ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2019-10-01 📝 Original message:Good morning lists, Let me ...

📅 Original date posted:2019-10-01
📝 Original message:Good morning lists,

Let me propose the below radical idea:

* `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly retained from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on par with:
* 1 RETURN
* higher-`nSequence` replacement
* DER-encoded pubkeys
* unrestricted `scriptPubKey`
* Payee-security-paid-by-payer (i.e. lack of P2SH)
* `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends
* transaction malleability
* probably many more

So let me propose the more radical excision, starting with SegWit v1:

* Remove `SIGHASH` from signatures.
* Put `SIGHASH` on public keys.

Public keys are now encoded as either 33-bytes (implicit `SIGHASH_ALL`) or 34-bytes (`SIGHASH` byte, followed by pubkey type, followed by pubkey coordinate).
`OP_CHECKSIG` and friends then look at the *public key* to determine sighash algorithm rather than the signature.

As we expect public keys to be indirectly committed to on every output `scriptPubKey`, this is automatically output tagging to allow particular `SIGHASH`.
However, we can then utilize the many many ways to hide public keys away until they are needed, exemplified in MAST-inside-Taproot.

I propose also the addition of the opcode:

<sighash> <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH

* `sighash` must be one byte.
* `pubkey` may be the special byte `0x1`, meaning "just use the Taproot internal pubkey".
* `pubkey` may be 33-byte public key, in which case the `sighash` byte is just prepended to it.
* `pubkey` may be 34-byte public key with sighash, in which case the first byte is replaced with `sighash` byte.
* If `sighash` is `0x00` then the result is a 33-byte public key (the sighash byte is removed) i.e. `SIGHASH_ALL` implicit.

This retains the old feature where the sighash is selected at time-of-spending rather than time-of-payment.
This is done by using the script:

<pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH OP_CHECKSIG

Then the sighash can be put in the witness stack after the signature, letting the `SIGHASH` flag be selected at time-of-signing, but only if the SCRIPT specifically is formed to do so.
This is malleability-safe as the signature still commits to the `SIGHASH` it was created for.

However, by default, public keys will not have an attached `SIGHASH` byte, implying `SIGHASH_ALL` (and disallowing-by-default non-`SIGHASH_ALL`).

This removes the problems with `SIGHASH_NONE` `SIGHASH_SINGLE`, as they are allowed only if the output specifically says they are allowed.

Would this not be a superior solution?

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj