đź“… Original date posted:2021-02-22
đź“ť Original message:Sorry, I haven't read everything. I just want to say what I think is
the best option and why.
Let's say something like 2 years in which miners can signal activation
after which, the MUST signal it for their blocks to be valid (I think
this is LOT=true, but I don't remember what LOT stands for).
Some may argue than it's easier to move from LOT=false to LOT=true
than viceversa (I think I'm getting this right), but either way
different clients could interpret things more differently more easily
and, you know, that's really bad.
If anyone is against the consensus change itself, what they should do
is run a client in which the must is turned into a MUST NOT. Whenever
miners signal activation, blocks aren't valid so that it doesn't
happen.
That way both sides can be cleanly separated and both communities
(assuming there's a community of users opposing the change) can stick
together with their own in the same chain. That is, having only 2
chains in total if there are users opposing the change or only one if
not, but never 2 chains for people who want the change or 2 chains for
pople who don't want it.
Just my two sats, please nobody ask me "why would anyone oppose
taproot?" or anything similar. Because I'm trying to generalize here,
if we're talking about activation, I think the specifics of the change
are kind of irrelevant.
Separately: thanks to everyone who worked on taproot.
On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Feb 22, 2021, at 05:16, Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au> wrote:
>
> If a lockinontimeout=true node is requesting compact blocks from a
> lockinontimeout=false node during a chainsplit in the MUST_SIGNAL phase,
> I think that could result in a ban.
>
> More importantly, nodes on both sides of the fork need to find each other.
>
>
> (If there was going to be an ongoing fork there'd be bigger things to
> worry about...)
>
>
> I think it should be clear that a UASF-style command line option to allow consensus rule changes in the node in the short term, immediately before a fork carries some risk of a fork, even if I agree it may not persist over months. We can’t simply ignore that.
>
> I think the important specific case of this is something like "if a chain
> where taproot is impossible to activate is temporarily the most work,
> miners with lockinontimeout=true need to be well connected so they don't
> end up competing with each other while they're catching back up".
>
>
> Between this and your above point, I think we probably agree - there is material technical complexity hiding behind a “change the consensus rules“ option. Given it’s not a critical feature by any means, putting resources into fixing these issues probably isn’t worth it.
>
> Matt
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Jorge TimĂłn [ARCHIVE] /
npub1fx…cl2d8
2023-06-07 18:28:59
in reply to nevent1q…vwgx
Author Public Key
npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8Published at
2023-06-07 18:28:59Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2021-02-22\n📝 Original message:Sorry, I haven't read everything. I just want to say what I think is\nthe best option and why.\nLet's say something like 2 years in which miners can signal activation\nafter which, the MUST signal it for their blocks to be valid (I think\nthis is LOT=true, but I don't remember what LOT stands for).\nSome may argue than it's easier to move from LOT=false to LOT=true\nthan viceversa (I think I'm getting this right), but either way\ndifferent clients could interpret things more differently more easily\nand, you know, that's really bad.\nIf anyone is against the consensus change itself, what they should do\nis run a client in which the must is turned into a MUST NOT. Whenever\nminers signal activation, blocks aren't valid so that it doesn't\nhappen.\nThat way both sides can be cleanly separated and both communities\n(assuming there's a community of users opposing the change) can stick\ntogether with their own in the same chain. That is, having only 2\nchains in total if there are users opposing the change or only one if\nnot, but never 2 chains for people who want the change or 2 chains for\npople who don't want it.\n\nJust my two sats, please nobody ask me \"why would anyone oppose\ntaproot?\" or anything similar. Because I'm trying to generalize here,\nif we're talking about activation, I think the specifics of the change\nare kind of irrelevant.\n\nSeparately: thanks to everyone who worked on taproot.\n\n\nOn Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev\n\u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Feb 22, 2021, at 05:16, Anthony Towns \u003caj at erisian.com.au\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e If a lockinontimeout=true node is requesting compact blocks from a\n\u003e lockinontimeout=false node during a chainsplit in the MUST_SIGNAL phase,\n\u003e I think that could result in a ban.\n\u003e\n\u003e More importantly, nodes on both sides of the fork need to find each other.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e (If there was going to be an ongoing fork there'd be bigger things to\n\u003e worry about...)\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I think it should be clear that a UASF-style command line option to allow consensus rule changes in the node in the short term, immediately before a fork carries some risk of a fork, even if I agree it may not persist over months. We can’t simply ignore that.\n\u003e\n\u003e I think the important specific case of this is something like \"if a chain\n\u003e where taproot is impossible to activate is temporarily the most work,\n\u003e miners with lockinontimeout=true need to be well connected so they don't\n\u003e end up competing with each other while they're catching back up\".\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Between this and your above point, I think we probably agree - there is material technical complexity hiding behind a “change the consensus rules“ option. Given it’s not a critical feature by any means, putting resources into fixing these issues probably isn’t worth it.\n\u003e\n\u003e Matt\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev",
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