📅 Original date posted:2019-07-17
📝 Original message:
Hi Nadav,
This is cool idea. I always imagined oracles would either give their DLC
signatures away for free or work via a subscription model.
The downside to this proposal is that the seller of the signature knows
which signature they're selling and therefore learns what kind of contract
the buyer must be involved in.
LL
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 1:37 AM Nadav Kohen <nadav at suredbits.com> wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> I recently posted a proposal here for a scheme through which a trusted
> data provider can utilize the Lightning Network to privately sell data
> where data is received atomically with purchase.
>
> I've more recently been thinking about situations where a party, that is
> *not* trusted, is attempting to sell its signature to a known message. One
> example of a situation where this would be useful is if someone is trying
> to offer a DLC-like Option contract where they are essentially
> collateralizing themselves in a funding transaction and then selling their
> signatures to Contract Execution Transactions (CETs). In this example, we
> must ensure that the buyer of the signatures pays if and only if they
> receive valid signatures for the CETs which are known.
>
> I believe that this is achievable in a relatively straightforward way if
> we were to use ZmnSCPxj's proposed payment points with scalars (as opposed
> to payment hashes with pre-images). The (Schnorr) signature seller could
> give the buyer their one-time public key, `R = k*G`, through which the
> buyer could compute the payment point whose scalar is the seller's
> signature: `sig*G = R + h(m, R)*A` where `A` is the seller's public key.
> Using this value as the payment point, the buyer could be assured that they
> pay if and only if they receive `sig` from the seller, where `sig` is the
> desired valid signature of `m`!
>
> Best,
> Nadav
> _______________________________________________
> Lightning-dev mailing list
> Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>
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Lloyd Fournier [ARCHIVE] /
npub1kh…y05yp
2023-06-09 12:55:38
in reply to nevent1q…8wst
Author Public Key
npub1khlhcuz0jrjwa0ayznq2q9agg4zvxfvx5x7jljrvwnpfzngrcf0q7y05ypPublished at
2023-06-09 12:55:38Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2019-07-17\n📝 Original message:\nHi Nadav,\n\nThis is cool idea. I always imagined oracles would either give their DLC\nsignatures away for free or work via a subscription model.\n\nThe downside to this proposal is that the seller of the signature knows\nwhich signature they're selling and therefore learns what kind of contract\nthe buyer must be involved in.\n\nLL\n\n\nOn Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 1:37 AM Nadav Kohen \u003cnadav at suredbits.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi All,\n\u003e\n\u003e I recently posted a proposal here for a scheme through which a trusted\n\u003e data provider can utilize the Lightning Network to privately sell data\n\u003e where data is received atomically with purchase.\n\u003e\n\u003e I've more recently been thinking about situations where a party, that is\n\u003e *not* trusted, is attempting to sell its signature to a known message. One\n\u003e example of a situation where this would be useful is if someone is trying\n\u003e to offer a DLC-like Option contract where they are essentially\n\u003e collateralizing themselves in a funding transaction and then selling their\n\u003e signatures to Contract Execution Transactions (CETs). In this example, we\n\u003e must ensure that the buyer of the signatures pays if and only if they\n\u003e receive valid signatures for the CETs which are known.\n\u003e\n\u003e I believe that this is achievable in a relatively straightforward way if\n\u003e we were to use ZmnSCPxj's proposed payment points with scalars (as opposed\n\u003e to payment hashes with pre-images). The (Schnorr) signature seller could\n\u003e give the buyer their one-time public key, `R = k*G`, through which the\n\u003e buyer could compute the payment point whose scalar is the seller's\n\u003e signature: `sig*G = R + h(m, R)*A` where `A` is the seller's public key.\n\u003e Using this value as the payment point, the buyer could be assured that they\n\u003e pay if and only if they receive `sig` from the seller, where `sig` is the\n\u003e desired valid signature of `m`!\n\u003e\n\u003e Best,\n\u003e Nadav\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Lightning-dev mailing list\n\u003e Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20190718/52d55a92/attachment.html\u003e",
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