subsidy.\n\n\n\u003e Limits on both the relative and absolute amount a miner can trade subsidy\n\u003e for block size prevent incentive edge cases as well as prevent a sharp\n\u003e shock to the current fee-poor economy (by disallowing adjustment below 1MB).\n\u003e \n\u003e Also the identity transform was used only for didactic purposes. I fully\n\u003e expect there to be other, more interesting functions to use.",
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