📅 Original date posted:2012-01-02
📝 Original message:Satoshi's paper mentions that storage requirements for the blockchain
can be reduced by deleting transactions whose outputs have been spent.
If I understand correctly, this technique can only be used for reducing
*storage* requirements, not *bandwidth* needed for the initial chain
download by a high-security client that doesn't trust any of its peers
-- right?
The rule is "trust the longest valid chain of blocks". Part of a block
being "valid" is that each transaction's inputs are unspent and their
sum exceeds the transaction's outputs unless it is a coinbase. This
cannot be verified for "stubbed out" transactions -- they have outputs
but no inputs, and aren't coinbases. So a paranoid client booting up
for the first time needs to be given an un-stubbed chain, right?
Of course, if a client decided to accept a stubbed blocks only when the
sum of the difficulties in the blocks after it exceeds some number N,
then attacking it could be made very expensive by picking a large
enough N.
Please let me know if I have misunderstood something.
Elden Tyrell [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ew…56jzh
2023-06-07 02:54:20
in reply to nevent1q…526z
Author Public Key
npub1ewgf27xpck6l48a49gps43j0x5lz6tn6jdm2vmc70zvcq9kjx5qqr56jzhPublished at
2023-06-07 02:54:20Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2012-01-02\n📝 Original message:Satoshi's paper mentions that storage requirements for the blockchain \ncan be reduced by deleting transactions whose outputs have been spent.\n\nIf I understand correctly, this technique can only be used for reducing \n*storage* requirements, not *bandwidth* needed for the initial chain \ndownload by a high-security client that doesn't trust any of its peers \n-- right?\n\nThe rule is \"trust the longest valid chain of blocks\". Part of a block \nbeing \"valid\" is that each transaction's inputs are unspent and their \nsum exceeds the transaction's outputs unless it is a coinbase. This \ncannot be verified for \"stubbed out\" transactions -- they have outputs \nbut no inputs, and aren't coinbases. So a paranoid client booting up \nfor the first time needs to be given an un-stubbed chain, right?\n\nOf course, if a client decided to accept a stubbed blocks only when the \nsum of the difficulties in the blocks after it exceeds some number N, \nthen attacking it could be made very expensive by picking a large \nenough N.\n\nPlease let me know if I have misunderstood something.",
"sig": "937fbbad24c14482d6bec9e4c9dbc534e5ac0642d94e68e1b30020e41293cd3fd66ce35542057ecf09a9c7ce98b2600bff2db7016c0572360b92403fff03f573"
}