📅 Original date posted:2015-02-12
📝 Original message:Den 12 feb 2015 16:42 skrev "Mike Hearn" <mike at plan99.net>:
> Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.
Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an
address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and
pay that.
My counterargument: with zero-conf but no replace-by-fee scorched earth,
there would instead be a market which thieves use where pools would offer
to execute doublespends that pay the thief and the pool, and where the
pools would set what terms and payouts they ask for.
All bidding pools with acceptable terms get a doublespend transaction that
pays that specific pool and the thief, the first to mine theirs win (and
the merchant loses).
Your protocol requires less setup, but that's the only notable difference
(besides risk of paying non-participating pools with scorched earth).
No notable difference in security for merchants.
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Natanael [ARCHIVE] /
npub179…lpmjt
2023-06-07 15:30:14
in reply to nevent1q…4ptn
Author Public Key
npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjtPublished at
2023-06-07 15:30:14Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-02-12\n📝 Original message:Den 12 feb 2015 16:42 skrev \"Mike Hearn\" \u003cmike at plan99.net\u003e:\n\u003e Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.\nWhichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an\naddress out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and\npay that.\n\nMy counterargument: with zero-conf but no replace-by-fee scorched earth,\nthere would instead be a market which thieves use where pools would offer\nto execute doublespends that pay the thief and the pool, and where the\npools would set what terms and payouts they ask for.\n\nAll bidding pools with acceptable terms get a doublespend transaction that\npays that specific pool and the thief, the first to mine theirs win (and\nthe merchant loses).\n\nYour protocol requires less setup, but that's the only notable difference\n(besides risk of paying non-participating pools with scorched earth).\n\nNo notable difference in security for merchants.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150212/e4e44b31/attachment.html\u003e",
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